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Ethnicity, birthplace, and achievement: the changing Hawaii mosaic

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PREFACE

The Office of Economic Opportunity's 1975 Census Update Survey of Hawaii not only provided valuable census-type data for the middle of the intercensal period but also made available unique information about many aspects of the state's population, information that has enabled us to do the analysis contained in this paper. We would like to thank James Dannemiller and the people of Survey Marketing and Services, Inc., who actually conducted the survey, for providing us with a computer tape of the data and for assistance in using that tape. At the Population Institute, many individuals helped in the course of the preparation of the paper, including Ruby Bussen, Victoria Ho, and Judith Tom (computer assistance), Mimi Paz (secretarial work), Clyde Kanehiro (graphics), Maureen St. Michel (word processing), Sandra Ward (editorial assistance), and Lois Bender (final production). We hope that the quality of this paper justifies the time and effort they have expended on it.

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ABSTRACT In Hawaii, there is considerable debate concerning immigration and in-migration, the present and likely future ethnic composition of the state, and whether the various ethnic groups are moving toward social and economic parity. Obtaining clear answers to these questions is hindered by the lack of adequate data from the U.S. Census. With the use of a 1975 U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity Census Update Survey and other local sources, however, we are able to address the above concerns and speculate on their likely implications for the future.

Our findings show that among the local-born, the most notable recent development has been the rise of the Orientals (essentially Japanese and Chinese) to equality with the *haoles* (essentially non-Portuguese and non-Puerto Rican Caucasians) on some social and economic indices and clear superiority on others. In contrast, local-born Filipinos and members of other groups remain disadvantaged on all dimensions used in this study. Mainland-born haoles initially suffer from high unemployment but are characterized by moderate income and high educational and occupational levels. Their income and homeownership levels appear to improve markedly with increasing duration of residence. Among Asian immigrants, recent arrivals are characterized by occupational and income levels far below what would be expected, given their educational levels. Longer residence appears to result in greatly improved income, but not occupational improvement. However, whereas immigrant Orientals are initially disadvantaged compared with immigrant Filipinos on many indices, the long-term Oriental immigrants hold a marked advantage over their Filipino counterparts on all indices. The paper offers cultural and historical explanations for these findings.

Differential birth and net migration rates for the various ethnic groups have resulted and will continue to result in markedly different age distributions and rates of population growth. A projection of the Hawaii population to the year 2000 demonstrates slower than expected growth for the haole population, a large increase in the proportion that is Filipino, and a large drop in the Oriental share of the population. These changing proportions suggest that the present dominance of the Orientals in the state government and local economy will come under increasing pressure.

Prior to World War II, Hawaii could be characterized as a multiracial society in which the *haoles*[1] (defined here as non-Portuguese and non-Puerto Rican Caucasians) were dominant both politically and economically. In the tumultuous years following the war, several of the local-born nonhaole groups became politically dominant and acquired a considerably greater share of economic power. The Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans (whom we will refer to collectively as "Orientals"—see below) became characterized by family incomes similar to those of haoles and well in excess of those of the other nonhaole groups,[2] came to dominate in the state government,[3] and now own most of the locally controlled business firms in the state. In contrast, the Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians (collectively termed "Hawaiians" in this study), Filipinos, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, mixed non-Hawaiians, and other smaller nonhaole groups have not achieved a strong voice in the state government and are characterized by incomes well below those of the haoles and Orientals.

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[1] The term *haole* literally means "foreigner" in Hawaiian. In everyday usage, it generally refers to Caucasians, except that Puerto Ricans (most of whom came soon after Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States in 1898) and Portuguese, who were originally brought over as plantation workers and are characterized by low socioeconomic status, are generally not considered to be haoles.

The existing economic and political relationships may be threatened by in-migration from the United States mainland and by immigration from abroad. Surveys of incoming passengers from the mainland indicate that some 270,000 intended residents moved to Hawaii between 1961 and 1975. (For yearly figures, see Hawaii, DPED, 1976, table 12.) Perhaps 95 percent of these were Caucasian. Immigration, which had been at relatively low levels since about 1930, suddenly revived after 1965 because of revisions in the immigration law. Between 1966 and 1975, some 60,000 legal immigrants moved to Hawaii, mostly from Asia. The potential effect of these movements to the state can be measured by the fact that there were only about 730,600 nonmilitary-related residents in Hawaii in 1975 (Hawaii, DPED, 1981: table 2). (Although the total population was larger, some 865,000, about 135,000 of this number were military-related individuals; most military-related individuals move out of Hawaii within five years of arrival or birth.)

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[2] A state survey taken in 1973 revealed median incomes among nonmilitary families to be as follows: Chinese, $15,200; Korean, $14,400; Japanese, $14,300; Caucasian, $14,100; Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian, $10,400; mixed non-Hawaiian, $9,700; Filipino, $9,600; Puerto Rican, $7,600; and Samoan, $6,900 (Hawaii, DOH, 1974, table 16). A 1964–66 survey of Oahu indicated the median Portuguese family income to be 40 percent below that of "other Caucasians" and 25 percent below the county average (Hawaii, DPED, 1968, table 13). See also our discussion of income.

[3] A survey taken in 1975 of all state employees except those in the Department of Education (which operates all public schools) and the University of Hawaii revealed that 51 percent of the employees were Japanese and an additional 8 percent were Chinese or Korean. It was estimated that Japanese comprised 36 percent of the state civilian working force and that Koreans and Chinese together contributed 6 percent (Haas, 1975:1–5). A 1974 survey of employees in the Department of Education indicated that Orientals comprised 66 percent of all teachers and 79 percent of all administrators (Kaser, 1974:A3).

Movement to Hawaii is an important political issue,[4] and the often openly expressed racially based sentiments to limit movement into Hawaii belie the image of the state as a place where persons of all races are welcomed and treated equally. Notwithstanding the passions aroused by the issue of newcomers in the Aloha State, there is a dearth of solid information concerning their numbers, characteristics, and effects on the economy. Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the local-born and migrant populations of Hawaii, addressing the following questions:

1. What are some of the population characteristics of the different ethnic groups in Hawaii? Are some groups growing more rapidly than others?
2. How do the ethnic groups fare in educational achievement, labor force participation and employment, occupation, income, and home ownership? Among the migrants, is there evidence that longer residence in Hawaii leads to greater economic well-being?
3. What are the implications of the answers to these questions for Hawaii's future?

DATA LIMITATIONS

Unfortunately, published U.S. census data are entirely inadequate for addressing these questions. In the first place, members of the Armed Forces and their dependents, who comprised about 15 percent of the state's population in 1975, are not tabulated separately in regular census reports. Their inclusion distorts many analyses, especially of the Caucasian population. Second, because of inconsistencies in tabulating race, results from different censuses are not comparable.[5] Furthermore, census practices in this regard do not correspond to how "race" is generally defined in Hawaii. Last, data on characteristics are rarely cross-classified by birthplace and, with the exception of a few tables on persons living elsewhere five years prior to the census, never by number of years lived in Hawaii.

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[4] The 1979–83 state administration proposed several measures to limit the number of people moving to the state. The nature of these measures is beyond the scope of this study; what are relevant are the sometimes blatant "we versus they" arguments used to support such measures and the apparent popularity of the measures among the local-born.

We have attempted to surmount these obstacles by using the 1975 U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Census Update Survey, which sampled all of the state except for Kauai County, with only 35,000 inhabitants, or 4 percent of the state's population (Survey and Marketing Services, Inc., 1976).[6] The OEO survey collected data on ethnicity in a manner consistent with the general practices in Hawaii, and asked each respondent how many years he or she had lived in Hawaii.

We exclude military personnel and their dependents from our study, as few can be regarded as permanent residents and most live on military bases and are thus somewhat isolated from the general population. For purposes of analysis, "Orientals" are often classified as one group, because of cultural similarities among the "East Asians," whereas the term "Asians" includes both Orientals and Filipinos. Filipinos are usually perceived by both themselves and the Orientals to be non-Oriental, and as an ethnic group are clearly in the "have-not" socioeconomic category (Samuels, 1963; Hyams, 1968; Masuoka, 1931). All other non-haole local-born ethnic groups are characterized by a common low socioeconomic status and are therefore classified together as "other" unless otherwise noted. We divide the non-Hawaii-born into three groups, depending on whether they have lived in Hawaii fewer than five years, five to ten years, or more than ten years. Among those born elsewhere, the emphasis is on mainland-born haoles and on foreign-born Asians, as those groups are dominant among migrants to Hawaii.

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[5] In 1960, for instance, except for part-Hawaiians, who were all classified as part-Hawaiians, offspring of white and nonwhite parents were classified by the race of the nonwhite parent, whereas in 1970 they were classified by the race of the father. In 1970, the category of part-Hawaiian was dropped and many who had been classified as part-Hawaiian in 1960 were reclassified as non-Hawaiian in 1970. In 1950, Puerto Ricans were enumerated as a separate nonwhite ethnic group, whereas in the 1960 and 1970 censuses they were counted as either white or black. For estimates of the extent to which census reclassifications affected indicated numbers by ethnic group in the 1960 and 1970 censuses, see Wright (1979, appendix B).

Compounding the problem is the fact that state vital statistics rely on definitions of race that correspond most closely to the 1950 census definitions and that have not changed to parallel changing census definitions.

[6] The survey volumes present the basic tabulations of the survey data. Data in this paper are from a computer tape of the survey data. They represent *estimates* of the population based on the Census Update Survey sample, which covered about 5 percent of the areas surveyed. Kauai County was excluded because a sample survey had been undertaken there a year earlier by another organization. Unfortunately, the Kauai data are not comparable to those collected in the Census Update Survey. However, the exclusion of Kauai has little effect on the state characteristics as indicated by data from the other counties.

As the Census Update Survey is a cross-sectional, point-in-time data source, we cannot use it to draw firm conclusions about what has happened over time. However, we do have data about groups who have lived in Hawaii for varying lengths of time since their arrival. This information can be used in two ways. First, for a characteristic, such as education, that does not change significantly for most people after arrival, we can compare the characteristics of the early arrivals and recent arrivals and conclude which group arrived with the background more likely to foster success. Second, for characteristics that are likely to change over time and to reflect achievements in the new environment, such as job status and income, we can interpret some patterns for different time-of-arrival groups as if they represent the experience of one cohort as it moved through time. (Insofar as the earlier immigrants were less educationally prepared to be successful, such interpretation probably underestimates the gains possible over time.) Such interpretations, although not entirely accurate, are probably justified and are the best we can do with the available data.

There is a possibility that changes made in the U.S. immigration laws in 1965 cloud our analysis. The changes affected the numbers of immigrants admitted and preference categories. The effect of the former change has been to increase greatly the number of immigrants from Asia, both to the United States as a whole and to Hawaii. The effect of the latter is harder to determine.

Until 1932, the great majority of immigrants to Hawaii were coming for work in the plantation economy, and the employers tended to select illiterate and poorly schooled individuals so that the immigrants would not expect better employment opportunities or be likely to demand better work conditions. After 1932, with the exception of one group of Filipinos recruited for plantation labor (and for purported labor union busting) in 1946, there was not much immigration to Hawaii until the 1965 changes in the law. Then, there began to be a sizable proportion of educated professionals moving to Hawaii along with the less well-educated, but this probably happened as much because the door to immigration from Asia was now open as because of specific changes in the law. For example, because educational levels have been rising in countries of origin, it is natural to find the educational level of immigrants rising. Thus we find much higher educational achievements of recent migrants (those who had lived in Hawaii 0–10 years at the time of the survey) compared with the educational levels of earlier immigrants.

FINDINGS

Characteristics of Hawaii's population

Almost half of the civilian (nonmilitary-related) population of Hawaii in 1975 was of Asian origin (Tables 1, 2). Some 18 percent were classified as haoles and the balance were listed as "others."[7]

The two factors that affect the ethnic composition of the state's population and changes in its composition are migration and natural increase. Effects of past levels of migration and natural increase are visible in the composition of the various ethnic groups by place of birth. In Hawaii, the Japanese, Chinese, and "others" are overwhelmingly local-born, whereas approximately half of the Filipinos and Koreans are foreign-born and seven-tenths of the haoles are mainland-born. Among persons 18 years of age and over, an even greater proportion (65 percent) of Filipinos are foreign-born and only 15 percent of the haoles are Hawaii-born (data not shown).

Migration data show large numbers of people arriving from both Asia and the U.S. mainland, with the latter dominating. Hawaii Visitors Bureau data show the arrival of 110,773 intended residents from the mainland during the years 1970–74 (Hawaii, DPED, 1981: table 27). Most did not remain in Hawaii, however; the Census Update Survey shows only about 37,500 haoles in 1975 who had lived in the state

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[7] These proportions are somewhat different than those found in the census and other surveys, because of the different ways of defining and assigning ethnicity. The exclusion of the military-related individuals results in a lower percentage of haoles than usually recorded. A 1976 State Department of Health survey gave roughly the same proportions as those from the Census Update Survey. Among the Asians, Japanese dominated and Filipinos were the second most numerous group.

TABLE 1 Civilian population of Hawaii (excluding Kauai), by ethnicity, place of birth, and years in Hawaii: 1975

Ethnic group	Total	Foreign-born, by years in Hawaii				U.S. mainland-born, by years in Hawaii				Hawaii-born
		Total	0–4	5–10	11+	Total	0–4	5–10	11+	
Total	695,000	90,500	27,000	24,500	37,900	114,100	44,600	37,100	32,100	481,200
Haole	128,300	9,300	3,300	2,800	3,200	90,600	37,500	28,300	24,700	26,700
Total Asian	329,600	71,600	19,600	18,300	32,500	7,700	2,000	2,700	3,000	247,900
Chinese	39,100	7,400	2,400	2,100	2,700	1,100	300	400	400	30,400
Japanese	201,300	18,400	3,000	2,500	12,400	4,900	1,100	1,600	2,100	177,300
Korean	9,700	4,300	2,400	1,000	1,000	400	100	200	100	4,900
Filipino	79,400	41,300	11,800	12,700	16,400	1,200	400	500	400	35,300
Other	237,100	9,600	4,000	3,300	2,200	15,800	5,100	6,100	4,400	206,600

NOTE: Figures in this and subsequent tables exclude military personnel and dependents, as well as the civilian population of Kauai, which had about 35,000 civilian residents in 1975. Totals may not equal sums because of nonresponse to some questions, because of rounding, and because persons born in U.S. possessions are included only in the totals. "Other" category includes 8,200 Hawaiians, 123,000 part-Hawaiians, 60,900 of mixed non-Hawaiian ancestry, 24,500 Portuguese, 5,800 Samoans, 4,000 Puerto Ricans, 1,900 blacks, 7,300 others, and 1,400 whose ethnicity was not stated.

SOURCE: OEO 1975 Census Update Survey.

TABLE 2 Percentage distribution of the civilian population of Hawaii, by ethnicity and place of birth: 1975

Ethnic group	Distribution by ethnicity				Distribution by place of birth			
	Total	Hawaii-born	Mainland-born	Foreign-born	Total	Hawaii-born	Mainland-born	Foreign-born
Total	100	100	100	100	100	69	17	13
Haole	18	6	79	12	100	21	71	7
Total Asian	47	52	7	73	100	75	2	21
Chinese	6	6	1	9	100	78	3	19
Japanese	29	37	4	11	100	88	2	6
Korean	1	1	*	9	100	51	4	44
Filipino	11	7	1	44	100	45	2	52
Other	34	43	14	15	100	87	7	4

NOTE: See note in Table 1.

* Less than 0.5 percent.

fewer than five years. By way of contrast, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization data for the period of July 1, 1970, to June 30, 1975, show more than 27,000 Asians (predominantly Filipinos) specifying Hawaii as their intended place of residence (Hawaii, DPED, 1981: table 29). The Census Update Survey found about 19,500 immigrant Asians living in the state fewer than five years. Thus, even though inmigrants from the mainland annually outnumber the immigrants from Asia by more than three to one, the relative contributions to population growth through *net* migration are not so greatly different.

The other factor affecting growth and ethnic composition is natural increase. Although mortality (about six per 1,000 in the general population in 1975) does differ somewhat among the groups (Park, Gardner, and Nordyke, 1979; Gardner, 1980), almost all of the differentials in natural increase result from differentials in fertility. Haole civilian fertility is quite low; in 1975 the crude birth rate was between 10 and 12 per 1,000, depending on whether both parents or only one was haole. Japanese and Chinese fertility is similar to that of the haoles, and that of the Koreans is slightly higher (about 15) only because of the influence of the foreign-born Koreans. In contrast, the crude birth rate of "others" in 1975 was in the neighborhood of 30 per 1,000 and that of the Filipinos about 25 (Nordyke, 1977).

The combined effects of migration and natural increase point to a decline in the Oriental share of the state's population in the future, less growth of the haole population than is suggested by the flood of intended residents from the mainland, and great growth and a rising share of the total population for the Filipinos and "others."

Age structure

One other demographic characteristic of Hawaii's population that is of interest to us here is the age structure. The age structure of a population is a product of past migration and natural increase. It is important because of its effects on fertility and mortality ("old" populations tend to have low birth rates and high death rates) and because of the effects of age composition on the calculation of various averages for a group, such as the average income. A summary measure, "median age," is used here as it is generally an accurate measure of the relative youthfulness of a given population.

In Hawaii, the Chinese have the highest median age. They are followed by other Orientals, Caucasians, Filipinos, and "others" (Table 3).

TABLE 3 Median age of the civilian population of Hawaii, by ethnicity, place of birth, and years in Hawaii: 1975

		Foreign-born, by years in Hawaii				U.S. mainland-born, by years in Hawaii				
Ethnic group	Total	Total	0–4	5–10	11+	Total	0–4	5–10	11+	Hawaii-born
Total	28	39	25	31	62	30	25	29	46	25
Haole	31	39	28	36	50	33	26	32	48	23
Total Asian	34	42	26	32	64	19	11	15	25	32
Chinese	38	37	25	33	54	*	*	*	*	39
Japanese	36	52	27	34	71	*	*	*	*	35
Korean	35	35	30	33	64	*	*	*	*	40
Filipino	28	39	25	31	63	*	*	*	*	17
Other	22	22	19	20	40	18	12	15	26	21

NOTE: See note in Table 1.

* Number of people in this group too small for meaningful calculations.

Among the foreign-born, however, the pattern is somewhat different, reflecting the periods in which the largest numbers (who were mostly young adults at the time of immigration) immigrated to Hawaii. Foreign-born Japanese are by far the oldest, followed by the other groups. Those living in Hawaii the longest periods naturally tend to be the oldest. Among the local-born, median ages are radically different, between 35 and 40 among the three Oriental populations but only 17 among the Filipinos. The high median ages of local-born Oriental groups reflect low birth rates in the past 15 years. The relatively low median age of the haoles reflects the presence of children born to inmigrants, whereas the extremely low Filipino median results from a moderately high birth rate as well as children born to immigrants. A youthful population of "others" is the result of both a high birth rate and the presence of children of interracial marriage who are classified as "mixed."

We employ this information on age structure as well as other information contained in this section as we examine other characteristics of the various groups and the implications of those characteristics for the future.

Educational attainment

Given the lack of skills needed for plantation labor, it is no surprise that most of the workers recruited from Asia for plantation work were poorly educated. The Oriental immigrants, however, were concerned about the education of their offspring and routinely made sacrifices for this purpose. As a result, the educational attainment of Hawaii-born Orientals of ages 25 and over is somewhat higher than that of the general Hawaii-born nonhaole population (Figure 1). Filipinos and "others" lag well behind. Local-born haoles are characterized by educational levels above those of the general population. In fact, the past dominance of the *kamaaina* (local-born)[8] elite is in part explainable by the partial monopoly they had on higher education before World War II,[9] and the continuing low economic status of the non-Oriental

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[8] *Kamaaina* in Hawaiian literally means "land child," that is, born in Hawaii. In everyday usage, the term is used to distinguish the long-established haole and other residents from the newer arrivals (*malihinis*).

[9] Prior to the twentieth century, haoles generally sent their children to private schools. "English Standard" schools, which required the passing of a test in English proficiency, were established in 1924 to accommodate the growing

FIGURE 1 Educational attainment of the civilian population of Hawaii, by ethnicity, place of birth, and broad age group: 1975



Note: Some groups were omitted because of small numbers in sample.

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nonhaole residents results in part from their generally low educational attainments.

Because the foreign-born Asians who have lived in Hawaii 0–4 and 5–10 years have similar educational attainments, as have mainland-born haoles, we have combined these groups into a single age category (0–10 years) for analysis. Figure 1 shows that two-fifths of the recent in-migrant haoles have completed at least four years of college, and very few have not graduated from high school. In contrast, almost two-fifths of the recent Filipino immigrants have not finished grade school, yet a fifth are college graduates. This bi-polar distribution among the Filipinos reflects the fact that many Filipinos currently moving to Hawaii are relatives of poorly educated immigrants already here, but a significant proportion of the new immigrants are professionals.

The recent Oriental immigrants are rather well educated in comparison with both the general population and the Hawaii-born Orientals. Whereas the educational attainments of the three nonimmigrant Oriental groups are somewhat similar, the immigrant Koreans and Japanese are somewhat better educated than the immigrant Chinese (data not shown).

When comparing the educational level of the Asian immigrants in Hawaii fewer than 11 years with that of the earlier arrivals, one cannot help but be impressed by the greatly improved educational levels of the recent immigrants. (Use of the concept of educational and other "improvement" above refers to higher levels of achievement for more recent arrival groups and not to changes over time for a particular group.) Even among the long-term immigrants, however, the educational advantage of the Orientals over the Filipinos is evident. Also striking are the high educational levels of the long-term mainland-born haoles. They are almost as well educated as the more recent in-migrants, even though general educational levels have improved greatly during the past few years.

In addition to data on all people over 25 years of age, Figure 1 contains information on individuals 25–29 years old to allow comparisons for the age group that is at a critical stage in the occupational career.

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number of haole children who could not attend private schools. The language requirement effectively excluded most Asians from these "public" schools. Only in the 1930s was the high school system expanded, in response to pressure from the Roosevelt Administration. Previously, most nonwhites reaching adulthood had no chance to attend high school.

Young adult local-born Orientals have a high level of educational attainment, similar to that of the recent haole in-migrants, and the educational attainment of the recent young Oriental immigrants is about as good. By contrast, a third of the young adult Filipino immigrants have not completed high school. Young adult haole in-migrants are characterized by educational levels similar to those of all adult haole in-migrants and to those of the local-born Orientals 25–29.

Among the young Hawaii-born adults, it is evident that the haoles have fallen behind the Orientals in educational attainment and do not seem to be significantly better educated than the local-born haoles in older age groups. This apparent lack of upward educational movement among the local haoles has undoubtedly facilitated the economic rise of the Orientals. The young adult local-born Filipinos lag considerably behind both the Orientals and the haoles; more than half have not progressed beyond high school. However, they are still much better educated than the local-born "others." When it is considered that the large majority of the "others" category–i.e., the Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians, the Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, and most in the "mixed" classification–have local roots that extend back for at least three generations, whereas most of the local-born Filipinos are offspring of poorly-educated immigrants, it is apparent that the educational levels of Filipinos are rising more rapidly than those of the non-Oriental nonhaole groups.

In seeking to explain educational differentials in Hawaii, one finds a wealth of literature pertaining to cultural values and their effects on education and educational levels. Much of this literature, however, is speculative and appears to be based more on conventional wisdom than on rigorous controlled study. In citing literature on educational levels that is germane to our findings, we must warn the reader of its speculative nature and the possibility that we have ourselves unconsciously adopted some of the biases found in the literature.

Perhaps most difficult to explain is why the educational levels of the young local-born haole adults have fallen behind those of their Oriental counterparts. A partial answer lies in the high aspirations that Oriental parents have for their children and their ability to control their children's behavior in this regard.[10] In addition, changes in the

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[10] For an excellent discussion of how third-generation Japanese American (*sansei*) parents control the aspirations and behavior of their children, see Johnson (1972).

United States society that have led to a weakening of the work ethic appear to have affected the local haoles more than the Orientals.[11] Lastly, there has been a disproportionate out-migration of well-educated haoles to the mainland (Wright, 1979: chap. 4). It may be that if there were no out-migration, the educational levels of the local haoles would be similar to those of the Orientals.

In explaining the rather low educational performance of the local-born Filipinos, it is pertinent to note that around 80 percent of the Filipino immigrants have come from the rural Ilocos region, where educational facilities are relatively few and may not be particularly conducive to "getting ahead" (Lasman et al., 1971). In addition, local-born Filipinos tend to be peer-group oriented (Alcantara, 1973), and teenage peers generally do not provide strong academic motivation.

All of the major groups in the "other" category are characterized by a lack of emphasis on educational attainment; thus, the poor showing among the local-born "others" is not surprising. Hawaiian teenagers in particular are peer-oriented and tend to be unresponsive to adult authority represented by the school teacher.[12] Most Portuguese immigrants came from impoverished Madeira and generally regarded one's status in life as being fixed from generation to generation. Hence, education was never stressed.[13] This is reflected in educational levels well below those of the Hawaiians and Filipinos (data not shown). Puerto Ricans who came to Hawaii have been characterized by high indices of social disorganization (e.g., crime and mental breakdown), as well as placing a low value on education (Brooks, 1948). It is difficult to characterize the mixed non-Hawaiian category, but it appears that the propensity to intermarry (and hence produce mixed offspring) is inversely related to occupational status (Schmitt, 1965), and it may be that a cultural conflict between parents may reduce their control of the aspirations and behavior of their children.

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[11] Dispassionate scholarly evidence is lacking for this assertion, but the senior author, in conducting a 1975 study of out-migration that involved persons graduating from a Hawaii high school in 1964, was impressed by the finding that all of the local-born participants who could be considered part of the "counter culture" were haoles (Wright, 1979: chap. 10).

[12] Of several scholarly articles on this subject, perhaps the best is by McNasser and Hugo (1972).

[13] Fuchs (1961:56–59) has written a poignant passage on the Portuguese, who before World War II worked largely in plantation supervisory positions. Appreciative of their rise from abject poverty in Portugal, trusting in the haoles to protect their intermediate status, and visualizing their place in life as being static from generation to generation, they watched complacently as the subservient Oriental plantation workers pushed their children to academic success. Their reaction when the world changed greatly after World War II and the Orientals suddenly surpassed them was to feel betrayed and to blame the Orientals rather than the haoles. Many Hawaiians, who did not as a group stress education, trusted the haole elite to award them political patronage and to keep the Orientals subordinate. They too were relative losers in the tumultuous postwar changes.

In summary, among adults in Hawaii 25 years old and older, the haoles are characterized by high educational attainment, the Orientals are slightly above the overall state average, and the Filipinos and "others" fall significantly below the state average in educational attainment. The recent immigrants are much better educated than those who came before the changes in the immigration law in 1965, although large numbers of Filipino immigrants continue to have less than a grade school education. Haole in-migrants from the mainland are characterized by high educational levels.

Among the persons 25–29, rapid educational "improvement" among the local-born Orientals and the lack of a corresponding rise among the local haoles is evident. The young Orientals have the highest educational attainment of all local-born groups and are educationally about equal to the in-migrants from the mainland. Although the local Filipinos lag behind the haoles and Orientals, their educational advantage over that of the long-term Filipino immigrants is nevertheless impressive. Disturbing are the low educational levels among the young adult, local-born non-Oriental nonhaoles, a fact that has contributed to the shifting of economic and political power to the Orientals. Young adult Oriental immigrants, by virtue of their education, seem well equipped to compete for the more desired jobs, but many of the young Filipino immigrants continue to be poorly educated.

Labor-force participation and employment

In this section only ages 18–64 are considered, as most persons below the age of 18 are in school and most above the age of 64 are retired. We also treat the age groups 18–24 and 25–64 separately, as many in the former group are attending college or handicapped by inexperience in holding employment, and most females above age 25 are married and many have children. We will not concern ourselves with the labor-force participation rates of males, since they are high and similar among all groups of adults.

Although the cost of living in Hawaii is nearly 20 percent above the national average, wages for given jobs are generally somewhat below the national average. This disparity has resulted in a very high labor-force participation rate (LFPR) among both sexes in Hawaii. According to the 1970 census, Hawaii ranked first and third in the proportions of adult females and males, respectively, in the labor force. The 1970 census also revealed an unemployment rate that was third lowest in the nation. However, unemployment in Hawaii began to rise after the census and for some years was generally above the national average. This fact fueled a local debate concerning the economic merits of newcomers to the state.

Among Hawaii-born females, LFPRs are highest among the Orientals and next highest for Filipinos (Table 4). The low rates for haoles and "others" stand in sharp contrast to those of the Asians. Rates for those 18–24 are generally slightly higher than for those 25–64.

There are several reasons for the high LFPRs of the local-born Oriental females. These women tend to be well-educated, as we have seen, and trained for clerical and professional jobs, as teachers and dental assistants, for example, that have traditionally been dominated by females. A strong desire for economic well-being (as well as cultural values conducive to economic success) characterizes the Oriental population; in many cases both spouses work to achieve this goal. A low birth rate and the proximity of grandparents to look after children also facilitate the employment of married Oriental females. The issue of the availability of grandparents to provide baby-sitting and its relation to female labor force participation in Hawaii has received little attention in research.

At the other extreme are the very low LFPRs of local-born Portuguese and Puerto Rican females (34 and 27 percent, respectively, in the 25–64 age group–data not shown). These rates appear to reflect strongly ingrained attitudes that wives should be full-time homemakers and mothers. At least part of the rather low LFPRs for Hawaiian females (53 percent in the older group) may arise from a syndrome of having illegitimate children as teenagers and thereafter becoming dependent on welfare assistance. (See Ryder, 1979, for an excellent discussion of the causes and consequences of this syndrome.) Also a possible factor is the fear of many Hawaiian males that their wives may "misbehave" in a job situation (Howard, 1971). Lastly, the common Hawaiian pattern of having many children and spacing them closely undoubtedly hinders participation in the labor force; indeed,

TABLE 4 Labor-force participation rates of females and unemployment rates of males and females, by age, ethnicity, place of birth, and years in Hawaii: 1975

	Female labor-force participation rate		Unemployment rate			
			Ages 18–24		Ages 25–64	
Group	Ages 18–24	Ages 25–64	Male	Female	Male	Female
Hawaii-born	65	60	13	14	4	6
Orientals	71	68	11	7	1	3
Filipinos	63	64	11	17	2	4
Haoles	53	52	24	27	6	7
Others	57	50	14	18	6	7
Born elsewhere						
In Hawaii 0–4 years						
Foreign-born Orientals	53	53	*	8	7	10
Foreign-born Filipinos	74	58	17	20	6	11
Mainland-born haoles	72	56	15	12	5	15
In Hawaii 5–10 years						
Foreign-born Orientals	*	55	*	*	10	12
Foreign-born Filipinos	*	68	*	*	2	8
Mainland-born haoles	67	62	17	22	7	6
In Hawaii 11+ years						
Foreign-born Orientals	*	60	*	*	0	3
Foreign-born Filipinos	*	62	*	*	0	3
Mainland-born haoles	*	57	*	*	4	7

NOTE: See note in Table 1. Labor-force participation rate is defined as all people in a given age and sex group working or seeking work divided by total number of people in that group. The unemployment rate is defined as all persons in a given age and sex group seeking work divided by total number of people in that group.

* Sample size too small (fewer than 1,000 in expanded population) for accurate estimate.

this practice affects the Filipinos also and all of the major groups included in "others" to at least some degree.

The low LFPR of local-born haole females is the most puzzling. Perhaps part of it reflects attitudes derived in an era in which most haole families were well-to-do without the necessity of wives working. Another possible factor is the tradition for well-off local-born haole wives to be active in nonremunerative service organizations.[14] However, these are only partial explanations at best, as most of the local-born haoles are not part of the old elite. Another possibility is that some of the Portuguese and Puerto Ricans (or those of Portuguese-haole or Puerto-Rican-haole ancestry) chose "Caucasian except Portuguese" identification on the Census Update Survey. The survey indicated LFPRs of only 34 and 27 percent, respectively, among Portuguese and Puerto Rican females. Whatever the reasons for the ethnic differentials among the local-born, the female labor-force participation patterns have certainly contributed to the economic rise of the Orientals as a group and to the continued economic disadvantage of those classified as "others."

Among female young adult migrants to Hawaii, relatively high labor-force participation rates characterize the Filipinos and the haoles, but not the Orientals. Among the older migrants, however, Filipinos tend to have the highest rates. Among the older migrant Oriental females, particularly the Japanese, there is a clear pattern of increasing labor-force participation with duration of residence. Only 38 percent of Japanese females living in Hawaii fewer than five years are in the labor force, but this figure rises to 46 percent among those in the state five to ten years and 59 percent among the long-term immigrants (data not shown). In Japan it is customary for females to leave the labor force after marriage, and it appears that this cultural norm does not change immediately after a move to Hawaii. However, economic realities in Hawaii do appear eventually to produce a participation rate not significantly different from those of the other Asian groups. The LFPRs of both Filipinos and haoles rise and then fall with increasing duration of residence; why this is the case is not clear but it may be related to life-cycle variables not considered here.

Turning our attention to unemployment rates, we find that among the general population the unemployment rate is much more severe among those between ages 18 and 24 than it is among older adults and that females are more likely than males to be unemployed. Among the Hawaii-born, the Orientals stand out by virtue of relatively low unemployment, especially among the younger females and all adults of ages 25 and over. Local-born Filipinos, except younger females, also have much lower unemployment rates than the state average. In contrast, unemployment is much higher among the local-born haoles and other non-Asians. The very high unemployment rate among the young adult haoles is especially noteworthy. Although unemployment rates in part reflect a differential willingness to take unattractive jobs, they also constitute a measure of "connectiveness" in the local economy. Prior to World War II, when most employers were haoles who favored hiring haoles, the young haoles had employment advantages over all others. With the partial shift of economic power to the Orientals, the haoles have lost this advantage. As most employers are now either Oriental or haole, and ethnicity or kinship is still a consideration in the hiring practices of many small employers, the Filipinos and "others" probably face the largest obstacles among locals entering the job market.

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[14] The predominance of familiar kamaaina names among the benefactors, fund raisers, and other workers for such civic institutions as the Honolulu Academy of Arts and Honolulu Symphony Orchestra is striking.

Among all recent migrants of ages 18–24, the unemployment rates are comparable to those of young adults in the general population. Such is not the case among the older migrants. Here the newcomers, especially the females, apparently face well-entrenched competition and suffer from the lack of local contacts. The particularly high unemployment rate among the recently arrived haole females is noteworthy because it is they who are most likely to complain of discrimination in hiring practices.[15] Whereas the unemployment rate is much lower among Filipinos and haole females living in Hawaii five to ten years than among their newly-arrived counterparts, the reverse is true among the Orientals and haole males. Why this should be the case is puzzling, as disadvantages associated with newcomer status should decline with duration of residence. We have already noted that most "intended residents" from the mainland leave within a few years. One would expect the unemployed to be disproportionately represented among the out-migrants. One possibility is that social, not economic, considerations stimulate most of the subsequent out-migration of the haole in-migrants.[16] Another possible explanation is that many of the well-educated recent arrivals may initially accept employment well below their training and capabilities, but some of these may later become unemployed as they try to obtain employment more commensurate with their backgrounds and aspirations. The virtual absence of unemployment among the long-term Asian immigrant males, and the low rates among the females, suggests the existence of values that enable the immigrants to hold employment well, once the initial disadvantages associated with their immigrant status are surmounted. In contrast, unemployment, especially among females, remains a problem among the long-term haole in-migrants.

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[15] This topic is constantly discussed but seldom written about. A newly arrived haole woman wrote to the "on-the-job" advisor in a local Honolulu newspaper to complain about job discrimination and was advised to take a more positive attitude toward finding employment. The response from other outraged in-migrant haole women who believed that they were victims of job discrimination was overwhelming. Most employment complaints made to the Hawaii State Fair Employment Agency are by haoles; the second largest number is made by blacks. (See Woo, 1975.)

In summary, local Oriental women are characterized by a very high labor-force participation rate, whereas the opposite is true among local haole and "other" women. LFPRs among the female Asian immigrants and the haole in-migrants tend to be intermediate. Local-born Asians, whether Oriental or Filipino, are characterized by low unemployment; the opposite is true of local-born haoles and "others." Unemployment is high among recent arrivals of all groups, but declines among the Filipinos with increasing duration of residence and is low among all long-term Asian immigrants. In contrast, unemployment remains something of a problem among the long-term haole migrants. These rates of labor-force participation and unemployment have direct consequences for the incomes of the various groups, which we will examine below.

Occupation

In this section we are concerned with the occupational distribution only of employed persons of ages 25–64, because the occupations of young adults, especially those in college and working part-time, are often poor predictors of later occupations. Occupations are classified into broad groups, both because of sample size and because of the similarities within these groups. Major attention is given to the categories "professional/technical/management," "clerical/sales," "construction," and "service." The first category generally requires a college education, clerical jobs usually require at least a high school diploma, remuneration in construction jobs is generally higher than that in other blue-collar employment, and service jobs are characterized by minimal educational requirements and low salaries.

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[16] Wright's (1979) study of out-migration from Hawaii revealed that almost all of those local-born out-migrants who later returned to Hawaii did so for social rather than economic reasons. There is a growing body of literature that suggests that most return migrants are not "economic failures."

In Hawaii, the most important and rapidly growing economic sector is tourism. Most of the jobs generated by tourism are in the low-paying service sector. The second most important economic sector, national defense, has been stable in recent years. Plantation agriculture, the most important economic sector prior to World War II, has dropped to a distant third in importance. Although sugar and pineapple production have remained fairly steady, the plantation labor force is only a small fraction of prewar levels. Overall, the economy has been growing rapidly, notwithstanding high unemployment levels throughout the early 1970s.

These trends are reflected in the fact that in 1975 more than a fifth of all employment (regardless of sex and age) was in the service sector, nearly a quarter was in trade, and one-eleventh was in construction. The share in construction was almost double the national average. By contrast, only 3 percent was in agriculture, and an additional 7 percent was in manufacturing, mostly the processing of agricultural products (Hawaii, DPED, 1976: table 142).

Occupational characteristics of adults 25–64 years of age are shown in Table 5. Among the Hawaii-born males, the Orientals and haoles have a similar occupational distribution, with a much greater concentration in the "better" occupations than the Filipinos and "others." More than half of the Koreans and Chinese males are in professional occupations (data not shown). The local-born Filipino and "other" males have high proportions in construction and somewhat higher than average proportions in service occupations. Among the Hawaii-born females, the occupational structure is most advantageous among the haoles, with the Oriental females lagging far behind. Again, the Filipinos and "others" trail far behind the haoles and Orientals. These differentials are consistent with the earlier noted variations for educational attainment.

Among those in Hawaii 0–4 years, there are sharp differences among the three groups under consideration. A majority of both haole males and females are in professional occupations, and low proportions of both are in service jobs. It seems clear that older mainlanders moving to Hawaii have highly specialized occupational skills. In the 18–24 age group, however, 27 and 29 percent of the haole males and females, respectively, are in service occupations (data not shown). This finding seems to support the local stereotype of the young mainlanders who come to Hawaii to enjoy the sun and the surf while supporting themselves with service jobs.

High proportions of Oriental male immigrants living in Hawaii fewer than five years are to be found in the professional and service occupations, but only a few in construction. In contrast, few of the Filipino recent immigrant males hold professional or clerical employment and many are in the service and construction sectors. A plausible explanation of these patterns is that in Asia there is a tradition that the well-educated are expected to shun "dirty" work such as construction jobs. Therefore, many of the Orientals with high school education who cannot find clerical employment opt for "clean" service jobs in preference to more remunerative jobs requiring hard physical labor. Filipinos, most of whom are poorly educated and from rural backgrounds, have no such scruples about taking "dirty" jobs that pay well. According to the Census Update Survey, among Oriental and Filipino males of ages 25–64, 81 and 42 percent, respectively, who had completed 12 years of education and lived in Hawaii less than five years were employed in service occupations. Also noteworthy is that many immigrant Filipino males are continuing to come to the plantations.

Among Asian immigrant females living in Hawaii fewer than five years, two-fifths of both the Filipinos and the Orientals are in service occupations. However, the remaining Oriental females are much more likely to be engaged in clerical employment than the Filipinos. That among recent Oriental immigrants a much lower proportion of females than of males are in professional employment undoubtedly reflects the fact that most Asian brides of American servicemen are not college-educated and that immigrant Oriental males moving as professionals are often accompanied by wives who are considerably less well educated.

Among those in Hawaii five to ten years, the most striking feature is the degree to which the occupational characteristics of all groups under consideration resemble those of their counterparts of fewer than five years' residence. There are some differences, however. Among the

TABLE 5 Occupational distribution of employed members of the years in Hawaii: 1975

Group	Male			
	Professional/ technical/ managerial	Clerical/ sales	Service	Construction
All persons	36	11	10	19
Hawaii-born				
Oriental	39	15	6	18
Filipino	18	11	11	27
Haole	37	13	6	20
Others	22	7	12	26
In Hawaii 0–4 years				
Foreign-born Orientals	48	11	33	5
Foreign-born Filipinos	9	6	25	30
Mainland-born haoles	56	13	6	11
In Hawaii 5–10 years				
Foreign-born Orientals	41	15	26	7
Foreign-born Filipinos	11	5	20	33
Mainland-born haoles	60	10	6	11
In Hawaii 11+ years				
Foreign-born Orientals	39	11	22	16
Foreign-born Filipinos	9	4	17	22
Mainland-born haoles	62	10	8	7

NOTE: See note in Table 1. Sums may not equal 100 percent because of rounding.

a Includes processing, machine trades, bench work, and miscellaneous occupations.

b Construction included in "other" category because fewer than 0.5 percent of all employed

c About two-thirds of this total are seamstresses.

Oriental and, to a lesser extent, the Filipino females, there is evidence of a strong movement out of service and into clerical employment with increasing duration of residence. A small shift away from the service occupations is also apparent among both Oriental and Filipino males. Surprisingly, the proportion of Orientals in Hawaii five to ten years and working in professional occupations is lower than among those in Hawaii for fewer than five years, for both sexes. We noted civilian labor force, ages 25–64, by sex, ethnicity, place of birth, and

			Female					
Farming/fishing	Other[a]	Total	Professional/technical/managerial	Clerical/sales	Service	Farming/fishing	Other[b]	Total
4	20	100	30	42	17	1	10	100
3	19	100	30	42	17	1	10	100
6	28	100	22	45	19	4	9	99
3	21	100	45	36	13	0	6	100
5	29	101	28	39	24	1	9	101
0	3	100	17	25	42	0	17	101
14	16	100	15	9	39	7	30[c]	100
3	11	100	53	28	12	0	3	96
2	10	101	10	45	27	0	18	100
13	18	100	14	20	32	10	23	99
3	11	101	49	36	12	0	3	100
2	11	101	18	33	30	1	20	102
20	28	100	9	22	46	8	16	101
1	12	100	54	38	7	0	1	100

females are in construction.

earlier that the educational levels of Asians in Hawaii 0–4 and 5–10 years are similar. It appears that immigrants who initially do not find professional employment do not later do so either, perhaps because professional licensing requirements and other obstacles prove to be insurmountable.

It should be kept in mind that migrants in Hawaii more than ten years tend to be less well educated than the more recent arrivals. Thus, that more than three-fifths and five-ninths of the employed long-term haole males and females, respectively, are in professional occupations is indicative of great success. (Or it may be that the nonprofessionals are more likely to leave the state.) Many of the poorly educated immigrant Asian females appear to have been stranded in the service occupations, but movement out of the service occupations with time seems to be the case among the males. (As this is a cross-sectional analysis, we cannot definitely state what types of jobs were held by the migrants in the past.) No fewer than a fifth of the long-term Filipino male immigrants are in agriculture. The fact that similar proportions of Oriental immigrants in the 5–10 year and 11+ year duration groups are in professional employment shows that a much higher proportion of the well educated in the latter group hold professional jobs. Either the long-term immigrants arrived when entry requirements for professional jobs were less stringent for newcomers than they are today, or upward mobility of the well-educated immigrants eventually takes place. Probably both factors are operative.

In summary, the Orientals and haoles tend to have the highest occupational levels, the Filipinos and "others" trailing considerably behind. But it is the in-migrant haoles who have the most advantageous occupational structure. Notwithstanding their complaints of discrimination against them in the local job market, haole in-migrants are doing very well indeed. High proportions of Oriental immigrants are in both the professional and service occupations. High proportions of Filipino immigrants are in both service and agricultural jobs.

The tourist industry is highly dependent on the immigrants. The availability of immigrants willing to take low-paying service jobs has certainly fueled the economic growth of the state. Given the reluctance of the Hawaii-born to work on plantations, the continued arrival of Filipinos has also been an economic blessing in the agricultural sector. Whether the economic role of the haole newcomers is positive or not is more problematic, as unemployment in the state is a continual problem and the structure of the economy favors the growth of service rather than professional jobs. Given the high educational levels and job aspirations of young local-born Oriental adults, it is evident that it is they who are in strongest occupational competition with the in-migrants from the mainland.

Income

The most easily quantified measure of "success" is income. In this section we examine the median income of families and of employed males and females between ages 25 and 64 (Table 6). Among the Hawaii-born Orientals, the median incomes of families headed by Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans are $20,700, $19,700, and $19,600, respectively. Far behind are families headed by local haoles, and family incomes among the local-born Filipinos and "others" lag even farther behind. By ethnic group, the median family incomes for the Hawaii-born "others" are as follows: Hawaiian, $14,600; mixed non-Hawaiian,

TABLE 6 Median income of families and employed individuals by ethnicity, place of birth, and years in Hawaii: 1975

Group	Families[a]	Employed persons, ages 25–64 Male	Female
All persons	$16,500	$12,800	$6,600
Hawaii-born			
Oriental	19,900	13,500	7,600
Filipino	14,100	11,100	6,200
Haole	16,000	14,300	6,200
Other	13,800	12,000	6,100
In Hawaii 0–4 years			
Foreign-born Oriental	7,900	7,600	4,300
Foreign-born Filipino	13,100	6,400	4,200
Mainland-born haole	16,300	14,600	8,000
In Hawaii 5–10 years			
Foreign-born Oriental	13,700	11,200	6,200
Foreign-born Filipino	16,000	9,300	4,600
Mainland-born haole	19,100	16,000	7,800
In Hawaii 11+ years			
Foreign-born Oriental	11,800	13,900	5,900
Foreign-born Filipino	11,700	9,900	4,900
Mainland-born haole	21,000	17,100	7,800

NOTE: See note in Table 1.

a Families headed by individuals of the specified characteristics.

$12,800; Portuguese, $12,700; Samoan, $9,900; black, $9,800; Puerto Rican, $9,600; and all others, $12,400. These differences reflect the combined effects of education, occupation, female labor force participation, unemployment rates, and other factors discussed below.

It is surprising that among families headed by persons in Hawaii fewer than five years, the Filipino immigrants appear to be doing almost as well as the local Filipinos and much better than the recent immigrant Oriental families, especially as much higher proportions of the Orientals are in professional occupations. This finding is a function of a higher family size for Filipinos, with more workers per family (see below).

Notwithstanding their concentration in professional employment, recently arrived haoles who head families have a median income that is slightly below the state median and close to the median of families headed by Hawaii-born haoles. The median family incomes of Oriental newcomers are far below those of local families with similar occupational and educational characteristics.

Among families headed by persons in Hawaii five to ten years, "improvement" in all groups, especially the Orientals, is evident. Families headed by Filipino immigrants in Hawaii five to ten years appear to be more affluent than those headed by local Filipinos, and families headed by haoles are, on the average, almost as well-to-do financially as those headed by local Orientals.

The apparent drop in the family incomes of the Asian immigrants in Hawaii 11 and more years results not only from their lower educational levels but also from their greater age—most of the Oriental and many of the Filipino family heads being retired. The median income of families headed by long-term haole migrants is the highest of any of the groups discussed.

In explaining income differentials, it is important to note that the median family income of a given group is heavily influenced by the average number of working family members. Among the Asian groups, the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans on the one hand, and the Filipinos on the other represent roughly opposite patterns. Among families headed by immigrants in Hawaii fewer than five years, there is an average of 2.13 employed persons per Filipino family, compared with 1.02 per Japanese family (data not shown). This average increases to 2.40 among families headed by Filipinos in Hawaii five to ten years. In contrast, the average number of employed persons per local-born Japanese family is 1.94 but it is only 1.57 per local-born Filipino family. Many of the Hawaii-born Japanese families contain children attending college and working part-time. Were these children to live away from home while attending college (a much more common pattern among Caucasians on the mainland), the family incomes of the Hawaii-born Japanese would be somewhat lower, as the children's earnings would not be counted as family income. In addition, many elderly Japanese parents live with their children. Were they to live away and be counted as separate families, the median income of Japanese families would be lower. In the case of the immigrant Filipinos, there are many extended families containing several working adults who live in the same house. (See Lasmon et al., 1971, for a detailed description of the common living arrangements of Filipino immigrants.) This pattern increases family incomes even though individual incomes may be very low. In contrast, the average household headed by Hawaii-born Filipinos is nuclear and, since most Hawaii-born Filipinos are young, unlikely to contain gainfully employed children. Irrespective of migration status, haole families contain an average of fewer than 1.5 employed members per household.

One other feature of the local Oriental population that contributes to family income is the late average age at marriage. The singulate mean age at marriage[17] among the Hawaii-born Orientals is 28 and 26 among the males and females, respectively (data not shown). It is two years older than the average for Oriental immigrants and three to five years older than for all other groups considered here. This characteristically late marriage among the Hawaii-born Orientals of both sexes is conducive to economic success, because late marriage reduces the number of potential children, facilitates (and results from) the gaining of higher education and labor force experience, and increases the potential economic resources that can be brought to a marriage.

The above analysis illustrates that family incomes are as much a function of family structure and cultural values as they are of individual incomes. In fact, the relationships between the various groups under consideration are substantially altered when the incomes of employed individuals between the ages 25 and 64 are considered.

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[17] For a description of the technique for deriving the singulate mean age at marriage, see Hajnal (1953).

Employed Hawaii-born Oriental females earn much more, on the average, than the Hawaii-born females in other groups. Among the Hawaii-born males, the haoles rank first, followed closely by the Orientals (although the Koreans, with a median of $14,700, rank slightly ahead of the haoles); the Filipinos and "others" lag well behind.

Among those born elsewhere, the most notable features are the extremely low incomes of immigrants of both sexes, and the (apparent) marked improvement in the income of males over time (apparent because we do not know past incomes for individuals). In fact, the median income of the long-term Oriental immigrant males is comparable to that of their local-born counterparts, and the long-term haole male migrants have a median income that is 25 percent greater than the state average. Also apparent is an increasing differential in favor of the immigrant Orientals, *vis-à-vis* their Filipino counterparts, with increasing duration of residence in Hawaii.

Data on income within specific occupation-education groups (not shown) demonstrate that the income levels of the recent immigrants are much lower than either educational or occupational levels justify. For example, the median incomes of professionally employed Asian immigrant males and females living in Hawaii fewer than five years were 60 and 52 percent, respectively, of the state medians for all males and females. Among the employed Asian in-migrants with a college degree, the medians were 54 percent of the state medians for males and females. It appears that the living standards of the local residents are being indirectly subsidized by the minimal salaries of the recent immigrants. In contrast, median incomes of both the male and female recent haole in-migrants are comparable to the state medians when occupation and income are controlled. However, whereas there is marked improvement over time in the case of the males (possibly in part an artifact of selective out-migration), the same is not true of the females. Data for the females show a small rise in the five-to-ten-year group but then a decline almost to the levels of the zero-to-four-year group when education and occupation are controlled.

Differences between the haole in-migrants and Asian immigrants again reflect the much greater obstacles faced by the immigrants. Not only are the haole newcomers fluent in English and knowledgeable about procedures for finding a suitable job, but also many of the large firms (which generally pay higher salaries than the smaller ones) are mainland-based, and the in-migrants in some cases are at an advantage over local nonwhites in obtaining employment in them. For instance, pidgin English, commonly spoken by local-born nonwhites, is unlikely to make a favorable impression on a prospective employer who has recently arrived from the mainland. A strong local norm against "showing off" may also be a hindrance in a job interview if the prospective employer values self-assertiveness. Undoubtedly, a large number of the male haole in-migrants were transferred to Hawaii by their companies of employment.

In summary, the median family and unrelated incomes show the local Orientals and long-term in-migrant haoles to rank the highest. Notable are the very low incomes of families headed by recent immigrant Orientals and the much higher incomes of the recent immigrant Filipino families. When only employed persons of ages 25–64 are considered, however, a rather different picture emerges. Here, the in-migrant haoles in Hawaii for many years are shown to rank economically well above even the local Orientals. The success enjoyed by long-term immigrant Oriental males is reflected in a high median income. By contrast, the low median incomes of recent Filipino immigrants and their slower improvement over time is also apparent. Low relative median incomes among the Hawaii-born Filipinos and "others" reflect a wide socioeconomic gulf between them and the more affluent haoles and local Orientals.

Home ownership

Home ownership is discussed here because housing costs in Hawaii are perhaps double the national average and well above those of any other state except possibly Alaska. In 1979, the average single-family house and condominium on Oahu sold for $145,800 and $93,500, respectively, and costs were probably comparable on the Outer Islands (Gomes, 1980). To be able to purchase one's home represents both financial success and protection against further runaway housing costs.

Among the civilian heads of households in the Census Update Survey, 58 percent owned or were buying their homes, including 4 percent in condominium arrangements. Because of the high costs of single-family housing, much of the housing stock being built today is in multistory condominium projects. Notwithstanding the huge inflation in housing costs, the proportion of families in owned housing has increased since 1970, a reflection of the willingness to make huge financial sacrifices to obtain home ownership and with it a measure of financial security. The rate of home ownership varies greatly by ethnic group and the number of years lived in Hawaii (Figure 2).

Whereas 77, 73, and 70 percent of housing units occupied by Hawaii-born Chinese, Korean, and Japanese heads of households, respectively, are owned or being purchased, the corresponding proportions for housing units occupied by Hawaii-born haoles, Filipinos, and "others" are 60, 47, and 53 percent, respectively. Again, it appears that the local-born Orientals have surpassed the local-born haoles in socioeconomic status, leaving the other groups far behind. The relatively poor showing of the Hawaii-born Filipinos and "others" in regard to home ownership is disturbing, for home ownership is becoming an increasingly difficult goal to reach in Hawaii.

Among those in Hawaii fewer than five years, home ownership rates are roughly a third of those of the Hawaii-born. It is noteworthy that the ownership rate among Filipinos is more than double that of the Orientals and comparable to that of the newly arrived haoles. The extended family pattern common among Filipino immigrants enables Filipino families with several employed adults to pool their resources and buy housing much more rapidly than the nucleated newcomer Oriental and haole families that often contain only one working adult.

The greatly increased home ownership rate of those in Hawaii five to ten years reflects the accumulation of capital and perhaps the lower housing costs in the late 1960s. The relatively high rate of condominium ownership among the haoles confirms the popular impression that many of the condominium projects appeal primarily to migrants from the mainland. Reasons why condominium owners are disproportionately migrants from the mainland include the following: some of the migrants are retired, others are childless by choice and do not want to be burdened with the upkeep of yard space; many of the condominiums are located near the ocean, which is an attraction for those wishing to enjoy the "sun and surf"; condominium units are usually cheaper than single-family housing; and most local families view condominium living as contrary to the "island lifestyle."

Among the immigrants in Hawaii 11 years or more, home ownership among the Orientals is higher than for the Filipinos, in part because most Oriental immigrant families in Hawaii for many years have achieved middle-class financial status. Indeed, the ownership rate exceeds that of all local-born groups with the exception of the Orientals. Notwithstanding the relative wealth of long-term haole

FIGURE 2 Percentage of population owning or purchasing home, by ethnicity, place of birth, and years in Hawaii: 1975



in-migrants, their ownership rate is well below that of the local Orientals.

The relevant question here is why the local Orientals have been so successful in purchasing their housing. Their financial success is only a partial answer, because the equally successful haoles have much lower rates of home ownership. Another reason is that because of the low birth rate among Orientals, many parents are able to help their children to purchase a home. A common pattern in the Oriental population is for a newly married couple to move in with one set of parents, eventually take over ownership of the family house, and either build a smaller adjoining unit for the parents or find one for them nearby. Furthermore, local Orientals through kinship or friendship contacts can sometimes locate "bargains" on the housing market. The relative success of the recent Filipino immigrants in purchasing homes is largely a function of the pooling of resources by a number of related adults. But Hawaii-born children do not appear to be able to manipulate their resources in a manner that enables most of them to purchase their own housing.

SUMMARY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

That the local-born Oriental population has achieved a remarkable success and now appears to have a higher overall socioeconomic status than even the formerly dominant local-born haoles is evidenced by the performances on all measures used here: educational attainment, labor force participation and employment, occupational distribution, median income, and home ownership. Attributes that have contributed to this success include a low birth rate, a great amount of parental control over the aspirations and educational performance of their children, a tremendous amount of cooperation between generations within families (e.g., the grandparents care for the youngsters so that the daughter can be gainfully employed, and the children contribute generously to the financial and social well-being of the parents), a strongly ingrained work ethic, and the transformation from being "outsiders" to being very much the "in" group in local society.

Although the local-born haoles are "doing well" as a group, they are slipping behind the local Orientals. They do not generally observe the intergenerational cooperation so typical of the Orientals, tend to marry at an earlier age, and do not appear to have maintained the work ethic to the same degree as the Orientals. In addition, outmigration is highest among the better-educated haoles.

The changes that resulted in the overthrow of the haole oligopoly after World War II have not greatly benefited the Filipinos, Hawaiians, or other nonhaole and non-Oriental groups. Evidence for this is clear in their standings on the earlier mentioned measures.

Several trends threaten the newly achieved status of the local Orientals. One is the low Oriental birth rate, which, although beneficial at the family level, means that the proportion of Orientals in the Hawaii population will decline in the future. The low birth rate was an advantage when the adult Orientals were sufficiently numerous to control the state government and simultaneously lavish more time and money per child than the higher fertility ethnic groups. With the older generation dying out and relatively fewer children reaching maturity, however, and with the influx of other ethnic groups from elsewhere, the Oriental share of the electorate is declining. Because the state and local governments are important sources of employment and patronage, tending to intervene more in economic affairs than is the general case on the mainland, loss of government control can have definite negative effects on the Orientals.

The local groups growing most rapidly by natural increase are the "have-nots," many of whom have grievances against "Japanese political control and the Orientals running everything."[18] There is a substantial immigration from Asia. Many of the new arrivals are Oriental, but more than half are Filipino, a group who in the past have gained negligible political power in proportion to their numbers, enjoying little cultural kinship with the Orientals, and have specific economic grievances. Furthermore, there is a large yearly volume of in-migrants from the mainland, although most do not settle permanently in Hawaii and their political impact is diluted because many are Republican in a state dominated by the Democratic Party.

Whereas the immigrants, especially Filipinos, pose no immediate threat to the economic status of the local Orientals and in fact benefit them by taking low-paying service jobs in the tourist economy in disproportionate numbers, the haole newcomers are shown by the indices used to be highly educated and occupationally trained. Those who stay for a long period are even more financially successful, on the average, than the local Orientals. Another consideration is the possibility of affirmative action, which has so far not affected Hawaii to an appreciable degree because the various have-not groups are classified as a single group with the more successful Asians and thus appear, in the aggregate, to be of average status. (This possibility has probably receded, at least temporarily, under the present Administration in Washington.)

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[18] As part of a survey on migration attitudes, Wright asked local residents to discuss what they believed to be the major problems facing Hawaii. Hawaiians and Portuguese were most often emphatic in complaining about "Japanese" or "Oriental" domination. See Wright (1979: chap. 13) for the results of the survey on perceptions of problems facing Hawaii in the future.

What are the prospects for the future? Projection into the future is risky at best because the underlying factors related to contemporary population changes are not constant. Nonetheless, a projection is presented here to show what the ethnic distribution may be in the year 2000. In making this projection we have assumed that: (1) there is a yearly net increase of 5,000 haoles from the population exchanges with the mainland and abroad and this yearly number will not change; (2) 80 percent of the Asian immigrants stay permanently in Hawaii and the yearly volume of Asian immigrants will remain at the same level as during the 1970s; (3) the yearly loss of 0.5 percent to the mainland among the local Orientals, Filipinos, and Hawaiians (reported by Wright, 1979:118, for the period between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s) will remain unchanged; and (4) the rate of natural increase in 1975 for each ethnic group will remain unchanged. Under these assumptions, the nonmilitary-related population of Hawaii will increase from 730,600 in 1975 to 1,222,000 in the year 2000. If the military component remains stable, the total population will be about 1,350,000. The proportion of Orientals will decline from 35.9 to 25.6 percent, whereas the proportion of haoles will increase from 18.6 to 23.7 percent, that of the Filipinos will increase from 13.8 to 19.4 percent, and the proportions of Hawaiians and "others" will remain essentially unchanged.

Assuming that the net volume of haole migration is directly proportional to the number of haoles already here and keeping all other assumptions constant produces a nonmilitary-related population of 1,301,000 in the year 2000. Percentages of this total by ethnic group will be as follows: Caucasian, 28.3; Oriental, 23.8; Filipino, 18.5; Hawaiian, 18.1; and "others," 11.3.

Although these figures belie the common notion that the haoles are going to "take over" the state in the near future, they do suggest that the present dominance of local Orientals in the state government probably cannot last. Presumably fewer Orientals will be hired by the state government in the future. More encouraging, from the standpoint of the local Orientals, is that the haole population (which is mostly of mainland origin) will not increase nearly as rapidly as the passenger surveys suggest.

At least a partial redistribution of the benefits gained by the local Orientals to the remaining have-nots is essential, if considerable intergroup conflict in the future is to be avoided. This adjustment is made more difficult because of the in-migration of well-trained haoles who demand employment commensurate with their qualifications. Also making the task more difficult is that, whereas the local Orientals prior to World War II already had social attitudes conducive to economic success in the competitive American society, the same is not true of the local-born have-nots in Hawaii.[19] Problems of obtaining socioeconomic equity are reflected in the Hawaii schools. Schools dominated by Orientals and in-migrant haoles consistently rank highest on standardized tests, whereas those dominated by have-nots perform poorly, and those dominated by ethnic Hawaiians score lowest. A casual reading of the local newspaper reveals that almost all college scholarships are awarded to Orientals, or to haoles from private schools.[20] Judging from the number of scholarships given to and musical awards won by immigrant Oriental children, it appears that the children of recent Oriental immigrants will fare very well indeed. In contrast, the immigrant Filipino children do not appear to be faring well in the Hawaii schools. Although it is common for the have-not parents to blame the poor performance of their children on culturally insensitive Oriental teachers who "favor their own," a more basic problem appears to be

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19 Cultural attributes among Hawaiians that are inimical to financial success are the subject of a study by Howard (1974). A discussion of the cultural attributes of local Filipinos that stress "getting along" as opposed to "getting ahead" is contained in Alcantara (1973). Samasoni (1979) has written a perceptive study of Samoan cultural norms that result in severe adjustment problems in Hawaii. Problems that have plagued the Puerto Ricans since their arrival in 1901 are dealt with in Brooks (1948).

20 Hawaii contains the most extensive system of non-Catholic private school education to be found in any state. The capacity of these schools is only a fraction of the demand, which reflects widespread disillusionment with the public school system. Since World War II, the Orientals have increasingly joined the haoles in enrolling their children in private schools. Educators periodically warn that a continuation of present trends could eventually result in the public schools becoming the "dumping ground" for those without the financial means to escape them.

that the values of the have-nots are not congruent with good academic performance, which in turn is strongly correlated with future prospects.

Adjustments associated with a more equal distribution of political and economic power will be difficult, and will undoubtedly be interpreted by many local Orientals as unfair, especially as they had to endure decades of repression and to work extremely hard to achieve their present status. Perhaps making this task easier is a spirit of tolerance and fair play that is much more characteristic of ethnic relations in Hawaii than on the mainland. The image of Hawaii as a paradise of goodwill and intergroup cooperation will in any case be severely tested in the years ahead.

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Population distribution policies in Asia and the Pacific: current status and future prospects

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PREFACE

This paper was originally prepared for presentation at the Conference on Urbanization and National Development held at the East-West Population Institute, January 25–29, 1982. Comments by both conference participants and anonymous reviewers proved helpful in revising the paper for publication.

ABSTRACT Governments of nearly all Asian and Pacific nations are dissatisfied with their current population distribution, and the overwhelming majority have already adopted policies to affect rates and patterns of internal migration or the configuration of their rural and urban populations. Reviews of population distribution programs suggest that they have had limited effectiveness and may have unintended consequences. Improvement in policies will require a reexamination of four policy-related issues: the scope of policies, the need for intervention, policy objectives, and instruments. Policies must be more carefully integrated with national economic planning, and the spatial effects of macropolicies must be assessed; program instruments must be more closely matched to the determinants of migration behavior. An improved data base is a fundamental prerequisite for policy improvement as is more careful monitoring and rigorous evaluation.

Throughout the developing world, the spatial distribution of population is increasingly viewed as a major developmental issue. The most recent United Nations Monitoring Report (UN, 1980) confirms the finding of earlier surveys (UN, 1979) that the governments of developing nations are now more concerned with problems of distribution than of fertility. In a July 1978 survey it was found that of the 116 governments in the less developed regions, 53 considered their current levels of fertility satisfactory but only six were content with the spatial distribution of their populations.[1]

The nations of the Asian and Pacific region reflect this global concern with population distribution as a policy issue. Of the 30 nations in the region (see Table 1), only two–Singapore and Nauru, both small island states–considered their spatial distribution of population to be "entirely acceptable" and intervention uncalled for. Eight nations viewed their distribution as "slightly unacceptable" and requiring limited intervention, while another five indicated their distribution was "substantially unacceptable" with "substantial" intervention necessary. Fifteen nations, fully half of those surveyed, believed their distribution was "extremely unacceptable" and in need of "radical intervention."

Why are so many governments dissatisfied with their current population distribution? There is no single explanation that holds for all

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[1] Whether this perception of relative importance is an accurate one is another matter. It overlooks, for example, the interdependence of population distribution problems and population growth rates.

TABLE 1 Perception of overall acceptability of spatial distribution of population, July 1978, by Asian and Pacific governments

Acceptability	Country
Entirely acceptable: no intervention required	Nauru Singapore
Slightly unacceptable: limited intervention required	Bhutan Burma Democratic People's Republic of Korea Malaysia Maldives Mongolia New Zealand Republic of Korea
Substantially unacceptable: substantial intervention required	Afghanistan Bangladesh China Sri Lanka Tonga
Extremely unacceptable: radical intervention required	Australia Fiji India Indonesia Iran Japan Kampuchea Laos Nepal Pakistan Papua New Guinea Philippines Samoa Thailand Vietnam

SOURCE: Compiled from UN (1980: table 73, pp. 119–20).

nations. It is more appropriate to identify a variety of factors that may lead to dissatisfaction, depending on national circumstances. In many developing nations, for example, the rates of rural-to-urban migration are considered excessive, since they may lead to population concentration in a limited number of urban centers that cannot adequately provide urban jobs and services. In the process, rural areas may lose their most educated youth who might otherwise have been the most productive and innovative of the rural labor force. More generally, problems may develop of spatial disparities in labor availability and employment opportunities, with a relative excess of labor available in old, settled agricultural regions as compared with newer frontier regions, or in the primate metropolitan areas as opposed to other urban centers. Population redistribution programs may be seen as necessary to reduce population pressure on fragile environments and agro-ecosystems (e.g., those in hill and mountain areas); to resettle nomads or consolidate rural villages in order to provide adequate health, educational, or other services; to settle border areas for purposes of national security; or to increase national integration through redistribution of ethnic groups. Very commonly, population redistribution programs have an equity objective: to reduce disparities in rates of growth among regions and in the accessibility of jobs and services among individuals. A powerful but unvoiced concern underlying programs in many nations is the fear of political, social, or ethnic instability that may result from major shifts in population and rapid growth of large cities.

This paper reviews the policies already adopted by Asian and Pacific nations in response to their perceived problems of population maldistribution. The first part of the paper provides a general overview of policy objectives, types of programs and policy measures, and their effectiveness or efficiency. The second part considers apparent policy deficiencies and suggests research needs and other possible avenues of policy improvement.

CURRENT DISTRIBUTION POLICIES IN THE REGION

Three aspects of current policies in the Asian and Pacific region may be usefully addressed in this brief overview: objectives, programs and instruments, and their effectiveness or efficiency.

Policy objectives

Three major objectives predominate in the region, as judged by the frequency of policy adoption (Table 2).[2] First, the deceleration or

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[2] The responses by individual nations to the UN survey should be treated with some caution, for they do not always correspond to policy objectives as found in other statements such as national development plans.

TABLE 2 Policies regarding spatial distribution of population adopted by Asian and Pacific governments

Region and country	Policies regarding basic trends in internal migration				Policies regarding modification of rural and urban configuration of settlement	
	Accelerate	No intervention	Decelerate	Reverse	Alteration of rural configuration	Alteration of urban configuration
China				x	x	x
Japan			x		x	x
Other East Asia						
Democratic People's Republic of Korea			x		x	x
Mongolia			x		x	x
Republic of Korea			x			
Eastern South Asia						
Burma			x		x	
Democratic Kampuchea				x	x	x
Indonesia			x		x	
Lao People's Democratic Republic				x	x	x
Malaysia		x			x	
Philippines				x	x	
Singapore		x				
Thailand			x			
Vietnam			x		x	x
Middle South Asia						
Afghanistan		x			x	
Bangladesh				x	x	
Bhutan	x				x	x

India		x		x	x
Iran		x		x	x
Maldives		x			
Pakistan		x		x	x
Nepal		x		x	
Sri Lanka		x		x	
Australia and New Zealand					
Australia			x		x
New Zealand	x				
Melanesia					
Papua New Guinea	x				
Micronesia-Polynesia					
Fiji		x		x	x
Nauru	x				
Tonga		x			
Western Samoa	x				

SOURCE: UN (1979:134).

reversal of rural-to-urban migration trends is apparently the most common goal: some 16 nations have policies to decelerate flows from rural to urban areas; another six, including several of the communist nations, have gone further and are attempting to reverse flows. The second major objective is to alter rural population distribution, in many cases through colonization or resettlement schemes. This goal was adopted in 20 nations. The third objective, altering urban configuration, usually through controls on primate city growth and development of small and intermediate-size cities, was adopted in 13 nations.

If the stated goals of individual Asian nations are examined in greater detail (Table 3), it is apparent that they reflect differences in national size, inherited patterns of settlement, resource endowment, and economic activity, as well as differing political perceptions of problems and needs. Commonly, nations have adopted multiple goals involving modification of both migration trends and aspects of rural and urban settlement patterns. Although policy objectives are occasionally stated in the form of fairly precise targets (e.g., Indonesia's transmigration goals), it is more common to find objectives formulated in more general terms. Thailand's Fourth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1977–81), which may be taken as an example, contained the following explicit population distribution objectives: (1) limiting the growth of the Bangkok Metropolitan Area; (2) developing regional growth centers outside of Bangkok; and (3) supporting intraregional as opposed to interregional migration, including rural-to-urban movement to regional centers (NESDB, 1977).

The vagueness of population distribution policy goals within national development plans is often matched by a failure to make explicit the connections between those goals and other aspects of the development plan (Pryor, 1974:11). Vertical linkages "upward" to development goals and "downward" to programs and projects are not clearly specified, nor are the horizontal linkages with economic, welfare, political, or other goals. Population distribution and redistribution objectives sometimes appear to have been prepared in isolation from other parts of the development plan and therefore seem abstract and unintegrated. This impression is further reinforced by the sectoral structure of most development plans, which "tends to disperse relevant elements through the plan volume(s)" (Pryor, 1974:17).

TABLE 3 Population distribution policies in selected Asian nations: goals, programs, and measures

Country	Goals	Programs and measures
Centrally planned		
China (PRC)	Slow rural-to-urban migration; reduce growth and decongest large cities; improve balance among regions and in urban hierarchy; develop agricultural and mineral resources in interior	Family planning; rustication program; development of new towns and growth centers; rural development programs; land colonization schemes
Mongolia	Facilitate rural-to-urban flow; increase number of cities and lower-order centers	Settlement of nomadic population; development of lower-order centers as industrial complexes
Vietnam	Reduce size of Ho Chi Minh City; transfer labor force from urban to rural areas; improve urban-rural and regional balance	Rustication of urban population; colonization of New Economic Zones; development of agricultural "green ring" around Ho Chi Minh City
Market/mixed		
China (Taiwan)	Decentralize population within Taipei and Kaohsiung; improve balance among regions and centers in hierarchy	Satellite towns; development of growth poles through infrastructure investment and tax incentives; improvement of social infrastructure in regions of out-migration

TABLE 3 *(continued)*

Country	Goals	Programs and measures
Indonesia	Reduce imbalance between Java and outer islands; reduce primary and uneven urban growth	Transmigration programs; rural and urban development in outer islands; restriction on Jakarta's growth; distribution of industrial activities
Republic of Korea	Control growth of Seoul; reduce imbalance in urban hierarchy; slow rural depopulation	Long-term physical plan for Seoul, including green belt; legislation for industrial location; fiscal and tax incentives/disincentives; construction of satellite cities; development of five growth poles; rural development through Saemaul Undong
Malaysia	Equalize regional development and distribution of economic benefits among ethnic groups; promote growth in Sabah and Sarawak; slow growth of major towns	Rural development (extension, credit, marketing, fertilizer subsidence, infrastructure); colonization and resettlement (FELDA): promotion of industrial development in low-income states (location incentives); growth centers; urban development and renewal, housing
Nepal	Reduce regional disparities between rural population and resources; reduce rural-rural migration; promote urban growth outside Kathmandu Valley	Integrated rural development in hill areas; improved transport and communication systems; development of small-scale industries in nonurban areas; growth centers; land resettlement

Pakistan	Reduce rural-to-urban migration; mitigate concentration of urbanization in a few, large cities and resulting problems of housing, services, unplanned development	Population planning; rural development including increased agricultural productivity, agro-industrialization, and services; more balanced development between rural and urban sectors, and between towns; improved urban services
Philippines	Reduce rural-to-urban migration; reduce concentration in Manila; promote balanced urban hierarchy and more even regional development	Reduction in population growth; integrated rural development; development of small and medium-sized cities through industrial dispersion and improvement of basic infrastructure and regional planning
Sri Lanka	Reduce metropolitan growth and rural-to-urban shift; promote rural resettlement	Rural resettlement; establishment of industrial and economic activities outside metropolitan area; welfare and income transfers to reduce rural-urban disparities; emphasis on provision of social services outside metropolitan core
Thailand	Limit growth of Bangkok; develop regional growth centers; promote intraregional rather than interregional migration	Decentralization of growth in Bangkok metropolitan area through new port, industrial, and government dispersal, taxes, land use controls; growth center policies; regional planning; rural development

SOURCES: UNPD and UNFPA (1979, 1981); Pryor (1979); Fuchs and Street (1979).

Policy programs and instruments

Individual nations clearly have adopted various explicit policy programs and instruments in response to perceived problems of migration and population maldistribution (Table 4). Included here are both programs with a primary goal of affecting population distribution and development programs that include population redistribution as at least a secondary goal. These programs may be categorized as follows:

1. "Closed city" programs, designed to constrain metropolitan growth by stopping or slowing down in-migration.
2. Rustication programs, designed to resettle urban residents in rural areas.
3. Programs designed to accommodate metropolitan growth by improving the urban habitat. There are many such programs; two with clear distribution implications are programs to improve housing and living conditions, in particular in slum and squatter settlements, and programs aimed at increasing urban efficiency by decentralizing growth in metropolitan areas through promotion of dormitory towns, satellite cities, and commuting.
4. Programs aimed at regional dispersion of urban growth through expansion of intermediate-size cities and regional centers.
5. Rural development and "agropolitan" programs, directed at retention of rural populations and the growth of rural service centers.
6. Land colonization schemes, designed to shift rural population to frontier rural areas with underdeveloped land resources.

As is evident from the above classification, population redistribution programs are often subsidiary components of more general spatial programs dealing with modernization and economic development, with the importance of the population redistribution component varying significantly from program to program.

The various types of redistribution programs constitute a package of individual measures or instruments that, taken as a group, are intended to achieve the program objectives. In selecting individual instruments, policymakers can choose from a broad range of economic, social, and administrative measures (Table 5). Such measures can be characterized as either positive, in the sense of offering incentives for in-migration to a particular locale, or negative, if they serve as disincentives or obstacles. They may be aimed directly at the individual or household but more commonly operate indirectly through employing

TABLE 4 Population redistribution programs, objectives, and instruments

Type of program	Migration/mobility objectives	Instruments commonly employed
Urban constraints		
"Closed city"	Reduce or slow in-migration to designated cities, including the metropolitan center	Tax disincentives; identity cards or internal passports, residence permits, registration of addresses; limitations on investment in industry or housing; discriminatory treatment in access to services by nonlegal residents; eviction of illegal residents, destruction of squatter housing
Rustication programs	Resettle urban residents in rural areas	As above plus the following: assignment of rural residence and work place; making ration coupons valid only in authorized place of residence
Accommodationist programs		
Slum and squatter settlement improvement	Accommodate to existing patterns of urban in-migration and growth by improving urban habitat, especially housing and related services	Legitimization of tenure in squatter settlements; upgrading of services and utilities; provision of prepared sites and basic services prior to occupancy
Dormitory towns and satellite city programs	Deconcentrate growth within metropolitan area by developing settlements in periphery	Infrastructure investment in metropolitan periphery; development of public transport and commuting facilities; housing project developments in peripheral settlements; industrial relocation grants and subsidies; zoning and other controls on further development in core

TABLE 4 *(continued)*

Type of program	Migration/mobility objectives	Instruments commonly employed
Promotion of growth in intermediate-size cities and regional centers	Channel migration to, and stimulate retention of, population in intermediate-size cities as alternative to metropolis	Infrastructure investments; incentives (grants, loans, subsidies) to employing organizations, particularly industrial firms; indirect incentives to individual migrants (housing developments, education, and medical service provision); direct incentives to individuals (job training and relocation grants)
Rural development		
Land colonization schemes	Resettle rural residents from overpopulated areas to new or underutilized agricultural areas	Infrastructure investments for land clearing, roads, dams, etc.; transfer payments for land acquisition; transfer of title; investment in productive facilities; provision of social services or technical assistance; credit provision; establishment of managing agency
Integrated rural development	Retain rural population and develop rural service centers	Land reform; provision of credit and extension services; physical infrastructure investments, including roads; development of marketing network; vocational training and education; expansion of off-farm employment; creation of rural market towns

SOURCES: Findley (1977); Demko and Fuchs (1981).

TABLE 5 Major population distribution measures

	Policy emphasis	
Directed toward	Incentives	Disincentives
Employing organizations	Direct government investment and location of state-owned enterprises, offices, and facilities; subsidies (grants, loans, tax rebates) to private sector on location basis; spatial industrial infrastructure policies (transport, utilities, etc.); government, procurement, and location policies; transport rate adjustments	Relocation of government enterprises, offices, facilities; restrictions, permits, licenses, tax surcharges for private-sector locations of industry and offices; land use or indirect controls on location
Individuals and families	Social infrastructure investments (housing, education, medical services, etc.); mobility grants, allowances, and loans; employment or other information agencies; job training and human resource development programs; various rural development measures—land reform, credit, extension services, public works	Administrative and legal measures (residence and work permits); discriminatory treatment of legal and illegal residences in access to services; slum clearance and squatter resettlement measures; residential zoning limitations

SOURCE: Fuchs (1981b).

organizations. Despite the range of choices available to policymakers, in practice the greatest emphasis is on economic measures, particularly those intended to affect *labor demand* spatially through effects on employing organizations. Measures aimed directly at individuals and households are much less common, but here too the emphasis is on economic measures that spatially affect *labor supply.*

Effectiveness of policies

The widespread adoption of population policies in the Asian and Pacific region has not yet been followed by rigorous evaluations of their effectiveness, perhaps because of the substantial difficulties involved in such evaluations. As already noted, the goals of population distribution policies are often imprecise and the programs embedded in more general spatial development programs, complicating the choice of criteria for determining effectiveness. The appropriate time periods are unclear. As with all policy evaluation, an *ex post facto* approach creates difficulties in controlling variables other than policy instruments and in isolating policy-induced effects from autonomous trends.

Nevertheless some impression of the effectiveness of existing policies can be obtained from recent general reviews of population distribution policies in Asia (Oberai, 1981; Day and Demko, 1981; Laquian, Aquino, and Postrado, 1981). These reviews synthesize a considerable number of country or program-focused studies, the great majority of which are descriptive assessments. The major conclusion of these reviews is that population distribution policies in the Asian region have had but limited effectiveness, a conclusion similar to that found in global reviews (Findley, 1977; Gosling and Lim, 1979; Demko and Fuchs, 1981) and in reviews of policies implemented in other regions (Fuchs and Demko, 1979; Abumere, 1981; Mabogunje, 1981).

Although the overall effectiveness of population distribution policies is limited, the experience varies considerably depending on the type of program involved:

Closed-city Programs

These represent attempts to limit primate city growth through legal and administrative measures affecting in-migration. Major examples in Asia include the attempts to limit in-migration to Jakarta through registration, permits, and controls on the informal sector; to Manila through discriminatory education fees and industrial controls; and to Seoul through taxes and land use planning (Simmons, 1979). The experience suggests that although such programs may slow in-migration, they may also create undesirable side effects. Administrative measures are often evaded through bribery; limits on growth within the administratively defined "closed city" are accompanied by increases in commuting and migration to adjoining areas of the metropolitan area; if successful, the program may result in undesirable demographic (e.g., aging) or economic consequences for the "closed" city.

Rustication Programs

Programs intended to transfer urban population to rural areas have been adopted by several of the communist nations in Asia. Judged only demographically, they have been successful in accomplishing major population transfers in brief periods. In China it is estimated that between 10 and 15 million urban secondary school graduates were resettled in rural areas in the period 1969–73 alone (Chang, 1975). In Vietnam, the population of Ho Chi Minh City, some 3 million in 1975, was reduced 700,000 in 1977 and further annual reductions of 500,000 were planned, to meet an eventual city size target of 1 million (Lange and Kolb, 1980).

The demographic effects of these policies have been striking, but the social and economic costs, including the effects on rural destinations, remain unknown. It is not clear whether urban problems of un- and underemployment were simply shifted to rural areas. To be effective, such programs require stringent laws and administrative measures, massive propaganda, and authoritarian political regimes (Simmons, 1979; 1981). Because of this, and their restriction of free movement and choice of residence and employment, considered civil rights in many countries, rustication programs are unlikely to be adopted outside of the centrally planned economies.

Urban Accommodationist Programs

In contrast to policies designed to reverse or constrain metropolitan growth, accommodationist policies attempt to adjust to in-migration and growth by improving the urban habitat. Included under this rubric is a range of programs concerned with housing (including slum and squatter settlements), transport and communication, sanitation, government and fiscal management, and also attempts to decongest the metropolitan areas by developing dormitory towns and satellite cities (Laquian, 1981; Linn, 1979). Such programs, intended to promote urban efficiency, raise issues of equity: do the overall welfare and development needs justify the large investments involved, which generally reach only a small proportion of the population? In addition, such programs' possible effect of encouraging further migration to the city, which would only aggravate the problems they were intended to relieve, requires further study. The need is for ameliorative programs that will increase urban efficiency without attracting excessive in-migration.

Attempts to Promote Growth in Smaller and Intermediate-size Cities

These attempts usually involve plans for growth centers and related regional planning measures. The earlier optimism regarding such urbanization dispersal strategies has given way to widespread pessimism, because the programs have generally failed to achieve expected growth in regional centers and there has been a notable lack of spread effects (Hansen, 1981). However, it is possible that the shortcomings may have resulted from failures to implement policies that remain only promulgated, as is apparently true in much of Southeast Asia (Salih et al., 1978:79). Elsewhere policy application may have been sporadic, and adequate time has rarely been allowed for expected results to be achieved. Despite the general disappointment with such policies, there have been notable successes, as in Korea (Mera, 1976). Since there are no clear alternatives to accommodating the enormous increases that will take place in Asian urban populations, other than permitting growth of metropolitan populations to reach unmanageable proportions, what seems to be needed is a reassessment of these policies—their objectives, selection of appropriate centers, measures, and timing—in order to frame more effective policies (Richardson, 1977). They also require integration into more comprehensive and balanced sets of urban and rural programs (Lo and Salih, 1978b).

Rural Development Programs

Disenchantment with the outcome of industrially based growth-center approaches, growing concern about the need to give greater attention to the rural sector, and the desire to reduce rural-to-urban migration have led to an increased emphasis on rural development programs. So-called integrated rural development programs ordinarily provide for coordinated provision of infrastructure and services in rural regions, and the development of an appropriate regional hierarchy of village and urban marketing and service centers. Examples in Asia include the Lampang project of Thailand, the Bicol project in the Philippines, and various rural development projects in the hill areas of Nepal. The relative recency of such projects has precluded definitive evaluation of their effects upon migration, which appear to vary depending on the precise program components and the nature of the rural region and its component population. Although the programs appear to have reduced permanent out-migration in many cases, "... a more significant though little publicized effect ... is the opening up of other migration and commutation alternatives: to other rural areas; to towns in the vicinity; and to other cities economically linked to the rural market towns" (Findley, 1981:166).

Land Colonization Programs

These schemes include Malaysia's FELDA projects, Indonesia's transmigration programs, the *terai* settlement projects of Nepal, and the Mahaweli project of Sri Lanka. They represent organized attempts to redistribute rural population from "overpopulated" to "virgin" or underutilized agricultural areas. The record of sponsored colonization schemes is mixed, but failures outnumber successes (Bahrin, 1981). Even when successful, land colonization schemes have a high cost per settler, if infrastructure costs are included. In Malaysia in 1976, costs per settler were US$10,000 for rubber projects and US$11,036 for oil palm projects, and in Indonesia's transmigration program in 1977, they were US$4,390 per settler (Laquian, Aquino, and Postrado, 1981: 14).[3]

Also a serious drawback is the so-called "second generation problem." Since land fragmentation is often prohibited in land colonization projects, most of the original settlers' children must eventually leave the projects, which in effect then only serve to delay rural out-migration. Spontaneous settlement generally accounts for 75 percent of new rural land settlement, and therefore more attention should be given to means to improve and channel such unassisted movement to "frontier" areas.

Not only does the experience of redistribution programs in affecting migration vary greatly by type of program, but also programs of a similar type vary greatly in outcome depending on the national context (Table 6). These differences suggest that details of program design, administrative structure and capabilities, political commitment, and so on, play a major role in determining the outcomes. Even allowing for

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[3] Since these costs include resource development as well as resettlement, they would have to be weighed against costs of creating alternative jobs in the rural or urban sector. Environmental costs, which may be substantial, are generally not included in the cost calculations.

TABLE 6 Evaluation of policies and programs by sources

Policies and programs	Goals	Effectiveness and efficiency	Target groups	Costs	Overall assessment
Rural development					
BIMAS program of rice production (Indonesia)	G	F	F	F	F
Saemaul Undong Movement (Republic of Korea)	E	G	G	G	E
Integrated rural development (Nepal)	F	F	F	P	F
High-yielding varieties (Philippines)	G	F	G	G	G
High-yielding varieties (Thailand)	G	F	F	F	F
Resettlement					
Transmigration program (Indonesia)	F	P	G	F	F
FELDA land development scheme (Malaysia)	E	G	E	G	E
Colonization of the *terai* region (Nepal)	F	P	F	P	P
Resettlement to Mindanao (Philippines)	F	G	F	F	F
Colonization projects, dry zone (Sri Lanka)	G	P	F	P	F
Resettlement program (Thailand)	F	P	G	F	F
Regional development					
Regional planning (Indonesia)	G	P	F	F	F
Regional development (Republic of Korea)	E	G	G	G	E
Regional planning (Malaysia)	G	F	G	G	G
Regional decentralization (Philippines)	F	F	G	F	F
Mahaweli development program (Sri Lanka)	F	P	G	G	F

Industrial estates and growth centers					
Industrial estates (India)	F	P	F	P	P
Industrial estates (Republic of Korea)	E	E	G	G+	E
Export processing zone (Philippines)	G	G	F	G	G
Accommodationist policies					
Resettlement of squatters (India)	F	F	G	P	F
Kampung improvement program (Indonesia)	G	F	G	G	G
Sites and services and upgrading (Philippines)	E	G	F	G	G
Low-cost housing (Thailand)	F	F	P	F	F

E = excellent
G = good
F = fair
P = poor

SOURCE: Laquian, Aquino, and Postrado (1981:19).

their influences, however, it is apparent from transnational comparison that the majority of such programs have been considered only fair or poor when evaluated on the basis of effectiveness, efficiency, or costs. In view of the considerable expenditures on such programs in Asia and the Pacific, or elsewhere in the developing world, this generally negative assessment raises the question of what might be done to make them more effective and cost-efficient.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Unless some fundamental change occurs in the nature and implementation of population distribution policies, it is unlikely that future outcomes will be more successful than those experienced to date. What are the implications of past experience for research needs, desirable policy changes, and institutional implementation? Some speculations are offered below concerning the scope and institutional framework of population distribution policies, the need for intervention, selection of appropriate instruments, policy evaluation, and the data base.

Population distribution policies in relation to spatial economic planning, sectoral policies, and institutional framework

Spatial Economic Planning

The scope or domain of population distribution policies remains poorly defined and, one is tempted to add, poorly understood even by its practitioners. Economically-oriented spatial planners often treat the distribution of population as essentially synonomous with that of economic activity, thereby failing to take into account the disparities evident in many developing countries. Demographically oriented migration specialists and planners, on the other hand, often view population distribution and movement in isolation from the spatial economic context, and in their policy prescriptions assume that migration can be managed without reference to spatial economic and development planning. From an examination of population distribution programs, however, it is readily evident that they overlap with spatial economic programs, whether national, regional, urban, or rural. The instruments employed in such programs are essentially the standard measures of spatial economic planning. None of this should be surprising since the processes leading to spatial population distribution problems are similar to those leading to polarized economic development, and many of the remedial programs must also be similar.

Spatial population planning thus may be viewed as complementary to spatial economic planning, distinguished from the latter by its explicit concerns with population and its characteristics, including composition, which is often treated homogenously in spatial economic planning.

Sectoral Policies

The explicit population distribution policies and programs discussed earlier account for only a portion of the spatial effects of government policies. Macro- and sectoral economic policies may also have strong, if unintended and indirect, effects on population distribution as well as on economic activity (Richardson, 1977). Major areas of concern include various policies regarding foreign trade and exchange, domestic and international investment, taxation, interest rates, agricultural price supports or ceilings, wage regulations, social welfare programs, government procurement policies, and government institutional structures. From examination of selected Asian development plans, there is reason to believe that the spatial effects of various sectoral policies may contradict the goals of explicit population distribution policies (Fuchs, 1981a), although the lack of a methodology to measure precisely the net effects of various sectoral policies remains an obstacle to a full understanding of their spatial effects and the degree to which they outweigh explicit spatial policies.[4] Further research on the subject is a priority research need (Richardson, 1977). The challenge for policy purposes, as Richardson has noted, is not only to recognize and identify sectoral policy effects, but also to find alternative means of achieving nonspatial objectives with policy instruments that avoid undesirable spatial consequences. This must become a high priority for Asian and Pacific nations in order for them to avoid further wasteful expenditures on contradictory policies.

Institutional Framework

The limited success of existing population distribution policies reflects, in part, a failure to achieve adequate institutional coordination (Pryor, 1981). Such policies cannot be formulated or implemented in isolation, but must be integrated with national, economic development policies including specific multi-year development plans, national urban policies, and area development plans. Conceivably, various institutional mechanisms can be developed to achieve the required policy integration and no single model need be adopted or would be appropriate for all nations. What is required, however, is that spatial population planning be more closely linked to spatial economic planning and that economic planners become more sensitive to the demographic implications of their policies, while more demographic researchers and planners shed their innocence of spatial economic development processes and policies.

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[4] One useful approach, although it would yield only a partial answer, would be to examine and assess spatial patterns of tax receipts and public expenditures, in other words, the redistributive effect of public sector finances (Bennet, 1979).

Goal definition

There are grounds for concluding that the mode of specifying objectives or goals is currently a major weakness in the population distribution policy process, and that the establishment of unrealistic or inappropriate goals may be a fundamental cause of the limited success achieved by nations attempting to manipulate their population distribution (Richardson, 1981). Some of these difficulties, and suggestions for their amelioration, follow.

First, in formulating population distribution goals, universal prescriptions cannot be employed; such goals must be formulated on the basis of unique national conditions, including the size of a country, its environmental and resource base, level of development, the structure and patterns of the economy, the dynamics and patterns of the population, the structure of its society, the form of government, and cultural and historical factors. That governments with widely differing national contexts have often adopted very similar goals, such as dispersed urbanization and limiting metropolitan growth, raises the suspicion that, rather than devising nation-specific goals, planners often resort to "borrowing" goals, or adopting those currently fashionable. An urgent and obvious remedy is for planners to formulate goals suited to the distinctive national requirements.

Second, there are no operational algorithms or other technical means of determining "optimal" distributions of populations. Existing approaches require data beyond the capacity of developing nations to acquire, or result in indeterminacy (Conroy, 1978; Willekens, 1979; Tan, 1980). Richardson's (1975) call for cost-benefit assessments of alternative settlement patterns has not yet resulted in operational examples. Planners must therefore accept the fact that for the foreseeable future, the definition of goals will remain largely judgmental; thus it is especially important to ensure that goals are the result of informed judgment and not arbitrary or wishful thinking.

Third, spatial population goals, or spatial economic goals, are lower-order and not ultimate goals; they must be formulated as subsets of national economic or social goals, which typically include economic efficiency and growth, social equity and welfare, environmental quality, and other standards of well-being (Alonso, 1972). How these national goals are to be translated into spatial population goals, however, is not very clear, particularly in regard to efficiency and growth. Although the concepts of an optimal city size and an optimal rank-size hierarchy have been widely discredited, substantial controversy still centers on the question of the relative efficiency of various sizes of urban places. Useful here would be further empirical research in individual developing countries, perhaps applying Lo and Salih's (1978) suggestion that efficiency may vary with function as well as size (comparative sectoral efficiency), and incorporating social costs and benefits if possible. Since labor absorption will become an acute issue in the future for many Asian and Pacific nations, studies on the labor absorptive capacity within these nations in the rural and urban sectors, regionally, and by settlement size would be a highly useful prologue to goal formulation. Similarly, further study of labor markets and clarification of the spatial relationships among labor supply, job opportunities, income, and mobility is an urgent need (McGee, 1981; Standing, 1981).

Fourth, planners have formulated goals largely on the basis of assumed national and social benefits. Personal preferences, of course, may differ from the presumed social preferences, leading to migration and location choices that differ from planning formulated goals. Survey research on individual residential and locational preferences (e.g., Fuguitt and Zuiches, 1973) would be desirable if we believe that planners' goals should to some degree reflect the wishes of the people. Similarly, survey research on intended migration and mobility, which has been demonstrated as useful for prediction in developed nations (Speare, Goldstein, and Frey, 1976), might assist in formulating more realistic goals. Moreover, survey research on the actual economic and social costs and benefits accruing to various types of migrants to different types of destinations would prove useful in translating national efficiency and welfare goals into population distribution goals.

Fifth, in the absence of comprehensive mobility data, planners have concentrated almost exclusively on permanent migration as a subject of policy, excluding short-term and repetitive movements. This is a serious oversight since in many Asian and Pacific nations, nonpermanent forms of movement already form a large and growing part of total mobility patterns and have important economic consequences (Goldstein, 1978). Goals are therefore less comprehensive than they should be, omitting aspects of mobility (e.g., commuting) that may be highly relevant to the spatial development process. As a result, the interdependence among the various elements of mobility, and the degree to which one substitutes for another, are overlooked. This oversight argues for survey research to determine the relative incidence, pattern, economic significance, and linkages of the full spectrum of mobility processes in individual nations.

Sixth, the time periods involved in the mobility response to economic and other stimuli is unknown in most nations; this creates difficulties in formulating population distribution goals, their articulation with economic goals and development projects, and their incorporation into short-, intermediate-, and long-term development plans. Research to clarify the time periods of mobility response is thus also an obvious need from the standpoint of goal formulations.

Assessing the need for intervention

Since the vast majority of Asian and Pacific nations have already adopted policies designed to modify the rates and patterns of internal migration and population redistribution, further assessment of the need for intervention may seem unnecessary. Nevertheless, there is a continuing debate as to the need for such policies, which serves to weaken the political commitment to and effective implementation of the policies within the individual nations and to diminish the financial commitment of donor agencies. More accurate assessment of whether intervention is required in particular nations could conceivably remove or reduce intervention where it seems unnecessary and strengthen the political and economic commitments to intervention in those cases where it appears warranted.

Detailed evaluations of the arguments against and for intervention have appeared elsewhere (Mera, 1981; Stöhr, 1981) and need not be elaborated here. Essentially, the case against intervention rests upon the automatic equilibrating mechanisms postulated under neoclassical economies, leading over time to equilibrium in the terms of trade and to spatial equilibrium in factor prices. Empirical support consists of various cross-national and longitudinal studies demonstrating convergence over time, as development proceeds, in personal and regional income disparities (Kuznets, 1955; Williamson, 1965; Alonso, 1980) accompanied by reduced urban primacy (El-Shakhs, 1972). The arguments for intervention essentially are that the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory and its automatic equilibrating mechanisms do not apply to most developing countries and, even if they did, few nations could afford to wait for the indefinite time lag required for equilibrium; intervention is therefore required to bring population distribution into better accord with resource and ecological patterns and to relieve political and social pressures (Stöhr, 1981).

Further general assessment of the need for intervention will, no doubt, proceed through elaboration of theoretical and comparative studies. From the standpoint of determining the need for intervention in a given country, however, more fruitful approaches may be suggested. Particularly useful would be studies examining the demographic and socioeconomic effects on origin and destination areas of existing and projected mobility patterns. Comprehensive research that examined demographic consequences and the social and economic costs and benefits to individuals, households, and communities in source and destination areas–covering the full range of mobility–would add enormously to an accurate assessment of intervention needs. (Detailed suggestions for such research may be found in Simmons, 1981, and Hugo, 1981b.) It would also serve to remedy a major weakness of the neoclassical approach, which equates migration with mobility and, in treating migration as simply a movement of a production factor, commonly ignores social costs borne by the migrants, as well as sending and receiving areas. (This criticism is elaborated for neoclassical studies of international migration in OECD, 1979:30.)

Improvement of instrument selection

To date there has been no systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the individual instruments employed as part of population redistribution programs (Table 5). In the absence of such evaluations, one alternative method for assessing their likely effectiveness is to consider the measures in relation to our knowledge of migration determinants. A general study along these lines has concluded that there may be considerable scope for improving the effectiveness of instruments, were they selected to match more closely the determinants of migration behavior on a country-specific basis (Fuchs and Demko, 1981). Some of the specific problems are outlined below.

The majority of measures employed are economic and related to increasing employment opportunities. This would seem appropriate in view of the recognized importance of employment and income as primary migration determinants. However, many of the instruments are quite indirect (e.g., infrastructure investments) and thus may operate in a weak fashion and over a very long period of time.

There is a heavy reliance also upon social infrastructure, for example, housing, schools, and medical and other services. It is not clear how important these amenities are as migration determinants. Furthermore, the measures may be so widely applied over a country as to negate desired spatial demographic effects.

The known effect of distance as a deterrent to migration is largely neglected in current instruments and programs, except for limited use of relocation grants. A possibly more useful approach would be to address redistribution programs geographically—toward likely migrants from source areas near the proposed destination area, thereby taking advantage of the distance bias.

Migrant selectivity, which plays a major role in the composition of regional flows, needs to be taken into account to a greater extent than at present. Programs and measures should be addressed toward subgroups most likely to move or stay, as called for by particular programs and objectives.

The importance of information in inducing and directing migration is similarly overlooked in most redistribution programs and measures. In the absence of formal information programs, migration streams become biased toward the metropolis, which receives the most media attention and is likely to have the largest pool of migrants informally transmitting information to friends and relatives in source areas. The use of information measures—through schools, government offices, and the media—is thus potentially a powerful tool for affecting both decisions to move and destinations. It would have the advantage of being relatively low in cost and the potential of showing results much more quickly than many economic measures. Greater focus on this instrument also gives population distribution policies the opportunity to make a more distinctive contribution to spatial development programs.

In addition to a more rigorous evaluation of programs and instruments, various types of additional research would seem desirable to bring about the selection of more appropriate policy instruments.

First, further elaboration of spatial development theory is needed. As Richardson (1973:140) noted some years ago, Friedmann's (1966) center-periphery model is still the "best formulated construct in a haphazard and fuzzy literature." Promising directions for improvement of the basic concept have been pointed out by Richardson himself; Friedmann (1973); Lo, Salih, and Douglass (1981) with their macrospatial model; and Logan (1981), who also calls attention to the need to treat national spatial development as an open system subject to trade, investment, and other international forces. Work along these directions is likely to confirm the need in spatial development and population planning for intervention in regard to such international factors and thus add a dimension missing from current programs.

A second need is for improved methodologies linking macroeconomic and demographic growth models. The current cleavage between these models handicaps both economic and demographic planning. Attempts to link regional input-output and multiregional demographic models seem particularly promising (Gordon and Ledent, 1980; 1981).

A third need is to reformulate macrolevel models of migration to include more variables that are subject to policy intervention. Macromodels of migration, generally based on cross-sectional analysis of census data by territorial units, have provided a broad overview of the spatial determinants of migration, useful to policymakers (Yap, 1975; Todaro, 1980). However, they also have serious limitations, which derive largely from limitation of their data sources: the focus on migration and exclusion of other forms of mobility and the serious and biased underestimation of migration that results from use of census temporal and territorial definitions of migration. Despite these limitations, there is still scope for substantially improving their utility for policy purposes by reformulating the variables employed. Such models commonly attempt to explain rates of migration between areas on the basis of wage or income levels, unemployment rates, degree of urbanization, and distance between origin and destination. The wage or income and employment variables may be subject to policy intervention, but distance and degree of urbanization are not potential policy variables. Distance should be decomposed into the constructs that it represents in reality and that could be subjected to policy intervention:

travel time and costs, and measures of information or contact. Similarly, degree of urbanization should be reformulated as composite or individual measures of the various urban services and amenities. The migration elasticities derived from such macrolevel models, reformulated to accord with policy-relevant variables, should thus be much more useful in the selection and design of appropriate instruments and programs.

Microlevel studies

To date macrolevel migration models have been more widely employed than microlevel models for policy purposes. In the future microlevel studies, focusing on the behavior of individuals and households, may prove more useful (De Jong and Gardner, 1981). They afford the opportunity for covering the full scope of mobility behavior and for a deeper and broader understanding of migration determinants than is possible from macrolevel studies, which must generally infer determinants from place attributes. Whether microlevel studies will achieve their potential for contributing to policy and planning will depend on the degree to which they are structured and designed to answer policy questions. The majority of such studies to date unfortunately have not adopted this perspective and have thus added little of direct use to policymakers (Simmons, Diaz-Briquets, and Laquian, 1977).

POLICY MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The limited success of population distribution policies can be traced in part to the neglect of policy monitoring and evaluation. As indicated earlier, formidable difficulties face those evaluating the effects of population distribution policies (see also Chan, 1980). As a result, most studies are descriptive, and evaluate by measuring achievement versus targets. This approach is inadequate because targets may be unrealistic and, in any event, it fails to account for what would have happened in the absence of policy implementation or to identify the actual effects of policy.

Various forms of trend or time series analysis are generally employed in public policy evaluation (Nachmias, 1979); the difficulty remains of separating autonomous from policy-induced effects. Here quasi-experimental research designs may prove useful. One possibility is to derive a general national regression equation with population growth or net migration rates by areal units or the dependent variable, using a set of socioeconomic variables as the independent variables. The equation can then be employed to predict either autonomous population growth or net migration. Policy effects can be estimated by comparing actual and predicted change for regions subject to policy programs or measures (Folmer, 1980).

Another possibility is to use control areas as a basis for trend comparison. Rural areas designated for development as land colonization schemes, for example, could be compared with those settled only by spontaneous migration, areas designated for integrated rural development compared with those not so designated, "growth" centers compared with intermediate cities not subject to policies, and so on. Selection of appropriate control areas to ensure comparability in socioeconomic and demographic structure is critical and can be accomplished through factor analysis, cluster analysis, and shift-share techniques (Merrifield, 1981).

In addition to measuring the overall effects of policies, planners will wish, if data sources permit, to study the effects of individual policy instruments in order to modify existing policies or improve future ones. Useful techniques for conducting such research include simultaneous equations and path analysis (Berentsen, 1978). Special surveys may also be used for evaluation and, when combined with a battery of the macrolevel evaluation methods, may be quite comprehensive (see, e.g., Moore and Rhodes, 1973; 1977).

DEVELOPING AN ADEQUATE DATA BASE

A major obstacle to improving population redistribution policies in the Asian and Pacific region, as elsewhere in the developing world, is the limited information available to researchers and planners about migration and mobility (Goldstein, 1981). Most national policies have, of necessity, been framed without adequate information about the types, volumes, and spatial patterns of mobility; characteristics of various types of movers and nonmovers; the reasons for moves and choice of destination; the satisfactions and dissatisfactions resulting from moves; future mobility intentions and location preferences; links between migrants and source areas; and the consequence of movements upon individuals, households, and the source and destination areas.

The 1980--81 series of censuses conducted in the Asian and Pacific region will substantially improve data on migration available to planners and researchers, but will leave an inadequate data base for most planning and policy purposes (ESCAP, 1981:3–5). To conduct policy-related research of the sort suggested above, it will be necessary to rely on specialized surveys. The National Migration Survey proposed for the ESCAP region, in conjunction with censuses and other sources, would provide a comprehensive data base for such policy-related research (Fuchs, 1981b). If development planners in the Asian and Pacific region are seriously interested in improving the effectiveness of population distribution policies, they would be well advised to support such migration surveys, for without such an advance in the data base, major improvements in spatial population policies are not likely.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The first part of the paper presents a general overview of population distribution policies in the Asian and Pacific region. The major findings may be summarized as follows:

All but two of 30 Asian and Pacific nations are dissatisfied with their current distribution of population; half perceive their distribution as "extremely unacceptable" and in need of "radical intervention."

The most common goal is to decelerate or reverse rural-to-urban migration. Altering rural population configurations is a more common objective than altering urban configurations.

Spatial population distribution programs are commonly part of more general spatial development programs. Often the population objective is secondary to economic objectives.

The instruments employed encompass economic, administrative, and social measures. The emphasis is generally on economic measures intended to affect spatial demand for labor.

The results of programs vary widely from nation to nation and from program to program, but in general they have demonstrated quite limited effectiveness. Rustication programs have sometimes achieved striking spatial demographic shifts but at unknown social and economic costs. Closed-city programs may have slowed metropolitan growth, but at the expense of a rise in corruption and other undesirable effects. Accommodationist policies raise questions of social justice and of their effect on stimulating further metropolitan growth. Intermediate-city programs have generally failed to affect growth and spread as expected. Land colonization schemes list more failures than successes and have proven expensive. Rural development schemes have increased mobility options for rural residents but have not stopped rural out-migration.

The second part of the paper considers apparent policy deficiencies and suggests needed research and other possible areas of policy improvement. The major arguments are as follows.

Population distribution policies must be viewed as complementary to spatial economic policies and more carefully integrated into national economic planning. Economic planners must become sensitive to the demographic implications of their policies, and demographic planners more conscious of spatial aspects of development processes and policies.

The spatial effect on the population of macro- and sectoral policies may outweigh those of explicit population distribution policies. Assessment of these policies, with a view to modification if required, is a major, and perhaps the highest priority, need.

Policy goals often appear to have been borrowed rather than independently designed to fit national characteristics and contexts. Further study of labor markets and the spatial relationships among labor supply, job opportunities, income, and mobility is urgently needed on a country-by-country basis, as is survey research to establish individual location preferences, mobility interactions, and benefits and costs accruing to various types of migrants to different destinations.

The need for intervention should be reassessed in the individual nations on the basis of studies of the demographic and socioeconomic consequences of current and projected mobility patterns upon individuals, households, and source and destination areas.

There appears to be considerable scope for improving programs by selecting instruments more closely matched to the determinants of migration behavior in individual countries. Distance deterrence and migrant selectivity should be incorporated into programs. Information measures are particularly promising because of the possibility of relatively low costs and shorter time periods than those demonstrated by commonly employed economic measures. Both macro- and microlevel studies, structured to include policy-relevant variables, have a role to play in improving program design and instrument selection.

An improved data base is fundamental to the research required for policy improvement. The 1980–81 round of censuses in the Asian and

Pacific region will be inadequate for planning and policy purposes. Economic planners must support migration surveys to provide the comprehensive data base necessary for policy research.

In an earlier examination of population distribution policies in developed countries, the author and a collaborator concluded that "knowledge in many areas is below the level needed to accurately guide policymakers," and that without a deeper understanding of the subject, governments "risk intervening in processes inadequately understood to achieve ends irrationally defined" (Fuchs and Demko, 1979:457). This unhappy conclusion applies equally to Asia and the Pacific, where the need for intervention is greater, the probability of success lower, and the costs of failure are likely to be higher.

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Paul Lightfoot,
Theodore Fuller,
and Peerasit Kamnuansilpa

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PREFACE

The study reported here was funded by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations' joint program for research on population and development, with material assistance also from the authors' respective departments. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Population Association of America meetings session on Forms of Impermanent Mobility, Washington, March 1981. The authors gratefully acknowledge comments made by Professors Sidney Goldstein and Murray Chapman on a preliminary draft of this paper.

ABSTRACT Recent studies in various Third World countries have revealed high rates of movement between rural and urban areas. This paper describes movement originating in part of Northeastern Thailand, a region traditionally characterized by high rates of movement but for which there are no recent microstudies of the movement process. Data are derived from complementary surveys conducted in Roi-et Province and Bangkok in 1978 and 1979. The paper analyzes movement in relation to four categories of interpersonal networks characteristic of Northeastern Thai society. These networks condition not only the characteristics of movers and their spatial patterns of movement, as has been repeatedly demonstrated elsewhere, but also the seasonality of movement. Movers are subject to the competing claims of village-based and urban-oriented networks; for most, the opportunities afforded by the latter frequently supersede obligations toward village-based networks, resulting in a lack of articulation between temporal patterns of movement on the one hand and demand for farm labor on the other. The question arises as to whether the cash remitted by rural-to-urban movers compensates for the disruptive effects of movement on local labor supplies.

Literature on modern Third World studies is replete with dualistic classificatory schemes, such as modern and traditional, capitalist and noncapitalist, urban and rural, proletariat and peasantry. The empirical basis for such dualisms as dichotomies is highly questionable; as an analytical framework a dualistic view obscures dialectical processes of contact, interaction, and change between social and economic milieux that at the extreme may be very different. Whether interaction results in a generally benevolent convergence, as the neoclassicists would have it, or in divergence and the reinforcement of the basic characteristics of each, as in underdevelopment theory, is not the main issue to be pursued here. What is important is that interaction occurs, and that as a result boundaries between differing social and economic systems and interest groups become at best fuzzy boundaries, if it is meaningful to speak of boundaries at all.

Migration between rural and urban areas is one aspect of these dialectical processes. Much of the significance of migration for modernization and development lies in its role in linking places that are spatially distant and socially and economically distinct. Migrants experience new and different physical environments, behavioral precepts, earning power, and forms of organization, socially and at work. If categorical terms are to be used, then it can be said that migration brings peasants to work as and with proletarians, students, minor officials, and petty capitalists. The migrants change as a result; but more importantly, they consciously or otherwise introduce some of the resources and trappings of urban culture into their villages. Physically returning to the villages to visit briefly or to stay and work makes them all the more influential as propagators of some image of the city. They may return as teachers, as peasants with their "peasantness" newly self-conscious and politicized, as importers of petty capitalism into their villages, or, most likely, as peasants with a little extra cash and a new gloss of urbane sophistication or "modernness." Whatever happens to the individuals, migration influences their households and large sections of their village communities. Nonmigrants find themselves confronted in their own villages with concrete or imagined facets of urban life, and they share whatever money the migrants send or bring home.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze rural-to-urban movements originating in Roi-et Province, Northeastern Thailand, in relation to the various social and economic networks within which any Northeastern farmer is likely to be enmeshed. The term "networks" is used here to mean groups of people linked by a common interest, obligation, or dependence of a social, economic, or political nature, and based on direct personal acquaintance and communication. Farmers or members of farming households are sure to be members of interlocking networks within their home villages. The networks serve to promote essentially village-centered values and obligations, and to make available social, economic, and political opportunities for individuals within the village. One of the effects of modernization is the spatial extension of interpersonal networks, including the extension into towns of originally village-based networks, and the emergence of entirely new networks that link rural and urban areas. These rural-urban networks, superimposed on traditional village networks, serve to promote their own values, obligations, and opportunities, which may or may not be compatible with those of the village.

Using this conceptual framework for rural-to-urban movement, one can ask what opportunities and obligations tend to be associated with each of several types of networks, how the competing claims of different networks are resolved by movers and prospective movers, and what the result is for the functioning of those networks. Analysis in these terms will illustrate the complexities of the process and explain why several common generalizations about cityward movement will not withstand close scrutiny in microstudies.

Various studies in other Third World countries have analyzed rural-to-urban movement in relation to voluntary organizations, in particular decisions about moving, the adjustment of movers to urban life, and the maintenance of links between places of origin and of destination (Abu-Lughod, 1961; Bruner, 1961; Little, 1965, 1973; Skeldon, 1976, 1980). These studies have focused on the urban end of the movement system. The voluntary organizations are essentially urban rather than rural phenomena, and they tend to be organizations established and run by migrants for the benefit of migrants and their home areas.

In their studies of Thailand, Textor (1961) and Fuller (1977) have indicated that identifiable organizations such as clubs and village associations, which have formal or semi-formal structures, are not important among recent rural-to-urban movers, partly because of the general lack of affinity among Thai people for such groups and also because of the short-term, circular nature of much of their movement (see Nelson, 1976). Consequently, the networks we discuss here–household, peer group, labor-exchange group, patron-client links–are characteristic of Thai society generally, not simply of migrant or otherwise spatially mobile Thais. Moreover, the movement process is analyzed more from the rural than from the urban standpoint, in order to begin to understand the effects of movement on the areas of origin.

RURAL-TO-URBAN MOVEMENT IN THAILAND

The main difficulty in establishing a general picture of the importance of cityward movement as a linking process in Thailand is inadequate measures of rates of movement. For the most part, estimates of these rates have been based on the decennial census and on other survey data that cover only long-term moves. The Thai census defines migrants as people whose place of "normal" residence was different on census day from that five years previously. The word "normal" is important, because it is intended to exclude people who have lived in a different place for less than two months. Thus the census estimate that 5.3 percent of the population had migrated between 1965 and 1970 cannot be taken as a measure of the total volume of movement.

Microstudies conducted in Thailand indicate that rates of rural-to-urban movement are far higher than the census suggests. Such movement includes local circulation between rural areas (van Roy, 1971; Moerman, 1968; Kirsch, 1966; de Young, 1963; Singhanetra-Renard, 1981) and movement to provincial towns (Lefferts, 1974) and to Bangkok (Klausner, 1972; Textor, 1961) as a means of extending the earning potential of rural households. Working with national-level surveys, Goldstein et al. (1977) found a high degree of continuing interaction between urban migrants and their home villages. Their study suggests that migration plays a role as an agent of change in rural areas independently of the physical return of the migrants.

Most of these observations of high rates of mobility have been qualitative, and there is as yet no reliable basis for estimating total rates of movement beyond the particular local areas investigated intensively in microstudies. Keyes is more precise: he found in his study of villages in Mahasarakham (Northeastern Region) that 71 percent of men of ages 20–39 had lived a month or longer in a city, and 52 percent had lived in Bangkok (Keyes, 1966). More recently, Lauro (1979) has provided the most detailed analysis yet available of movement, principally circular movement. In the village he studied in Ayuddayah Province (Central Region), he found that "over 13 percent of all villagers were regularly away from the community for several months each year" as "seasonal migrants" (Lauro, 1979:251). In total, 35.5 percent of villagers had ever been "seasonal migrants," in the sense that "during periods of reported residence elsewhere they had returned to the community to participate in rice farming activities"; 17.9 percent were classified as "return migrants," having returned to the village after an absence of one year or more. An important finding from Lauro's survey is that the rate of seasonal movement had increased dramatically, an upsurge first occurring in the early 1960s. The number of villagers becoming seasonal movers for the first time tripled between the two five-year periods of 1957–61 and 1962–66. Further substantial increases occurred during the mid-1970s, up to the survey year of 1976. Expressed in person-years of seasonal migration as a percentage of total person-years lived among people 15–64 years old, the rate of seasonal movement tripled from the period 1962–66 to the period 1972–76, from 11 to 33 percent (Lauro, 1979:254). By the mid-1970s, approximately half of all seasonal migrants were moving to Bangkok.

Rates estimated by Singhanetra-Renard (1981) for movements to towns from a village near Chiengmai are lower than those computed by Lauro, and the movements less oriented toward Bangkok. No comparable estimates have yet been published for the Northeastern Region. In 1979, however, the Labor Department surveyed village headmen throughout Roi-et Province in an attempt to estimate the numbers of villagers who sought work in other provinces "after the harvest." The unpublished statistics indicate that, for the province as a whole, 9.7 percent of the rural population migrated in that one season alone. Although the accuracy of the survey is difficult to substantiate, the proportion is consistent with recent findings in six Roi-et villages, as discussed below.

THE STUDY AREA

Roi-et was settled relatively early in the history of the Northeastern Region, and throughout the nineteenth century it was one of the main centers of economic and political activity beyond Korat. It became and remains the most densely settled Northeastern province, with 133 persons per square kilometer, compared with 93 for the region. But the combined effects of events in the last 50 years have created a social and economic environment highly conducive to the outward movement of the population.

The influences of the modern Thai state and its commercial networks have penetrated the province enough to reduce the death rate and cause population growth there to accelerate rapidly, reaching 3.3 percent per year during 1970–76; to create a strong image in the minds of the people of a materially better life elsewhere, through the rapid economic growth of Bangkok and of mass communications (Lightfoot et al., 1981); and to make distant places far more accessible than ever before, through the rapid improvement of transportation services. Atsamat, a district town of 2,000 inhabitants, has a direct and inexpensive twice-weekly bus service to Bangkok, 700 kilometers away.

Yet in the face of these changes little has occurred locally either to provide for the needs of greater numbers of people or to improve their living standards. Roi-et has practically no frontier land where the agricultural area could be extended. Neither traders nor the government has done much to intensify and modernize agriculture, which is still dependent almost everywhere on traditional crops, seed varieties, farming techniques, and rainfall rather than on irrigation. There has been little urban development: in 1979 the town of Roi-et had a population of 30,209 engaged in administration, commerce, and services rather than manufacturing. Unlike some other Northeastern towns–Korat, Khon Kaen, Udornthani, and Ubonratchathani (see Map 1)–Roi-et has never been designated a growth pole. District towns within the province have 2,000–5,000 people each, and are distinguished from surrounding villages only by a district office, one or two repair shops, a few general stores and restaurants, and a small morning market for fresh produce. Ranked by gross provincial product, Roi-et is the second poorest of Thailand's 72 provinces. It had higher net and gross rates of migration to Bangkok during 1965–70 than any other Northeastern province, as shown in Table 1. Rates of out-movement have probably increased since.

Little more would need be said if one were seeking a macrolevel understanding of movement out of Roi-et. But questions remain that are central to any attempt at assessing the effects of rural-to-urban movement, and at controlling or managing the process. It is in an effort to answer these questions that our analysis of movement focuses on interpersonal networks.

DATA

This analysis of movement at the "rural end" is based on field work conducted in 1979 in six villages in Atsamat District, Roi-et. Aside from many semi-structured conversations that provided the basis for qualitative observations, formal interviews in 356 households constituted the principal source of data. Household registration cards, corroborated and amended by village headmen, provided the sampling frame. We used random sampling procedures, with the proviso that households would be included only if they contained at least one male or one never married female between the ages of 15 and 39 who was presently living in the household. In each household separate interviews were conducted with the household head and a member of the household between ages 15 and 39, either a male or a never married female. The sample included about 50 percent of the households in each of the six villages.

All the demographic and movement data from the Roi-et survey are from a representative of each sampled household, normally the head or the spouse of the head of the household. Respondents were asked to provide information for all persons over the age of 10 whom they

MAP 1 Northeastern Thailand and Roi-et Province


LAOS
Mekong River
Nongkhai
Loei
Udonthani
Sakon Nakhon
Nakhon Phanom
BANGKOK
0 40
km
Khon Kaen
Kalasin
Mahasarakham
Roi-Et
Yasothon
Chaiyaphum
Ubonratchathani
Sisaket
Buriram
Nakhon Ratchasima
Surin
KAMPUCHEA
National boundary
Provincial boundary
Provincial town
District town

considered to be members of their households. Regarding out-movement, household heads were asked which members had been absent for one night or longer during each of four agricultural seasons per year over a three-year reference period, from the "before-harvest" season of 1976 to the "planting" season of 1979, or a total of 12 seasons. For the one year (four seasons) prior to the interview, heads were also asked what proportion of each season had household members spent in the village and what proportion had they spent in the

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TABLE 1 Five-year migration from Northeastern provinces to Bangkok: 1965–70

Province	Population, ages 5+	Migrants to Bangkok	Migrants from Bangkok	Rate of migration from Bangkok	Rate of migration to Bangkok	Net rate of migration to Bangkok
Kalasin	459,121	1,878	505	0.1	0.4	0.3
Khon Kaen	853,103	4,864	2,826	0.3	0.6	0.2
Chaiyaphum	155,398	2,441	608	0.1	0.5	0.4
Nakhon Phanom	461,843	1,139	925	0.2	0.2	0.0
Nakhon Ratchasima	1,223,930	13,143	6,500	0.5	1.1	0.5
Buriram	644,215	3,156	837	0.1	0.5	0.4
Mahasarakham	446,625	3,194	616	0.1	0.7	0.6
ROI-ET	638,053	9,976	1,011	0.2	1.6	1.4
Loei	267,127	487	494	0.2	0.2	0.0
Sisaket	646,461	4,907	734	0.1	0.8	0.6
Sakon Nakhon	484,317	1,212	686	0.1	0.3	0.1
Surin	620,605	4,734	753	0.1	0.8	0.6
Nongkhai	359,759	838	724	0.2	0.2	0.0
Udonthani	893,866	2,626	3,457	0.4	0.3	0.1
Ubon Ratchathani	1,204,028	12,218	2,916	0.2	1.0	0.8

SOURCE: 1970 Census volumes for Phra Nakhon and Thonburi provinces.

place of destination. These questions were designed to capture the full range of movement from the brief visits to town by villagers and the equally brief returns home by people now living most of the time in town, to the once-only move to town that might become a permanent change of residence. By using household heads as informants, we could gather data both for people in the village and those away at the time of the survey. A related survey was used to collect information from individuals concerning their moving experiences. The reference to agricultural seasons was intended both to aid the memories of the informants and to facilitate analysis of the temporal patterns of movement in relation to the variations in demand for farm labor.

One of the measurement problems associated with this procedure is the demand it makes on the memories of the informants. This problem was minimized by careful interviewing, with cross-checks wherever possible between responses to different questions, and with references to specific events to jog respondents' memories. Other problems are partly of measurement and partly conceptual. Given the fluid, continuous process of movement in and out of the study villages, household membership is difficult to define adequately. How should someone be classified who has been living in town for several years, but makes occasional village visits to bring money or help with the harvest? Is he still a household member and are his moves therefore to be included in the analysis, or not? In his movements he may behave in precisely the same way whether he is married or single; should marriage therefore affect the category into which he is placed? What of the man who spends half his time in the village and half in town, and has a house, work, and family in each location? These are some of the conceptual problems, whose resolution affects the way in which rates of movement are calculated, as do differences among household heads in their criteria for deciding who is a household member and who is not. The complexities of the household's role in migration decisions are discussed later. For the time being it can be said that we deemed people to have left the household if they were absent for an extended period, did not contribute to the household economically, and, most importantly, if they had married. Absence and noncontribution, or absence and marriage, would usually be enough for a former member not to be counted as a member at the time of the survey, but no one of these characteristics would normally be sufficient by itself for exclusion.

The six study villages vary in size, with populations of 72 to 163 households, or from 480 to 1,100 people, in 1979. They are grouped in two communes, Nong Muun Than and Phon Muang, separated by 25–35 kilometers, or 60–80 minutes by car (See Map 2). At the time of the survey there was practically no sealed road in the entire district. Each village was accessible by car at all seasons of the year, although this had been true only since the creation of new minor roads under the Tambon Development Program, inaugurated in 1975. Prior to that year access by vehicle during the rainy season, from June through October, was at best uncertain. Even the present roads occasionally become impassable through flooding and erosion. Transport services are now generally good, there being many privately run motorcycles, minibuses, and pick-up trucks available for passengers.

As for commercial services, each of the six villages has at least one rice mill. The larger villages each have one or two shops selling basic household goods. Each village has a primary school; one village–

MAP 2 The study villages in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province


to Roi-et
Thawatburi District
Selaphum District
Kok
TAMBON PHON MUANG
Nam Kham
0 5
km
Chii River
Non
Atsamat District
THAILAND
Atsamat
BANGKOK
TAMBON NONG MUUN THAN
Suwanaphum District
Nong Hua Khon
Nong Muun Than
Phanom Phrai District
Kracai
● Study villages
○ Other villages
District boundary
A.R.D. laterite road
Minor roads

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Nong Muun Than–also has a secondary school for children up to the age of 15.[1]

A second, complementary survey was conducted in Bangkok and included 788 people who had moved from any Northeastern province and were currently working in the capital. The sampling method in this case was purposive in nature, thus avoiding the enormous problems of obtaining an equal probability sample of Northeastern migrants in a city of 5 million people. Interviewers were instructed to search in parts of Bangkok known to have concentrations of Northeasterners, such as the Hua Lampong area, and gradually to build up lists of places where individuals could be interviewed. In all cases interviews were conducted, with the employers' approval, at places of work. We used quotas to ensure that the sample included adequate numbers in various occupations. The survey yielded valuable insights into movers' experiences in Bangkok; nevertheless, the nature of the sample means that any inferences about the total population of Northeasterners in the city must be made with great caution.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the distribution of the Bangkok sample by occupation and by province of origin. On the basis of National Statistical Office (NSO) surveys of migrants in Bangkok, it seems likely that Northeasterners working in government jobs were overrepresented in our sample, whereas those in laboring and factory employment were underrepresented (NSO, 1978a). Noteworthy is the large number of movers from Roi-et (Table 3), particularly in relation to the total population of the province (see Table 1), which confirms that the high rate of out-movement to Bangkok identified in the 1970 census was continuing.

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[1] One final point should be made concerning data collection in the study villages. The survey was conducted in conjunction with a controlled experiment in the use of information as a means of redirecting movement toward Northeastern towns as opposed to Bangkok. The results of that experiment are discussed elsewhere (Fuller and Lightfoot, 1982). Briefly, the level of movement to towns within the Northeastern region increased during the seven-month period when the information program operated, for particular groups of villagers in three out of the six study villages. Owing to aggregation for the purposes of the present paper, however, few of the figures presented below have been noticeably affected by the information program. A few instances in which figures may have been distorted in this way are footnoted.

TABLE 2 Northeastern migrants in Bangkok: distribution of the sample by occupation

Occupation	Number	Percentage
Unskilled laborer	72	9.1
Servant or housekeeper	102	12.9
Construction worker	90	11.4
Bus conductor or driver	93	11.8
Repairman or skilled worker	84	10.7
Government official or worker	110	14.0
Entertainer (singer, actor, etc.)	45	5.7
Vendor	47	6.0
Service provider	60	7.6
Factory worker	72	9.1
Professional	12	1.5
Unknown	1	0.1
All occupations	788	99.9

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.

SOURCE: Survey of Northeasterners in Bangkok.

MOBILITY RATES

The high rates of mobility among Roi-et people stem from long-established traditions of movement. The Thai-Lao people are relative newcomers to the Northeast of Thailand, and migration associated with the filling-in of the settlement pattern is continuing in some areas (Ng, 1969). There is a long tradition of movement to avoid the occasionally unreasonable demands by local princes for rice and labor. Moreover, there is the tradition of *pay thiaw,* according to which young men, often in groups, travel in search of adventure, money, and wives (Kirsch, 1966). Finally, Buddhist monks have traveled extensively in certain seasons of the year for educational purposes, establishing links between temples; and those links in turn have been conducive to moves of a more secular kind. Much of the movement between the Northeast and Bangkok before about 1950 seems to have been related to links established between monks and temples.[2] There is no evidence

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[2] There is evidence from Northern Thailand that, at least in the area of Chiangkham, movement in association with trade in the late nineteenth century was considerably more extensive than is generally realized (Moerman, 1975). The

TABLE 3 Northeastern migrants in Bangkok: distribution of the sample by province of origin

Province	Number	Percentage
Ubon Ratchathani	116	14.7
Roi-et	91	11.5
Nakhon Ratchasima	77	9.8
Khon Kaen	67	8.5
Surin	58	7.4
Yasothon[a]	57	7.2
Chaiyaphum	51	6.5
Udonthani	46	5.8
Mahasarakham	39	4.9
Sisaket	37	4.7
Sakon Nakhon	37	4.7
Kalasin	32	4.1
Buriram	27	3.4
Nongkhai	26	3.3
Nakhon Phanom	23	2.9
Loei	3	0.4
Province not stated	1	0.1
All provinces	788	99.9

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.

a Yasothon was created out of Ubon Ratchathani Province after the 1970 census.

SOURCE: Survey of Northeasterners in Bangkok.

as to whether people from Atsamat joined the seasonal movement of Northeasterners to farms in the Central Region in the early decades of this century (Johnston, 1976). Studies in Bangkok as well as data from this study show that movement from Roi-et to the capital was well established by the mid-1950s. Several members of the study villages had made what was then a difficult journey, walking for most of the 150 kilometers to the railway station at Ban Phai.

Rural-to-urban movement has become an integral part of the social and economic life of the six study villages. Depending somewhat on the time of year, there is either a noticeable absence of young people and many heads of households, or a constant coming and going as

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historical significance of trade in initiating population movements in the Northeastern Region is still to be explored.

movers leave their villages and return from their temporary stays in town. Even those who have not moved recently have friends and relatives in town; and opportunities, problems, and acquaintances in town are common topics of conversation.

Among the population of ages 10 and over who were regarded as members of the sampled households in 1979, 23 percent had spent some time in town during the preceding three years. During the three-year reference period a total of 962 rural-urban moves were made by 442 people out of a total of 1,923 people in 356 households. Movement had occurred from 77 percent of all sampled households.

This movement was heavily oriented toward the city of Bangkok, the destination for 57 percent of all rural-to-urban moves. Sixteen percent of the population over the age of 10 had spent some time in Bangkok during the three years, 59 percent of all households had some form of migratory link with the capital, and in some cases as many as four household members had moved there. By comparison, only 32 percent of the households had migratory links with any Northeastern town, and only 7 percent of the population over the age of 10 had moved to any town within the Northeast Region. Less than 1 percent had moved to both Bangkok and a Northeastern town and about 1 percent had moved to other towns besides Bangkok and those in the Northeast.

Most of the moves were circular and involved fairly short periods spent in towns at any one stretch. Among movers who had visited Bangkok and were in the study villages during the survey period, 31 percent had stayed in Bangkok for 30 days or less. But 41 percent had stayed for longer than 90 days on any one visit. Most of those who had moved had done so more than once, the mean number of moves being 2.2 per person.

Before investigating the processes underlying these rather starkly presented figures it is instructive to compare the rates derived from this study with those of the census and registration system. The 1970 census indicates that the number of people moving from Roi-et to Bangkok during the period 1965–70 amounted to only 1.6 percent of the population 5 years old and over living in Roi-et Province in 1970 (Table 1). A more recent source, the residential register, records a rate of out-movement from Roi-et to all destinations of 1.6 percent per year for the period 1975–77. The differences between the census and registration system figures may reflect in part an increased rate of movement during the 1970s. The more important differences lie between those two rates and that from the surveys of the six study villages. Owing to their short duration, most of the moves recorded in the course of this study would be missed by both of the other two sources. The registration system would miss them because people are unlikely to go to the trouble of registering their moves when they expect, as most movers do, to return sooner or later to their home villages. The number of out-moves actually registered for people still living who had once lived in the six study villages amounted to only 10 percent of the total number of people absent from the villages at the time of the survey. The census would miss most of the short-term moves, even if they happened to coincide with the time at which the census was conducted, because it records place of residence on a *de jure* rather than a *de facto* basis.

Therefore, although both the census and the registration system identify Roi-et as a province with a greater than average rate of outmigration, those sources greatly understate the total volume of movement that has been taking place. Movement is dominated by short-term, repeated, circular moves rather than by once-only rural-to-urban transfers of the Roi-et population. Both the survey and the census data show that Bangkok is by far the most important destination. A question that cannot at present be answered is whether similar relationships among census, registration, and village survey data could be identified in other Thai provinces.

NETWORKS

The networks of interest are the household, the labor-exchange group (which in some respects is an extension of the household within the village), the peer group, and patron-client links. After outlining the main characteristics of these networks that are relevant to rural-to-urban movement, we assess their effects and the ways in which they are affected by movement, focusing on selected characteristics of movers, the spatial patterns of moves, the timing and duration of moves, and the movers' experiences in towns.

The household consists of relatives who live together most of the time and share work responsibilities and a common purse. The size of households in the study villages ranged from two to 14 persons; the mean was 6.8. Such figures fail to show the almost continuous state of change in a household, as children mature and take on increasing economic roles, making both demands on and contributions to the household as a whole. When they marry, an associated change is the addition of a spouse to the household or the departure of the married son or daughter to a different household, accompanied by the gain or loss of the brideprice. With these variations in size and structure, households have varying degrees of ability and inclination to respond through migration to economic hardships or to capitalize on opportunities caused by general economic development. Household size and composition might therefore influence not only the propensity to move, but also the tendency toward economic differentiation so often observed within villages.

The usual pattern is for husbands to move into the houses of their parents-in-law in the early years of marriage, before setting up a separate household. It is considered normal for the youngest daughter and her husband to stay on in her parents' house, which they eventually inherit. Consequently, the composition of a household tends to pass through several stages, beginning with the young nuclear family and followed by two or three married children and their spouses residing there with their own children; gradually the married children depart, leaving the youngest daughter with her own family and a surviving parent.

This dynamic, changing nature of interpersonal relations within the household is important to bear in mind when assessing the influence of the household on rural-to-urban movement. In spite of commonly repeated assertions about the strength of the household as a social unit in peasant societies, and in the Thai case about the importance of *bun khun*[3] in cementing relations among households, there is a constant process of disintegration and reformulation of households. The Thai literature presents two quite different interpretations of how the household network affects and is affected by the process of movement from rural to urban areas.

Lefferts (1974), in his analysis of daily commuting into the city of Khon Kaen, represented the urban economy as an opportunity for farm families and villages to increase their resources through income-earning activities. Commuting of household members, he suggested, was an attempt by household heads to extend the income-earning potential of the household. We may extend this view by portraying at least some household heads as encouraging their children to take advantage of whatever urban opportunities are available, in the interests of both the child and, through remittances of cash, the household. This interpretation is consistent at the microlevel with Griffin's (1976) broader view of out-movement as beneficial to rural economies. In contrast, Klausner (1972) saw increased rates of movement by young people from Ubonratchathani to Bangkok as a sign of the breakdown of family and village society, and particularly of losses of labor in the village in defiance of the wishes of older village residents. Thus in Griffin's view the family plays a positive role in migration to the city and benefits from it, whereas according to Klausner the family is the unwilling victim of whatever processes outside the household give rise to movement to town.

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[3] The term *bun khun* refers to children's sense of continued obligation to their parents, in reciprocation for their parents' care for them as children.

It appears at first sight that family conflicts over decisions about moving to town are unlikely to arise, because most household heads seem to favor urbanward movement by household members. They percieve there to be more economic and other advantages than disadvantages to themselves and to the movers. For most household heads, however, support for the idea of moving is equivocal: many would prefer their children to move to towns within the Northeastern Region than to Bangkok, mainly because the shorter distances involved would enable movers to return to the village more frequently (Lightfoot et al., 1981).

In Roi-et there was considerably more willingness among household heads to have their sons move than for their daughters to leave home. The reason for this preference was that heads feared more for their daughters than for their sons in town, but they generally considered daughters to be more reliable in sending money home to the household. Most importantly, household heads' support for moving was conditional upon the mover returning each planting and harvest season, so that there would be no significant loss of family labor on the farm. This proviso was strongly expressed by many household heads.

Although many prospective movers acknowledged their parents' influence on moving decisions, it would be an exaggeration to say that household heads controlled the movements of all members of their households. Among respondents 15–39 years of age who were not themselves household heads, 65 percent said they would follow the advice of their household head concerning any move; thus over a third would apparently not feel constrained in this way. Almost half (47 percent) of the Northeasterners interviewed in Bangkok said that their parents had not approved of their decisions to move.

Labor-exchange groups consist of households, usually within a single village, that cooperate in performing tasks requiring more labor than is available within each household individually. A few members from as many as ten households help with the planting, harvesting, or threshing of rice, or with less regular tasks such as house construction. There is an understanding that each participating household will benefit in proportion to the assistance it contributes to the group. The precise nature of such *long khaek* agreements varies from place to place and over time; the agreements often include the provision of food for the workers by each "host" in turn, and may extend to some form of assistance for member households whose crops fail.

The labor-exchange network is composed of households rather than individuals, and if it affects the propensity of any individual to move it does so through the household head. He is aware that having a household member move to town during the planting or harvest season will entail not only a loss of that member's labor, but also a reduction or loss of the benefits of membership in the labor-exchange group, most importantly the ability to call on a relatively large labor force at crucial periods in the agricultural calendar. Similarly, the absence of individuals at those times affects the labor-exchange group as a whole through the household, resulting in a reduction of both total labor and the level of cooperation among households.

The importance of labor-exchange groups has declined considerably throughout Northeastern Thailand as a result of the general monetization of the economy. Independently of rural-to-urban movement, people with enough land and a large enough cash income are able to pay for farm labor, and this has helped undermine the cooperative principle of the *long khaek* tradition.

Peer groups consist of friends, usually of the same sex and of about the same age and economic, social, and political standing. They may overlap to a considerable extent with labor-exchange groups. In Northeastern Thai culture much value is put on friendship and the maintenance of peer-group relations, as encapsulated in the prevalent concept of *phuuk siaw* ("binding together"), or solidarity and loyalty among friends. These relations may be highly influential networks in conditioning the movement process, in several ways. They represent the most immediately accessible social grouping outside of the household;

and any ideas, information, or obligations that are circulated within the networks almost inevitably carry a good deal of weight. Moreover, peer groups have often cooperated in both traditional and modern movements to either rural or urban areas, and this shared experience has reinforced the structure of the groups. There are many stories about four, six, or ten young men leaving the village together in search of work. Johnston (1976) has written of much larger groups moving from the Northeast to the Central Plain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Household heads in our study villages reported that they worried less about their children who moved in groups, which are believed to afford both protection and a source of continued contact with the village, than they did about children who left home alone. Thus the existence of peer groups not only increases the prospective movers' confidence about moving, but also serves to neutralize a household head's opposition to his son's or daughter's move. There are cases of friends alternating their urban visits, taking turns to stay in the same room in town and to look after each other's village responsibilities. Finally, the long experience of cityward movement in the villages means that most peer groups include at any one moment at least one member who is in town. Eighty percent of respondents of ages 15–39 in our study knew and could provide personal details of at least one such person, and it was common for respondents to know half a dozen or more temporary or permanent urban dwellers. Most of these urban contacts were from the same village, but in some cases they included people whom the respondent had met on a previous visit to town. Contact was maintained with friends in town both directly through occasional visits in both directions and through letters and messages taken by other circular movers. Such friends were crucially important as sources of information about jobs and other opportunities in town, and they were almost always considered able and willing to provide housing and help in looking for work should a villager move to town.

Much has been written about the role of patron-client relationships in Thai and other Southeast Asian societies (Scott and Kerkvliet, 1973; Rabibhadana, 1969; Mulder, 1978). The term "patron-client relationship" is used here in a broad sense, to indicate a dyadic relationship rather than a network, one involving people at different social, economic, and political levels, and which is defined by those differences in levels. The more powerful partner in the relationship, with greater access to a variety of resources, is able to help his clients gain some degree of access to those resources. Scott and Kerkvliet differentiate patron-client links from other vertical, dyadic ties that are more functional or coercive. Patron-client links "involve a diffuse and flexible pattern of reciprocity between a powerful man and his follower" (p. 244). The tie is more one of friendship than of contract, and the rewards to each partner lie in nonmaterial and indirectly material benefits such as "loyalty" and "protection," as well as in directly material advantages. Nevertheless, Scott and Kerkvliet (1973) and Siamwalla (1980) discuss the transformation of many patron-client links toward more functional and exploitive forms as part of the process of modernization. For today's Northeastern Thai villager, patrons may be bureaucrats, politicians, or simply wealthy men who are in a position to help their clients, or *luk nongs,* by giving work, administrative favors, or advice, or by lending money, land, or goods in exchange for labor, rent, and loyalty. They may also be local traders or money lenders who are powerful enough to dictate or strongly influence local rates for interest, wages, and crop prices, particularly where poor farmers have no choice but to sell rights to their crops in order to survive financially until harvest time.

Like peer groups, patron-client links in Roi-et commonly extend into urban areas and influence rural-to-urban movement. Urban-based patrons are in a position not only to help migrants to find work, but also to provide work. They may be employers themselves, or foremen who prefer to hire people whom they already know or have heard about from others. They assist the newcomers because they benefit from a degree of continuity in their labor force, and from knowing something of the origins of their workers, or because they have some personal link with the village and a resulting sense of obligation. Textor (1961) and Scott (1976) have noted cases in which patron loyalties have been mobilized for political purposes within Bangkok. Patrons' favors in urban areas, like those in villages, often extend beyond simply providing work; they commonly include the provision of shelter.

Our study of Northeasterners in Bangkok showed that 47 percent of circular movers stayed with their employers. Such hospitality on the part of patrons is even more common for migrants working in the construction industry, where temporary accommodation is provided on the site as a matter of course. But the number of movers and prospective movers who knew patrons able to provide work was quite small even in such a high-mobility area as Roi-et, where one would expect the proportion to be higher than elsewhere: 5 percent of respondents, including some with and others without the experience of having moved to town themselves, knew someone who they said was in a position to provide employment.

No doubt it is partly because of the links provided by both patron-client and peer-group networks that those in the study villages with a history of circular movement reported little difficulty in finding work in town. To the extent that recent movers do face an unemployment problem, as in the case reported by Chamratrithirong (1979) of the 12 percent of males and 9 percent of females who failed to find work after over 90 days in Bangkok, the problem may be greatest for those moving from areas without the well-established rural-urban interaction networks that exist in the study villages.

One must also bear in mind the propensity of rural Thais to make decisions and act independently of social and economic networks. The independence of individuals and the resulting "loose structure" of Thai society have been widely discussed in the sociological literature (Embree, 1950; Evers, 1969; Mulder, 1978). When asked the reasons for a particular decision, and who influenced them, many farmers claim not to have had or needed any advice, and to have acted on their own initiative. This pattern of behavior has become more plausible with the coming of mass communications. Most households now have radios, visiting mobile theaters occasionally show movies, and in the study villages contact with towns is so common that most residents have at least a generalized image of city life. Nevertheless, the key questions are not whether social and economic networks condition movement, but how much and in what ways they do so, allowing greater or lesser latitude for individuals; and what the effects of movement are on other members of those networks.

SPATIAL PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT

The migration literature includes many accounts of movers following relatives and friends to the same town and even to the same area of town, the same boarding house, the same type of work, and the same employer. The result is that underlying the aggregate patterns of movement between provinces and regions are highly place-specific routes linking particular villages with particular urban destinations, established and sustained through the medium of information and offers of help sent or taken back by earlier movers. Much movement in Thailand conforms to such micropatterns. Most people in the villages of Roi-et moved only when they knew of a specific job and place to stay; and information about both almost invariably came from either the movers' own experience and urban contacts, or from fellow villagers already in town. Destinations for working males were most commonly construction sites, factories, and taxi-driving jobs, in many instances obtained through the same foremen or taxi-fleet owners. Female movers, who according to Chamratrithirong (1979) are more likely than males to have arranged a job before moving, tended to work in factories and as house servants. They too depended heavily on friends from their home villages for information about these jobs. Repeated moves to relatively specialized industries engender skills and a useful familiarity with those industries, as Stretton (1981) has demonstrated with respect to construction workers in Manila. Skills reinforce the influence of peer-group and patron-client networks on the prospective mover's choice of destination.

As we noted earlier, most movement from Roi-et was to Bangkok. There were also links between the study villages and the tin industry in southern Thailand; sugar refineries in Kanchanaburi, a province beyond Bangkok, but from which trucks were sent once a year to recruit and transport laborers to the sugar areas for the harvest period (Breman, 1978/79); the sea-going fishing industry of Chantaburi; and some towns within the Northeast, particularly Roi-et and Khon Kaen. But most of these links were specific to particular households and groups of households, and, significantly, there was no village-wide pool of information about urban opportunities. Thus households and peer groups within villages were important networks for conditioning destination choices. As we reported earlier, household heads preferred their household members to move to Northeastern towns, and the orientation of most moves toward Bangkok suggests some degree of conflict between the heads' preferences and the spatial distribution of prospective movers' urban contacts. Most movers would not consider going to any town other than Bangkok because they had no information about opportunities elsewhere, and no friends or relatives with whom to stay.

One should be careful not to overstate the importance of village-urban networks in determining destination choices, especially in view of the Thai predilection for personal freedom. Once in town movers become involved in urban networks, often quite independently of any links with their home villages. Our data indicate that "branching out" socially is usually a slow, difficult, and not particularly necessary or desirable process for the Northeasterner. Nevertheless, Chamratrithirong (1979) found that after less than six months in Bangkok 21 percent of male and 16 percent of female movers from all regions had established "very close" relationships with new city-based neighbors. He also observed an associated tendency toward increasingly "urban" behavior patterns among movers to Bangkok.

One would expect that with increased urban experience a mover would be less likely to follow well-trodden village-city routes and more likely to establish new routes for villagers whom he or she was sponsoring. Consequently, within a broad framework the microlevel spatial patterns of rural-to-urban moves can be expected to be in an almost constant state of change. Nevertheless, most changes in destinations on successive visits occur within the same city; as we noted earlier, only 1 percent of the population of the study villages had moved to both Bangkok and a Northeastern town during the three-year reference period. One result of the importance of personal networks in initiating and maintaining rural-to-urban movement is a great deal of inertia in the general spatial orientations of movement. Regardless of the actual distribution of jobs and other opportunities, prospective movers almost always follow their friends and relatives to the same towns, if not to the same jobs, unless other equally credible information networks are established to link them with alternative destinations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MOVERS

Demographic and household characteristics

Although there are occasional conflicts within households as to who should move, where, and when, the variations in propensity to move shown in Table 4 show that social constraints on movement continue to operate with considerable effect within the villages, making rural-to-urban movement a highly selective process. Without at this stage making any distinction by duration or frequency of absence, we see that the highest rates of movement occurred among single people in the age group 25–29. In fact, for single people of both sexes the propensity to move increased steadily till the age of 30, after which the

TABLE 4 Proportions of Northeastern villagers who moved at least once during 1976–79, by marital status, relation to household head, sex, and age group

Marital status, relation to head, and sex	Age group													
	10–14		15–19		20–24		25–29		30–39		40–49		50+	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
MARRIED														
Head														
Male					2	*	9	44	70	39	70	17	104	5
Female[a]					6	17	17	0	90	4	71	0	77	1
Not head														
Male	1	*	5	40	36	53	49	41	60	28	13	23	8	0
Female[a]	1	*	13	31	62	32	41	12	42	5	5	0	7	0
SINGLE														
Head														
Male									3	*			2	*
Female							2	*	1	*	1	*	1	*
Not head														
Male	183	2	181	44	104	68	43	77	11	45	3	*		
Female	173	5	163	52	65	62	8	75	7	0	3	*	1	*
WIDOWED/DIVORCED														
Male			1	*			2	*	3	*	3	*	16	0
Female					3	*	3	*	5	20	16	6	52	0

* Sample size (fewer than 5) too small for percentage to be meaningful.

[a] In the case of females, "head" is defined as head of household or wife of head.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

numbers become too small to make confident statements. This increase is obscured by the fact that the greatest numbers of movers are considerably younger, 37 percent under the age of 20 and 67 percent under the age of 25 in our sample. The high rates of movement for young females, higher than the rates for males up to the age of 20, reflect the increasing mobility of Thai women noted by Arnold (1978). This mobility of young women is curious in view of many household heads' reluctance to have their daughters move, and particularly because female movers are more likely than their male counterparts to move to Bangkok, the least-favored urban destination from household heads' viewpoint. The Bangkok bias among female movers probably reflects the greater availability of opportunities there for female employment; but the generally high propensity of young unmarried women to move indicates the importance of social and economic networks outside the household in overcoming the preferences and in some cases the commands of household heads with respect to their children's behavior.

Table 4 shows that marriage reduces the propensity to move. Its effect is understated in this table because many of the moves recorded for persons who were married at the time of our interviews probably occurred while those persons were still single. The figures strongly suggest that marriage limits female mobility far more than male mobility, especially for women who are either heads or wives of heads of households: 39 percent of married male heads of households in the 30–39 age group had moved during the three-year reference period, compared with only 4 percent of women who were married and either heads or wives of heads.

Married men of ages 25–39 were more likely to have moved if they were heads of households than if they were living as subordinate members of an extended family. One reason may be that as household heads they had greater decision-making power than other men and were thus more able to take advantage of urban opportunities. But the principal reason is that they were heads of relatively young, nuclear families in which they had the greatest potential for generating income. Their households lacked adult labor for the farm, and therefore opportunities for increasing income within the village were very limited; and there was no one else within their households capable of seeking work in town. The propensity of these heads to move was therefore a rational response to difficult circumstances while the household was passing through a particular stage.

Economic characteristics

Whatever the role is of household size and structure in influencing the moving decisions of members, one would expect economic status to have an important influence on such decisions. Analysis at the level of the individual is hampered, however, by two complicating factors. First, the individual's perception of economic circumstances may be more important than his or her actual economic level in the decision-making process. Perceived economic level is a function of the interplay among the household, peer-group, and patron-client networks, for it is from information acquired and assimilated through the last two that any sense of relative wealth or deprivation, or of opportunities elsewhere, is established in the mind of the individual villager. Consequently, a poor household apparently most in need of having a member go to earn money in town may be constrained from doing so by its exclusion from peer-group and patron-client networks that make urban opportunities familiar and accessible. Second, the relationship between economic well-being, whether perceived or absolute, and propensity to move is not linear. Although, for example, Roi-et's high level of out-movement may be attributed to general poverty, the migration literature indicates that the poorest individuals within any locality are not necessarily the most likely to move to town. Some, such as those who have lost their land, may be driven to move as a matter of survival, but such cases are unusual in Northeastern Thailand. Moving to town in search of an alternative or supplementary source of livelihood involves risk, and the poorest are the least likely to take chances that may jeopardize whatever slender resources they have. In contrast, the relatively wealthy are most able to withstand the loss of some family labor and the costs of moving, and can therefore capitalize on urban opportunities. Bearing these points in mind, there is no reason to expect simple relationships between measures of economic welfare and propensity to move.

Since rice farming was the principal occupation and source of income for 93 percent of the households, farm size is an indication of economic level. The mean area of land farmed was 4.6 hectares (29 *rai*) per household, and as shown in Table 5 most farmers were owners of their land. Eighty-six percent owned all the land that they used; renting neither to nor from others; 9 percent rented some or all of their land from others; 4 percent rented some or all of their land to others. Renting to others was associated with an inadequate supply of

TABLE 5 Percentage distribution of households by land-ownership class and township

Class	Nong Muun Than	Phon Muang	Total
No land owned or used	2	1	1
None owned, all rented from others	6	2	4
Some owned, some rented from others	4	6	5
All owned, none rented from or to others	82	89	86
Some owned, some rented to others	5	1	3
All land rented to others	2	1	1
All classes	101	100	100

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

family labor, as in cases where the male household head had died or left, rather than with a particularly large size of holding. There were only the earliest signs of the emergence of a true rentier class within these villages, which were characteristic in this respect of most of Northeastern Thailand.

Nevertheless there were considerable variations in the size and adequacy of farms within the area. As shown in Table 6 a large group of farmers may be described as having an intermediate level of economic well-being. Almost one half (47 percent) of all farmers owned from 0.24 to 0.71 hectares of paddy land for each member of the household; few in this group rented to or from others. Some farmers were considerably better off than the average, however. The median amount of land owned was 0.56 hectares per household member, but 21 percent had over 0.96, and 12 percent had over 1.2 hectares. At the lower end of the scale were households markedly disadvantaged even by local standards. Seventeen percent of the households owned under 0.24 hectares per household member, including 5 percent who owned no land at all. Almost half of those owning 0.16 hectares or less per household member used rented land either exclusively or to supplement what they owned.

To measure perceived economic level, we asked respondents whether they considered their land adequate to meet the economic needs of their households. Their responses were subjective and did not necessarily bear much relationship to an outsider's view of what was adequate. Sixty-nine percent of the household heads said their land

TABLE 6 Movement rates by amount of land owned per person and perceived adequacy of land

Amount owned (hectares) per person	Farm-size class and adequacy of land (*rai*[a])	Percent of sample	Percentage in each class with movers to:		
			All towns	Bangkok	NE towns
<0.24	<1.5				
	Adequate	5	83	61	22
	Not adequate	12	70	63	25
	Total	17	75	62	24
0.24–0.47	1.5–2.9				
	Adequate	17	65	51	28
	Not adequate	10	77	69	23
	Total	27	68	58	26
0.48–0.71	3.0–4.4				
	Adequate	16	83	63	67
	Not adequate	4	60	53	20
	Total	20	78	61	42
0.72–0.95	4.5–5.9				
	Adequate	12	78	68	32
	Not adequate	3	60	40	10
	Total	15	75	63	27
0.96–1.19	6.0–7.4				
	Adequate	7	79	67	25
	Not adequate	2	67	50	17
	Total	9	77	63	23
1.2+	7.5+				
	Adequate	12	78	42	48
	Not adequate	0.3	0	0	0
	Total	12	76	41	46
	All classes				
	Adequate	69	76	58	36
	Not adequate	31	69	60	21
	Total	100	74	58	31

[a] 6.25 *rai* = 1 hectare.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

was adequate, but there were some who were satisfied or dissatisfied in each farm-size category (Table 6). Over a quarter (29 percent) of those with less than 0.24 hectares per household member said they had enough land, and one of the 37 household heads owning 1.2

hectares or more per person said his land was inadequate. Although these responses partly reflect variations in land quality, it is also true that aspiration levels vary widely among households. Nevertheless, in general the proportions of respondents considering their land adequate were greatest among households who had the most land per household member.

Table 6 shows no relationship between area of farmland per person and propensity to move to town. When households are grouped by farm-size per household member, irrespective of land adequacy, the proportion of households from which movement had occurred varied only between 68 and 78 percent, and no discernible pattern suggests a direct link between the two variables. On disaggregating the groups according to perceived adequacy of land, we find that movement rates were somewhat higher among those who judged their land to be adequate than among those who considered it inadequate. With all farm-size classes combined, 76 percent of households with "adequate" land had experienced some rural-to-urban movement, but this was true for a smaller proportion (69 percent) of those with "inadequate" land. The difference in migration experience is in the same direction within five of the six land classes.

When the farm-size classes are disaggregated according to destination, the tendency toward higher mobility rates among households with "adequate" land is more pronounced for those who moved to Northeastern towns than for those who moved to Bangkok. Among all land classes, 36 percent of those with "adequate" land reported some movement to Northeastern towns, compared with only 21 percent among those with "inadequate" land. In the case of migrants to Bangkok, in contrast, there was virtually no difference between those with "adequate" and those with "inadequate" land: 58 compared with 60 percent. Similarly, the highest rates of movement to Northeastern towns occurred among those having the largest farms; within that size class, the rate of movement to Northeast towns was greater than the rate of movement to Bangkok. This difference in economic level is related to the fact that the population of movers to Bangkok included a higher proportion of persons moving in search of work, whereas movers to Northeastern towns included a higher proportion going to continue their education. Moving for the latter reason, with its high short-term costs, can be interpreted as a strategy for consolidating or capitalizing on an already satisfactory economic situation, whereas moving in search of work was motivated in many cases by a desire to meet basic family needs that could not be met within the village.

TIMING AND DURATION OF MOVES

The traditional, subsistence-oriented, and almost monocultural farming system of the study villages has important influences on the rural-to-urban movement process. The low productivity of the farms and their incapacity to yield a dependable cash income are important contributory causes of outward movement. In addition, rice farming without the aid of artificial irrigation is a highly seasonal activity. Northeastern Thailand has two annual peaks of labor input, during July and August for planting and during December for the harvest. At other times of the year there is little work to be done on the farms. Hence the timing and duration of rural-urban moves are important to household heads who want the benefits of a cash income to the household from urban employment, without reducing the work force of the household at crucial farming periods.

Table 7 shows, for a total of 1,923 people ten years old and over in 356 households, the numbers who were in Bangkok, in a Northeastern town, or in any other towns for part or all of each agricultural season over the three-year period of our study. Table 8 shows movements for the same group by duration of move for the year prior to August 1979. The precise timing of each farm season was defined during the interviews according to the work patterns of each particular household.

These aggregated figures reveal a seasonal pattern of movement, for both tables show variations by season in rates of absence from the villages. Seasonal variation is most pronounced in relation to movement to Bangkok. In each year the highest rates of absence occurred after the harvest and before the following planting season, a period of about six months for most households. In each year approximately twice as many people were absent in that season as in the preceding harvest season (Table 7).[4] Generally, movers were more likely to return to their villages for the harvest season than for the planting season. The conventional conclusion would be that most movement is seasonal and therefore reasonably well articulated with the labor needs of local farming systems. This conclusion would be consistent with the

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[4] The high rates of movement to Northeastern towns in the two seasons immediately prior to the 1979 survey ("before planting" and "planting" in 1979) result at least in part from the information program.

TABLE 7 Locations of villagers, by agricultural season

Season	In rural area throughout	In town for part or all of season				
		Bangkok	North-eastern town	Other town	Total	
					No.	%
Planting, 1979	1,675	148	83	17	248	13
Before planting, 1979	1,623	210	75	15	300	16
Harvest, 1978	1,765	96	54	8	158	8
Before harvest, 1978	1,662	194	58	9	261	14
Planting, 1978	1,770	97	50	6	153	8
Before planting, 1978	1,659	198	58	8	264	14
Harvest, 1977	1,798	80	39	6	125	7
Before harvest, 1977	1,703	168	49	3	220	11
Planting, 1977	1,798	75	47	3	125	7
Before planting, 1977	1,708	160	47	8	215	11
Harvest, 1976	1,818	64	36	5	105	5
Before harvest, 1976	1,738	137	42	6	185	10

NOTE: N = 1,923; data are missing for a small number of cases in each season.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

popular view in Thailand of the nature of movement between the Northeast and Bangkok.

However, far more complex temporal patterns of movement emerge when the movements of individuals are considered. They suggest that the term "seasonal" not only is simplistic, but also disguises an important lack of articulation between rural-urban movement and the farming calendar. Table 8 indicates that many absences last for less than whole seasons, particularly in the long "before planting" season. Tables 9 and 10 show the variety of circulation regimes followed by individual movers, and the varying character and spatial orientation of people associated with different regimes.

In Table 9 the movers are categorized by the temporal patterns of their moves to towns. Those in town for only one season during the three years constitute 21 percent of the total. Fifty-two percent of those single-season movers were under the age of 20 (Table 10), and a majority (56 percent) had moved during one or the other of the two seasons immediately preceding the 1979 survey.[5] Thus these movers

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[5] The high incidence of single-season movers in those two seasons probably resulted from the information program described earlier. The program had its

TABLE 8 Numbers and percentages of villagers by portion of agricultural season spent in town

	Portion of season and number or percentage of villagers									
	None		Some		Half		Most		All	
Season	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Planting, 1979	1,675	87	16	1	12	1	44	2	168	9
Before planting, 1979	1,623	84	29	2	13	1	59	3	192	10
Harvest, 1978	1,765	92	6	0.3	1	0.05	30	2	121	6
Before harvest, 1978	1,662	86	8	0.4	5	0.3	36	2	212	11

NOTE: N = 1,923; data are missing for a small number of cases in each season.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

TABLE 9 Patterns of absence, by agricultural season, for villagers who moved to town during 1976–79

Movers, by length and timing of absence	Number	Percentage
Those absent during 1 season		
Farming season	40	9
Nonfarming season	51	12
Total	**91**	**21**
Those absent during 2+ seasons but not more than 1 season at a time		
Farming seasons only	5	1
Nonfarming seasons only	85	19
Both farming and nonfarming seasons	11	2
Total	**101**	**23**
Those absent during 2+ seasons consecutively		
One consecutive series of seasons	145	33
2+ seasons away separated by periods at home of 1+ seasons	105	24
Total	**250**	**57**
All movers	**442**	**101**

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

were mainly young people at the start of their moving careers. Interestingly, the number of single-season movers (40) who moved during a farming season was almost equal to the number (51) who had moved during a nonfarming season. With the exception of those moving in the two most recent seasons, who would most likely continue to move subsequently, few people had moved only once to town and not either stayed for an additional season or returned on a later occasion. In other words, few people either achieve their goals or give up as rural-to-urban movers within one season.

A further 23 percent had been in town during two or more seasons,

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greatest effects among those with little or no recent history of movement. Of the "single-season" movers who moved in the two seasons, 39 percent went to Northeastern towns, 53 percent to Bangkok, and 8 percent to other towns. The slightly higher than usual proportion going to Northeastern towns (Table 10), consistent with the aims of the information program, further suggests that these figures were affected by the program.

TABLE 10 Percentage distribution of villagers who moved to town during 1976–79, by age, sex, destination, and length and timing of absence

Age group, sex, and destination	Length and timing of absence			
	1 season only (N = 91)	6 non-farm seasons (N = 40)	All 12 seasons (N = 57)	All other rural/urban movers (N = 254)
Age group				
10–19	52	23	32	39
20–29	26	43	58	48
30–39	13	18	7	10
40–49	5	13	4	2
50+	2	5	0	1
All age groups	98	102	101	100
Sex				
Male	64	75	63	59
Female	36	26	37	41
Both sexes	100	101	100	100
Destination				
Bangkok	62	95	67	72
NE towns	32	10	39	30
Other towns	9	3	5	6
All destinations	103	108	111	108

NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. Percentages for destinations sum to more than 100 because some persons went to two categories of towns during the three years.

SOURCE: Survey of villagers in Atsamat District, Roi-et Province.

but never in two consecutive seasons. Most of them (19 percent of the total) were truly seasonal movers, in that they had confined their absences to nonfarming seasons. Forty (9 percent) had been absent during all six nonfarming seasons, returning each time for the following harvest or planting season.

These 40 were a particularly interesting group because their pattern of movements corresponded to the popular notion that circulation in Thailand is a seasonal phenomenon. Far from being typical, however, they were a very distinctive group (Table 10). They constituted a small minority of all those who were involved in urbanward movement during the three years; they even represented less than one-third of villagers who went to town only in nonfarming seasons. Moreover, they were demographically distinct: they were noticeably older than average, and in this group males predominated to a greater extent than among other groups of movers. They were also more likely than other movers to move to Bangkok rather than to towns in Northeastern Thailand. Lastly, the group included a large proportion of heads of relatively young nuclear households, those identified earlier as having few adult workers in their households to help with farming or earning off-farm incomes. Their seasonal pattern of movement demonstrates a necessarily more responsible attitude toward their village-based households than that required of younger, single people.

The largest category of movers, 57 percent, had been away during two or more consecutive seasons, on at least one occasion. This pattern implies an absence during at least one farming season. For some, their extended stays in town were punctuated by at least one complete season in the home village. Their returns most often coincided with a farming season, contributing to the appearance of seasonality in the aggregate patterns of movement discussed earlier. But since these people were absent during at least one farming season, it would be misleading to describe them as seasonal movers.

Fifty-seven persons (13 percent of the total) had been in town for all or part of each of the 12 seasons under consideration. In the context of movement from the Roi-et area, they were relatively long-term movers who may have become "permanent" migrants. Nevertheless, only half of this group (28 of the 57) stayed away for a complete year, without returning to their home villages. The small size of this group as a proportion of all movers underlines the importance of circulation in relation to total mobility in this area of Thailand.

EXPERIENCES IN TOWN

The foregoing analysis illustrates the variety of movers' backgrounds, the strength of their ties within the village, and their intentions. It suggests caution against generalizing about their experiences in town. Why should a 40-year-old household head moving to Bangkok after a miserable harvest for the tenth or fifteenth time experience the city in the same way as his daughter or economically less desperate neighbor who is moving for the first time, or as the son of the rice-mill owner who hopes to become a doctor? Tirasawat (1978) concluded that there is no single process of migrant adjustment in Bangkok; the nature of the adjustment process varies with characteristics of both the movers and the specific features of the movers' situation at the place of destination.

Nevertheless when one looks at the experiences of movers from the Northeast, a culturally distinctive region, some common patterns emerge. Responses to several questions illustrate the ways in which fundamental differences between the economically marginal, peasant culture of the Northeast and the highly individualistic, contract-based urban culture impinge on the individual mover.

Northeasterners who were interviewed in Bangkok, and who had gone there from various provinces (Table 3) were asked the main advantages and disadvantages of living in the city. Results are summarized in Table 11. What might broadly be termed "economic" considerations are important among both advantages and disadvantages. Fifty-one percent of respondents said that better income, "prosperity," or availability of work was the main advantage of city life; and by far the most commonly stated disadvantage was the high cost of living. Many responses, however, reflected interest in an improved quality of life, or self-development, of which income is only one component. Seventeen percent of respondents referred to "urban facilities," and a further 6 percent mentioned "entertainment," contrasting city life with the relatively dull routine of village life. The opportunity to acquire "experience and knowledge" was the main advantage cited by 13 percent of the movers.

Not all movers were fully satisfied with city life. To a greater extent than in the case of advantages, the pattern of perceived disadvantages indicates a concern with much more than overtly "economic" considerations. Worry about the "high cost of living" reflects not only a problem of finding enough cash, but also a deeper fear of dependence on an uncaring social environment where many relationships are defined in monetary terms, in contrast to life in the village where necessities can be obtained without a monetary transaction. The physical environment of the city was the main disadvantage for 14 percent of the respondents. They regarded the city as crowded, polluted, unhealthful, and physically unsafe.

As noted earlier, Northeastern Thai culture is characterized by group consciousness, or *phuuk siaw,* the placing of a high value on friendship. This sense of *phuuk siaw* tends to be reinforced by the

TABLE 11 Northeasterners in Bangkok: advantages and disadvantages of going to the city

Advantage/disadvantage	Number	Percentage
Advantages		
Better income	318	40.4
Urban facilities	131	16.6
Experience and knowledge	101	12.8
Prosperity and opportunities for the future	44	5.6
Availability of work	39	4.9
Education	14	1.8
Entertainment	46	5.8
Other	4	0.5
Don't know, not stated	2	0.3
None	89	11.3
Total	788	100.0
Disadvantages		
Living costs	283	35.9
Environment	112	14.2
Characteristics and behavior of urban people	44	5.6
Hard work, regulation and discipline	37	4.7
Safety (crimes)	28	3.6
Missing home or family	19	2.4
Housing	16	2.0
Difficulty in finding job	8	1.0
Other	7	0.9
Don't know, not stated	6	0.8
None	228	28.9
Total	788	100.0

SOURCE: Survey of Northeasterners in Bangkok.

contempt that Bangkokians often show toward Northeasterners. The corollary is that the Northeasterners see Bangkok people as unfriendly, cunning, unreliable, deceptive, and selfish. Six percent of our respondents said that the characteristics and behavior of urban people was the main disadvantage of living in town, but similar feelings are probably shared by most recent movers from the Northeast.

Dislike of conditions of work also reflects deep-seated differences in lifestyle between the city and rural Northeastern Thailand. Farming and household chores involve hard work, but not the mindless and highly disciplined drudgery of certain kinds of work in towns. Some movers can avoid this problem by taking jobs as taxi drivers, in which they are relatively free to chart their daily patterns of work; hence the popularity of these jobs among migrants to many Southeast Asian cities. Conditions of work constituted the main disadvantage of urban life for 5 percent of the respondents, though many more expressed dislike of their working conditions.

It is worth noting that 29 percent of respondents said there was no disadvantage in living in town; and many of the remaining 71 percent undoubtedly felt that the advantages far outweighed the disadvantages. On balance, then, most movers saw moving to town as a positive rather than a negative step. But there were exceptions. For some, the problems of finding a job or the experience of being robbed or working in unacceptable, slave-like conditions made life a misery. Fully 11 percent of the movers, presumably those who had had no real choice about going to town, perceived no advantage at all in living in Bangkok.

Most of the Northeasterners interviewed in Bangkok had been successful in securing jobs with better incomes than they could earn in their home villages. There were exceptions, of course. Life is particularly difficult in the city for those without well-established contacts there. Estimating the rate of success on the basis of an urban-based study is difficult because the unsuccessful movers tend to return home; but in the case of the Roi-et study villages, where people had effective networks with the city, few movers failed to find jobs.

The economic situation among Northeasterners in Bangkok is summarized in Table 12, which shows mean monthly incomes and amounts of cash sent to the village, by demographic group. Incomes were higher among older migrants, although this finding is partly a function of the decreasing proportion of females in successively higher age groups. Women earned less cash than men and received a higher proportion of their income in the form of free accommodation and food. This difference largely explains the low incomes and low rent payments among the youngest respondents, where the proportion of females was highest.

Remittances sent home are an important link between movers and their villages of origin. Parents of younger movers may provide funds to meet the initial costs of going to town, and they may approve of the move only if their son or daughter agrees to send them money. There is thus a reciprocal relationship between many parents and their

TABLE 12 Income of and remittances from Northeasterners in Bangkok, by age and sex

Age and sex	Income per month (US $[a])	Remittances per month US $[a])	Remittances as percentage of income
Age group			
10–19	40	22	54
20–29	85	29	35
30–39	104	36	35
40+	129	57	44
Sex			
Male	99	38	39
Female	57	21	37
Mean	82	30	37

a $1 (U.S.) = 20.4 *baht*.

SOURCE: Survey of Northeasterners in Bangkok.

children in the rural-to-urban movement process. If the mover is a household head whose family is still in the village, he will remit cash in order to meet his basic responsibilities. Among those we interviewed in Bangkok, 61 percent of household heads whose families were still in Roi-et said they sent or took cash home more or less regularly. The mean amount sent was $30 (614 *baht*) per month; it represented 48 percent of the mean household income of rural Northeastern Thailand, as measured in the National Statistical Office's most recent regional socioeconomic survey (NSO, 1978b).

An interesting feature of the figures shown in Table 12 is the difference in the proportion of income sent home by younger and older movers. The youngest movers sent a much higher proportion of their cash income than the others. One reason may have been their relatively high incomes in kind; another was probably a greater sense of obligation to the households that supported their moves. This sense of obligation apparently had diminished among movers in the 20–39 age group but was stronger among the oldest category of movers, many of whom were the heads of village-based households. This finding is consistent with the greater tendency of older movers to return for the key farming seasons. The difference between the sexes in the proportion of income sent home was insignificant, despite the greater earning power of males.

CONCLUSION

Society in the Atsamat study villages retains many of its peasant characteristics, with traditional social formations, production methods, and attitudes still easily identifiable. But it is a peasant society increasingly oriented toward the modern, urban, capitalist world of Bangkok, partly because of the monetization of the local economy, but more importantly because of the process of circular movement. More and more households and individuals see wage labor in the city as the only realistic strategy for improving their living standards. The rate of movement is high, has increased, and is likely to increase further as new peer-group and patron-client networks are established between rural and urban areas, adding widespread availability of urban opportunities to existing pressures for out-movement.

The principal finding of this paper is that rural-urban movement is a highly complex process, in two important respects.

First, movement results from a wide variety of pressures on individual villagers, due to their involvement in various social and economic networks that entail irreconcilable sets of obligations and opportunities. Moving decisions take account of household resources and composition, needs and aspiration levels, and interpersonal relationships in a variety of networks, with the result that movement cannot be explained at the microlevel by any single variable or class of variables. There is no support, for example, for the proposition that individual villagers move because they are poor. It would be more accurate to say that the people who move are those who learn of particular opportunities elsewhere and have the resources to meet the costs of moving. They are not necessarily poor people, and many movers are well-off in relation to their local communities.

Second, rural-urban resource transfers associated with movement are also highly complex. Movement results in a loss of labor, though how serious the loss is depends on the timing and duration of the move; and the amount of loss in turn depends on the mover's sense of obligation to the village and other networks of which he is part. To compensate for the loss of their labor, most movers send or bring cash to the village. Whether the cash is adequate compensation depends to a great extent on how the loss of labor is calculated. If labor-exchange practices within the village break down, all households lose the advantages of being able to call on groups of workers for particular labor needs, including the households that are neither involved in movement nor benefiting from cash remittances. There is also the long-term effect of lost labor that could have been used to improve the productive capacity of the village economy. Our study found no evidence that remittances were used for investment purposes that might have had the same effect. Therefore, the question arises whether movement results in short-term gains in consumption levels for individuals and their households, at the expense of the longer-term productive potential of the local economy.

Many empirical questions remain to be answered, but this paper suggests two conclusions. First, in Atsamat and other localities of rural Thailand rural-to-urban movement occurs on a sufficiently large scale that its real and potential effects, whether good or bad, should be taken into account in planning local development. Second, the complexities of the process are such that one should beware of any general conclusions about it and of any "blanket" policies designed to affect any part of it.

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Development perspectives and population change

Ozzie G. Simmons

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PREFACE

This paper was originally commissioned by the East-West Population Institute to provide the background and context for the Institute's Conference on Population, Resources, and Development. The conference was held September 13–17, 1982, in Honolulu, and brought together policy-makers, parliamentarians, and scholars from East and Southeast Asia and the United States to discuss a range of policy issues concerning relationships between population and development. The present version has been revised for publication. I am grateful to my colleague John J. Macisco, Jr., for valuable advice during preparation of the paper.

ABSTRACT Scholars in the fields of population and development largely went their separate ways until relatively recently. Systematic consideration of development processes and issues in the developing countries began essentially after World War II, and concern with population growth did not engage worldwide attention until the 1960s. The shift to an explicit focus on the issues raised by the *interaction* of population and development had its inception in the mid-1970s. In a matter of a few decades, the fields of population and of development have generated a huge volume of literature, both scientific and nonscientific. This paper presents a selective overview of some of the principal issues.

The paper considers the major perspectives that have informed the development debate, the links between current development perspectives and population change, some of the determinants and consequences of population growth, and the need for incorporating population factors into national economic and social development planning. Development policies that seek to reduce poverty and population policies aimed at reducing fertility go hand in hand. Effective implementation of policies that address both sets of problems will require major social and economic structural change.

SYSTEMATIC consideration of development processes and issues in the developing world began essentially after World War II, although some of the ideas central to development thinking have been around for a long time. Concern with population growth is also largely a post-World War II phenomenon (with the earlier exception of the Malthus controversies), but it did not engage worldwide attention until the mid-1960s. Attention to population *and* development emerged in the 1970s and coalesced as a focus at the Bucharest World Population Conference in 1974. Despite the relative brevity of these time periods, an unprecedented volume of literature and discussion has been generated in these fields, both scientific and nonscientific. This paper makes no pretense at a review of this literature, but presents a selective overview of some of the principal issues.

The paper first considers the major perspectives that have informed the development debate and then moves on to links between current development perspectives and population, to identification of some of the interrelations between population and development, to population and development planning, and finally to views on implementation. Given the limitations of space, the discussion is necessarily characterized by considerable oversimplification and distillation of what are often complex and controversial issues.

THE GREAT DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE

Definitions of "development," as it refers to processes of change in developing countries (LDCs), are many and diverse. Economic definitions have focused on increased production or consumption and more recently have embraced distribution of goods and services. But any brief (or unidisciplinary) formulation is likely to be of dubious value. This is because development is essentially a multidimensional process involving important changes in a society's economic, political, and social sectors, as well as in cultural beliefs and practices. And if definitions are not to be hopelessly parochial or ethnocentric, which unfortunately has too often been the case, they must consistently address the questions of development by whom, for whom, for what, and how it is to be achieved.

Development economics, which constituted the starting point for contemporary thinking about development, is a relatively new branch of economics that emerged largely after World War II (Streeten, 1979: 21). When the large-scale effort at development began in the 1950s, Western economists, and those they trained from the Third World, had virtually no experience in national development planning. They did have at hand, however, the experience of the rapid post-war reconstruction of the economies of the industrial countries of Western Europe, supported by Marshall Plan aid. Neoclassical models, which they regarded as responsible for this success, were considered just as appropriate for investment planning to generate growth of national income in the LDCs. In retrospect, it has been lamented that the problem of economic development was taken up in the wake of the successful post-war reconstruction in Western Europe, which led to unfounded optimism about what could be done in the LDCs. This was probably, however, a fruitful error because if the developed countries (DCs) had really been aware of the scope and complexity of the problem they might never have taken it up at all (Hirschman et al., 1979).

Although there were some prominent dissenters early on, the mainstream economic development thinking in the 1950s and early 1960s was dominated by a relatively simple paradigm: If the poor countries were to solve their social and economic problems, they needed "development," such as had been undergone in the West, which could be measured by per capita income growth. Such growth could be accelerated with the help of trade and aid and investment of private capital from the DCs. Distribution was not an issue, since it was assumed that income could be distributed later, and indeed that this would happen automatically through a "trickle-down" effect. Inequality was regrettable but necessary to generate savings and provide incentives.[1]

The GNP per capita of the LDCs grew at an average rate of 3.4 percent a year during 1950–75 (Morawetz, 1977:12). This was faster than either the LDCs or the DCs had grown in any comparable period before 1950 and exceeded all expectations. To be sure, this average growth rate concealed wide differences in performance, since per capita income in some countries grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent while in the large poor countries of South Asia and in many in Africa, with a total of 1.1 billion people, it grew by less than 2 percent a year. After 25 years, however, even some of the countries with the highest economic growth rates did not achieve development in the sense of widespread and significant improvements in the wellbeing of the poor majorities of their populations (Higgins, 1977:99–100). On the contrary, unemployment grew, inflation accelerated, the number of malnourished and undernourished people increased, there were more children out of school than in school, health services reached only a minority of the people, and inequality of income distribution was as pervasive as ever. Given this dismal picture, the prevailing development paradigm came under increasing attack, and the "oil crisis" of the early 1970s really shook its credibility (Seers, 1979:27).

What went wrong? Among other factors, the goals of development were identified narrowly with growth in GNP to the exclusion of other critical goals; central government planning from the top down dominated development thinking and policy-making, and the need for participation, decentralization, and mobilization of local communities was not recognized; the rate of population growth and the problems generated by it were underestimated; the role of the DCs was seen only as involving capital aid and technical assistance, and the total impact on the LDCs of the economic policies pursued by the industrial nations was not taken into account; urban bias prevailed at the expense of the rural sector; intermediate and advanced technologies were introduced that treated labor as a scarce factor in generally labor-surplus economies; and the Third World was considered, rather monolithically, as an area with common problems, whereas some of the differences within the LDCs were at least as great as those between them and the DCs (Streeten, 1979:46–48). The list could be extended.

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[1] Streeten (1979) contends that the early discussions of development by economists were characterized by the proliferation of ideas, criticisms, and qualifications, which contrasts sharply with the monolithic view that a single paradigm existed. This view, he says (Ibid.:25), "is an optical illusion created by looking back from later vantage points." Be that as it may, Streeten himself states later in the same paper that the Rostow model of stages of economic growth, which was a relatively pure embodiment of the neoclassical growth paradigm, was "mainstream," the influence of those who criticized the paradigm was "peripheral," and "it remains true that, though not in academic circles, the Rostow model had a powerful grip on the imagination of policy makers, planners and aid officials" (Ibid.:27–28). For other views on development theory, see Brookfield (1975), Lehmann (1979), Ohlin (1979), Papanek (1968), Ranis (1977), and Uphoff and Ilchman (1972).

The earlier major models of development are those of "modernization" and of "underdevelopment," or "dependency." In the euphoria and optimism that characterized the immediate post-World War II period, confidence in the inevitability of progress had a critical influence on views about how development of the Third World ought to proceed. Thus the concept of modernization came to the fore as the model to which development efforts should be oriented (Bernstein, 1979:80–83). The modernization model constitutes a mirror image of Western society, in which the virtues of sustained economic growth, democracy, efficiency, and "rationality" are to be emulated by the LDCs in a series of progressive stages if they want to become "developed." The model was extensively criticized for its ethnocentric, deterministic, and linear characteristics, and indeed for its blithe overlooking of the empirical reality of what was going on in the LDCs, but it held center stage for a time and is still entrenched in some circles because it is a comforting and essentially simplistic notion about how to get from here to there in a world of otherwise confusing uncertainty.

The modernization model has further doleful consequences because it carries with it the assumption that tradition is an opposing force, the obstacle that modernization must overcome if it is to arrive at its destination (Hutton and Cohen, 1975). This is essentially an ahistorical view of traditional society (primarily peasant society) as an unchanging equilibrium and it obscures, among other things, the fact that many prominent characteristics of so-called traditional societies emerged during the 19th century as a result of the widespread social, political, and economic changes following colonialism. Just as the modernization view leads away from systematic empirical observation, so the view of traditionalism leads to the glossing over of first-hand observation of the variety of actual situations in which different peasant groups find themselves, in order to understand why they behave as they do.

Beginning in the late 1960s, and partly in response to the growing disenchantment with the modern-traditional dichotomy, another view became popular in which the international system of rich country-poor country relationships creates and maintains the underdevelopment of the poor countries. Whether deliberately exploitative or unintentionally neglectful, the coexistence of rich countries (the "center") and poor countries (the "periphery") renders the efforts of the poor countries to choose their own style of development more difficult, if not impossible (Streeten, 1979:27). In the less developed countries, the groups who have wealth, high social status, and political power constitute ruling elites who perpetuate the international system of inequality and LDC dependence.

The most voluminous and sophisticated body of thought about underdevelopment and dependency has emerged in Latin America.[2] Space prohibits any elaboration of this thought here, but it may be noted that it has both reformist and revolutionary strands. The actual mechanisms of dependency are seldom spelled out in detail (O'Brien, 1975:23–25). It is never clear which specific policies are to be followed with regard to technical transfer and technical development, unemployment, income distribution, and so on. The main policy advocated is that of changing the internal structure to achieve national development. Whatever may be the limitations of the dependency view, however, it has made a basic point of substantial importance, namely, that the interplay between the internal LDC structures and international structures is the critical starting point for an understanding of the process of development.

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[2] For a view of underdevelopment from the communist countries, see the work of Tamas Szentes (1977, 1980), a Hungarian economist. Griffin (1969) has done an extensive study of underdevelopment in Latin America. Kahl (1976) has published a detailed review of the work of three of the leading Latin American sociologists who have worked on underdevelopment (or dependency) –Germani, Gonzalez Casanova, and Cardoso. Frank (1969, 1980) is the best-known (because his work has been available in English) proponent of the underdevelopment perspective. Brookfield (1975) writes lucidly about the Latin American work, as he does about most other aspects of development.

Like modernization, underdevelopment is perceived as a unitary process with uniform causes and uniform effects. Again like modernization, the underdevelopment or dependency perspective employs a unilinear determinism to arrive at the desirable end state. Just as tradition is the obstacle to be overcome if modernization is to triumph, so the penetration of international capitalism constitutes the obstacle to be removed if indigenous economic and social development is to occur in the countries of the Third World (Bernstein, 1979:91–94).

The limitations of both the modernization and the dependency models have given new impetus to a search for development perspectives that are not so closely tied to competing ideologies and bound by dichotomous thinking, perspectives that can embrace a variety of development alternatives for the LDCs. The most prominent shift in development objectives during the past three decades has come about through the perception that the exclusive pursuit of economic growth was too narrow an objective and that other objectives, related to poverty reduction–improving income distribution, increasing employment, and satisfying "basic needs"–must be taken into account (Morawetz, 1977:7). What has been discovered (or in fact rediscovered, since these issues have been around for some time) is that production objectives cannot be separated from those of distribution.

In the early 1970s, staff of the World Bank and of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex undertook a study of the relationships between economic growth and distribution. The study resulted in a report, which received wide attention, concluding that distributional objectives should be treated as an integral part of development and growth strategy and advocating "redistribution with growth" (Chenery et al., 1974). One major component of this approach would be to focus on a range of direct measures, such as land reform, the distribution of education and other public services, and measures to redistribute assets toward the poverty groups, adapting the approach to the different characteristics of rural and urban poverty groups. Several critics have argued, however, that a policy of redistribution *with* economic growth has little validity since, on the one hand, it may not be possible to grow first and redistribute later because the structure of growth already established in an economy largely fixes the pattern of distribution so that those who already own assets are in the best position to profit once growth begins, and, on the other hand, marginal redistribution (i.e., the distribution of a part of the additional income generated by economic growth) is insufficient to solve the problem of widespread unemployment and mass poverty. Consequently, these critics conclude that it is necessary to redistribute first and improve productivity later (Morawetz, 1977:41; Weeks, 1975:101; Adelman, 1979:161, 165).

The emergence of "basic needs" in the mid-1970s as an approach explicitly directed at meeting the needs of the poor in expanded and accelerated programs can be seen as a natural consequence in the continuing search for more effective development strategies. The essential formulation of the basic-needs perspective was contained in a report prepared by the International Labour Office (ILO) for the participants in the ILO World Employment Conference in 1976 (International Labour Office, 1977). In the few years that have elapsed since then, a huge literature on basic needs has appeared, and the basic-needs approach has come to occupy a prominent place on the agenda of international meetings (Garcia-Bouza, 1980).

In the ILO formulation, basic needs include two elements: (1) certain minimum requirements of a family for private consumption–adequate food, clothing, and shelter; and (2) essential services provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport, and health and educational facilities. Brief reference is made to placing this approach within the broader context of nonmaterial needs–human freedom, physical security, and other factors that contribute to a person's sense of identity, achievement, and satisfaction. There are many lists of basic needs in the literature, but the precise scope, content, and priorities must be left for definition to the countries and groups that adopt a basic-needs approach (Cassen, 1978a). Clearly, it would be more than presumptuous to think that this task can be accomplished by the staffs of international agencies.

Whatever may be the definition of basic needs, a large portion of the populations of the LDCs falls below any acceptable levels. Consider the estimates in a 1980 World Bank report (International Bank, 1980:33–34): The number of people in absolute poverty in the LDCs (excluding China and other centrally planned economies) is estimated at around 780 million. In 1975, about 600 million adults in the LDCs were illiterate; only two-fifths of the children currently complete more than three years of primary school. In 1978, 550 million people lived in countries where the average life expectancy was less than 50 years, and 400 million in countries where the average death rate of children one to four years old was more than 20 per 1,000. The most widely accepted estimate of the number of malnourished people is about 460 million; malnutrition appears to contribute to between one-third and two-thirds of all child deaths, and perhaps even more in the poorest countries (Murdoch, 1980:2).

Increased employment and income for the poor are central to the basic-needs perspective. Despite the substantial industrial progress achieved in the LDCs, it would have had to be much greater to absorb even the rapidly growing urban labor force, let alone the labor force in agriculture, which in many LDCs constitutes around 75 percent of the total labor force (Sewell et al., 1980:82–83).

Criticism of the basic-needs approach has appeared from many quarters, not least from LDC officials, to the effect that vigorous pursuit of this approach will impair the rate of economic growth, i.e., that basic needs can be met only at the expense of growth (Garcia-Bouza, 1980:45–46; Dell, 1978). For most of the principal advocates of the basic-needs approach, rapid rates of economic growth continue to be regarded as essential, but it is true that for some the preferred locus for such growth appears to have shifted from industrialization to rural development. It is likely that this shift accounts for the fears of LDC officials that pursuit of the basic-needs approach may be at the expense of economic growth, which to a large extent they still equate with industrial development (Singh, 1979:586). The choice is not between industry and agriculture (although much greater emphasis on employment-oriented rural development is needed), however, but between different types of goals for development. It has been observed that the test of a successful strategy of industrialization is the extent to which it reduces the gap between the high incomes in the high-productivity, high-technology sector and the low incomes in the low-productivity, low-technology sector by raising the performance of the latter without impeding progress in the former (Streeten, 1975). The satisfaction of basic needs depends not only on the provision of government services but also critically on the generation of productive employment and greater income for the poor so that they can pay their share. Moreover, the basic-needs approach calls for a search for low-cost solutions to problems of food, health, education, and shelter through reallocation of current patterns of expenditure in these areas in favor of the poor, and for mobilization of community action to contribute to the financing of public services. To meet the basic needs of the poor on a sustainable basis, it is essential to raise the rate of economic growth in the LDCs.[3] At the same time, as the rate of growth of internal demand is likely to be increasingly important in the future, a basic-needs approach should contribute to faster industrial development, especially given the present state of the world economy (Singh, 1979:587–88, 600–01).

Global estimates of the costs of meeting basic needs require so many assumptions that they are likely to be closer to fantasy than to reality. The specifics of such estimates cannot be gone into here, but in general it may be noted that development aid would have to be increased substantially, particularly for the poorer countries, if a global basic-needs program is to be implemented by the end of the century (the ILO target). (See Sewell et al., 1980: 105; Streeten et al., 1981: 175–76.) Since 1976, the bilateral donors and multilateral agencies have been increasingly directing their attention to support for basic-needs activities. Aid agencies are not well placed, however, to focus exclusively on support for basic needs, especially if their aid is tied to imports and is not available for local expenditure. Consequently, it is more helpful to support a country's development efforts as a whole as long as that country has a commitment to a basic-needs program, and to make assistance as flexible and long-term as possible (Cassen, 1978a: 12). There is no question, however, that increasing attention to support of basic needs has been salutary, indicating as it does that the donors have recognized that aid has failed to reach those who need it most.

Two other development issues deserve at least brief attention, namely, the relationships of basic needs to the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and to a comprehensive development strategy. It is important to emphasize that the principal source of proposals for a basic-needs approach has been the DCs and the international agencies rather than the LDCs themselves, although a number of LDCs were concerned with problems of poverty reduction long before the ILO manifesto in 1976 (Wolfe, 1979:10). The DCs have espoused the concept of basic needs in part because they want to ensure that the aid they provide does not represent a simple transfer from the DCs to the higher-income groups in the LDCs. Whatever may be the factual basis for this belief, it means that NIEO proposals that do not assign importance to meeting the needs of the poor would not evoke much support from the DCs. But there is a widespread perception, especially in the LDCs, that the basic-needs approach is either a "second best" development strategy, excluding poor countries from the benefits of industrialization, or a ploy to block the legitimate efforts of Third World countries to modify the structure of international economic relations so that it becomes more favorable to their needs and interests (Garcia-Bouza, 1980:45).

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[3] For a good recent discussion of the issue of basic needs and economic growth, see Streeten et al. (1981:96–108).

It is true that most of the official documents advocating basic needs have placed principal emphasis on major internal changes, and that little attention has been paid to the need for the equivalent changes in international economic relations. Positive responses by the industrial nations to the search by the LDCs for an NIEO could be helpful in strengthening national economies, but would hardly be a sufficient condition for helping the poor. If international reforms are to help the poor, they must be complemented by changes in the LDCs designed to channel the benefits of production and distribution to those who need them most. Perhaps the principal significance of the basic-needs approach is that it places the central focus on people rather than on countries as the primary units in the development process, certainly a welcome innovation. Just as advocates of an NIEO have tended to neglect the necessity of internal reforms, so those who espouse basic needs have accorded relatively less emphasis to international reforms. Consequently, the seeming competition between basic needs and an NIEO has emerged as the important issue, rather than their complementarity (Garcia-Bouza, 1980:44). Clearly, the representatives of the DCs and the LDCs will have to move on both fronts if the needs of poor people and of the national economies in the Third World are to be met.

In the ILO report and subsequent writings, the basic-needs approach appears to constitute the central component of a comprehensive development strategy that would not only accord absolute priority to meeting the basic needs of the poor but also provide the grand design for national development as a whole. These formulations, however, give little attention to industrial development, as has been noted, and have little to say about the need for fundamental structural change. For these and other reasons, some development specialists deny that the basic-needs approach can lay claim to constituting a comprehensive development strategy (Dell, 1978:33; Minhas, 1979:43–44). They concede that the basic-needs advocates have made a substantial contribution to the development dialogue by emphasizing the importance of equitable distribution of the benefits of development, but have claimed too much in according it the status of a comprehensive development strategy. These issues may be of critical concern to participants in the ongoing development debate. But whether the basic-needs approach should constitute *the* comprehensive development strategy or whether it should be viewed as a precondition for the implementation of a program to help the poor as part of a broader development strategy is not nearly as important as whether overall national development strategies can be designed to help the poor and the society as a whole to achieve their development objectives, whatever the individual developing countries decide these objectives should be.

LINKS BETWEEN POVERTY-FOCUSED PERSPECTIVES AND POPULATION CHANGE

Income distribution and redistribution now occupy a prominent position in the development dialogue, but references in the development literature to the links between distribution problems and population change are sparse indeed. The work on "redistribution with growth" mentions population only in passing and most of the advocates of a basic-needs approach have little to say about the population implications. (This omission has been shared by Third World statesmen. Neither the "Declaration of a New International Economic Order" nor its associated "Program of Action," adopted at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations in April 1974, contains any explicit reference to population as a factor in international economic relations or in national development.) The ILO report (1977:59–60) does make a single reference to population, acknowledging that the rate of population growth is obviously the main determinant of the number of people whose basic needs must be met, and that although in the long-run development will itself lead to reduced population growth, intensified and more appropriate family planning programs are required to reinforce this process.

Actually, the principal dimensions in the basic-needs approach and the factors considered to constitute the important determinants of fertility largely coincide. Moreover, as will be seen, there are several reasons for believing that demographic factors have influenced recent trends in income distribution. Both increase in average incomes and redistribution of income, which are among the principal goals of the basic-needs approach, are intricately related in complex ways to population change. The growth of GNP per capita, as has been noted, used to be regarded as the main indicator of success in development. But experience has shown that substantial growth of average incomes by itself may have little meliorative effect on income distribution and fertility reduction. Venezuela and Mexico, for example, are countries that generated high rates of economic growth and at the same time maintained badly skewed income distribution and high fertility (Rich, 1973:72–73). So there is increasing interest in looking at the relationship between fertility and those factors associated not so much with average income growth but with the distribution of the gains of development (Cassen, 1978b:49).

The original theory of the demographic transition constituted an elaborate description of the various "stages" (analogous to the modernization model) in the development of the industrialized countries at which mortality and fertility behaved in particular ways, with low mortality and fertility prevailing at the point where economic and social development has been "achieved." And it was believed that this process would hold for the LDCs as well. Subsequent research showed, however, that this pattern did not hold for a number of Western countries, let alone the LDCs, so that the "demographic transition" is now just a term to describe the passage countries traverse from high to low mortality and fertility (Cassen, 1976:786–88; Coale, 1975; Teitelbaum, 1975). In fact, marked fertility decline already has occurred in a number of countries where development changes have been in the direction of basic-needs objectives and the populations are mainly poor and rural. Sri Lanka, Kerala (in India), and the People's Republic of China are the examples most often cited. Freedman (1979:65–66) has observed that they have at least the following changes in common: (1) better health and greater life expectancy, which means fewer births are needed for the survival of any desired number; (2) higher education for both sexes, which increases the costs and decreases the benefits while children are in school; (3) welfare programs, providing at least minimum subsistence for the poor majority, at least in food, which may decrease dependence on children; and (4) communication and transportation facilities capable of providing the information (not least about family planning), services, and goods that have produced the other changes. Although these cases may not be generalizable, Freedman (Ibid.) notes that the same pattern of fertility decline associated more with distribution of the gains of development than with growth of average incomes seems to be occurring in northern Thailand and probably in Java and Bali as well.

A recent analysis of cross-country data that became available during the mid-1970s focuses on some relationships between basic-needs policies and population growth (Morawetz, 1978). The analysis takes as its departure point the argument that policies specifically designed to improve the health and nutrition levels of the poorest people are likely to cause infant and general mortality rates to decline. But, the argument goes, a reduction in mortality rates is likely to lead to an increase in the population growth rate, which, in turn, may partially or fully offset the welfare gains from implementating the initial policies. This argument ignores, however, a second important effect of basic-needs policies on population growth—their effect on fertility. The findings of the analysis are as follows: First, basic-needs policies—to the extent that they lower infant mortality rates, increase education, cause the income distribution to be more equal, and raise per capita income—may indeed bring about an eventual reduction in fertility as well as mortality rates. Second, there does seem to be some slight evidence that reduced infant mortality and increased education interact in reducing fertility, but the data do not permit any precise estimate of the importance of such interaction. And third, there do seem to be lags in the effects of decreased infant mortality and increased education on the fertility rate, but the data shed little light on the determinants of the length of these lags.

So, although basic-needs policies seem to carry with them the promise of eventual fertility decline, the critical question is how soon that decline occurs. Apparently it is not true that implementing basic-needs policies necessarily sustains rapid population growth, but it is also apparently not true that governments that follow a basic-needs policy are already doing all that is necessary to control population growth. Governments still need to take all measures in their power to reduce fertility rates as rapidly as possible to avoid population sizes that could have serious consequences for the development prospects of their countries.

It should be noted that, although poverty and rapid population growth are definitely related, neither is the necessary determinant nor consequence of the other (Birdsall, 1980: 1). Various aspects of this relationship will be identified in the following section on the determinants and consequences of population change. Here it may suffice to say that within many developing countries, particularly those with low levels of economic and natural resources, the degree and scale of future poverty could be reduced with lower rates of population growth (Ibid.). Fertility rates are declining in many LDCs, but given the built-in momentum generated by the large proportion of children and adolescents in LDC populations, population growth will continue well into the next century regardless of what is done now to reduce fertility. If the gains of development are to be enhanced for the coming generations, however, everything possible must be done to head off subsequent increases of even greater magnitude. Consider the following World Bank projections made in 1979 (International Bank, 1980: 142–43): By the year 2000, world population will grow from the present 4.1 billion to 6 billion (and probably to at least 9 billion by 2050), and the population of the developing countries will grow from 3 to 5 billion. World population growth rates are projected to decrease from the present 1.71 to around 1.36 in the year 2000, while the rate for the LDCs should decrease from 2.12 to 1.62. Nevertheless, the absolute annual increases in population size are projected to grow from about 70 million in 1980 to 82 million in the year 2000 for the world as a whole and from 64 to 76 million in the LDCs.

With ever larger numbers entering the labor force in the LDCs, problems of unemployment and underemployment will become greatly exacerbated beyond those that already exist unless poverty-focused development policies can generate programs for creating employment and increasing income for the poor that will give them much greater access to the gains of development and convert population constraints into economic opportunities. Some developing countries have already begun to cope with the current problems of poverty and the longer-term need for slowing population growth if prospective gains are not to be imperiled, while others have yet to move on both fronts.

INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Consensus in the field of population and development is not easily come by (as in many other fields of human endeavor), but most persons concerned with the field would probably agree to the following general propositions: Enhanced development, where this includes economic growth and the more equitable distribution of its gains, is likely to be accompanied by declining fertility; reduction of fertility is not an end in itself but rather a means to facilitate these goals of development since rapid population growth slows down development; and, in a variety of circumstances, integration of population efforts with those of other development programs may enhance the effectiveness of both. This is a short list, and as a guide to policy intervention it has no value at all because of its generality. But it does provide a starting point.

A voluminous literature on the determinants and consequences of fertility is already available, employing a "macro" approach in which countries are the unit of analysis or a "micro" approach focused on households and individuals.[4] In a few pages all that can be done here is to highlight some of the contributions and limitations of this literature, and perforcedly to direct the discussion primarily to fertility. Although mortality and migration merit similar attention, they must be largely ignored here. From the studies of determinants, a consensus has emerged on at least a few factors that tend to reduce fertility, namely, female education, decreases in infant mortality, and greater equality in income distribution to the extent that it increases the well-being of the poor. But consensus stops here. In the interpretation of these findings, there is no agreement on which, if any, of these factors is necessary for a fertility decline, or on the relative importance of one or another factor. There are various explanations of why the results of fertility research are subject to this and other uncertainties, which can be advanced at different levels.

To begin with, much of this research was oriented to demographic transition theory, so that the task of research was viewed largely as one of specification and statistical estimation of the relationship between socioeconomic variables associated with modernization and economic development, on the one hand, and fertility, on the other. Like the modernization model that earlier dominated development thinking, this orientation essentially obscured empirical reality. There are in fact a number of pathways from high to low fertility; fertility can decline under a variety of cultural and economic conditions, and it is misleading to assume that convergence with the process followed by some industrialized countries must precede such decline (Freedman, 1978:609). Since demographic transition theory is not very applicable to the developing world, there is little conceptual apparatus left with which to interpret the kinds of statistical relationships that have been found (Population Council, 1981:314).

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[4] For reviews of this literature, see Cassen (1976) and Birdsall (1977). Jones (1978) has done a comprehensive review for Southeast and East Asia, and Urzua (1978) has done the same for Latin America.

Second, attempts to attribute fertility decline to one determinant or another are unlikely to be successful (Ibid.:318–19). The causal connection between a particular determinant and fertility is complex and certainly indirect, since it must operate through intermediate behavioral and biological factors–what have been termed the proximate fertility determinants of marriage pattern, contraceptive use and effectiveness, prevalence of induced abortion, and duration of lactational immunity from conception (Bongaarts, 1978, 1982). Moreover, the difficulties of attributing causation to one factor are compounded by the likelihood that several relevant factors may be changing at the same time (Cassen, 1978b:29–30). These factors are linked together in intricate ways, for some are simultaneously determined and many are independent in one relationship and dependent in another. And they often move together over time so that their independent effects are difficult to isolate. What one is dealing with, then, is a set of mutually interacting causes, all of which are part of a broad process of social and economic change. Given these considerations, it is clear that the difficulties of a piecemeal approach to the determinants of fertility are formidable indeed.

Third, and related to the preceding points, is the fact that the relationships between fertility and its determinants and consequences vary among regions, countries, and different socioeconomic, occupational, and cultural groups within countries. Rapid population growth is a global problem, but it does not follow that this problem can have any general solution (Hawthorn, 1978:14). The conditions, correlates, causes, and consequences of fertility rates in different countries vary sufficiently so that attempts to reduce fertility must take into account the particular institutional, cultural, and material environments in which reproductive behavior takes place, as well as the type of development policy being pursued (McNicoll, 1978, 1980). Much of the research to date has taken these environments as givens and has focused on individual and household characteristics largely to the exclusion of these environments. This is not to say that comparative or cross-cultural research is of no value. On the contrary, comparative treatment may very well strengthen particular explanations by placing them in a larger framework of what works and what does not, but only if the research documents the empirical reality of the setting in which reproduction occurs. Such work could be sufficiently specific to serve as the basis for policy decisions in that particular setting and at the same time permit more general conclusions.

An appreciation of the extent to which mutual interactions characterize the relationships between population and development has led to an increasing emphasis on the importance of identifying the consequences as well as the determinants of population change. There is growing awareness, not only by those in population but by those with other development interests as well, that it is just as important to build a knowledge base about how changes in population size, composition, and distribution affect the goals of development strategy as to know about the effects of development strategy on population factors (Saunders, 1978:4). In many LDCs, the consequences of rapid population growth are now creating problems that are of more immediate urgency than that of reducing the high fertility that generated the problems. The consequences of population change are evident in many sectors, e.g., in employment, housing, rural development, urban growth, and education. In the short-run, knowing the consequences of population change may be more important than knowing the causes since, as indicated earlier, the built-in momentum to population growth can be slowed only by policies that will have an effect in the long-run although policy now must be oriented to adjusting to the consequences of that growth (Freedman, 1978:623–24).

A wide range of factors has been identified as determinants and consequences of fertility, reflecting the complexity of the relationship between population and the social, economic, and psychological factors that are also part of the broad process of societal change. A United Nations task force has recently begun constructing a framework for the conceptualization, measurement, analysis, and formal representation, through modeling, of interrelations between population and development (United Nations, 1981a, 1981b). The framework comprises a 61 by 61 matrix for the mapping of direct linkages among 15 main development objectives, ten population variables, and 36 other variables reflecting the broader economic, social, cultural, and political aspects of the development process. Determinants and consequences are considered here one by one, although this violates the reality that they do not operate independently and can be understood and interpreted only in a larger context. To proceed otherwise, however, would be to enter into the morass of everything being related to everything else. In any case, this review must be cursory and selective.

DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY

Infant mortality

Typically, declines of fertility have been preceded by declining mortality. In many LDCs, however, mortality has declined markedly but fertility has declined very little or, as in some African countries, has even risen. But instances of major fertility decline in the absence of mortality reduction are so rare in the LDCs that many believe the reduction of infant and child mortality may be virtually a precondition for substantial reductions in fertility. Mortality decline appears to be leveling off in many LDCs at what are still unacceptable levels, and this phenomenon makes the current groundswell for primary health care for the poor all the more important. It seems reasonable to believe that improved health care will eventually encourage some decline in fertility.

There remain many unanswered questions, however. Little is known about the determinants of the length of the lag between mortality and fertility decline and the resulting effect on population growth rates (Preston, 1975, 1978; Schultz, 1976). Although there is more evidence for than against the proposition that decreases in infant and child mortality will be followed by fertility decline, such factors as family income, education, and economic growth affect both fertility and infant mortality and probably distort the results of attempts to measure the direct relationship between the two. In East and Southeast Asia, for example, perhaps the one ubiquitous element in all the regions where fertility has declined rapidly is that the decline has been preceded by a substantial decline in infant and child mortality. But then infant mortality has also declined in most regions where fertility has not declined. It appears that a decline in infant mortality may be a necessary precondition for sustained fertility decline but not a sufficient one (Jones, 1978:32).

Education

Perhaps the most widely accepted generalization is that of the inverse relationship between education and fertility. Nevertheless, the evidence seems to indicate that education may cause fertility to increase or decrease (Cochrane, 1979:9–10). The decrease is greater for the education of women than of men and in urban than rural areas. But education is more likely to increase fertility in countries with the lowest level of female literacy. It is possible that education initially increases the ability to have live births, probably through better nutrition, improved health, and departure from traditional patterns of lactation and postpartum abstinence. Initially, this effect seems to be strong enough to counteract the effect of education on the postponement of marriage. In societies with higher average levels of female literacy, education lowers the demand for children by altering their perceived costs and benefits. It is likely that education should be viewed as more often contributing its influence less directly than has been portrayed in the literature, since it seems to operate and mediate through and with other factors, as is the case with the other determinants of fertility (Graff, 1979:134).

Value and costs of children

The proposition that fertility tends to respond to shifts in the balance of costs and benefits involved in having children has met with fairly wide agreement (Miro and Potter, 1980:96). Some of the elements that enter into this calculus for individuals and families are the opportunity costs attached to time spent by parents and others in childrearing; direct costs such as those arising from expenditures on food, clothing, and education; and the economic and psychosocial benefits. Much of the work has been done by economists employing the "household economics" approach, but there has also been a series of psychosocial studies of the value of children, which have yielded useful insights about the role that children play in their parents' lives (Bulatao, 1979a, 1979b).

These psychosocial studies focus on the transition in the value of children, i.e., on changes in the values and disvalues that parents attach to children. In some sense children become less valuable, but they also become valued for different reasons and the burdens they impose on their parents are altered not just quantitatively but also qualitatively (Bulatao, 1979b: 1). The principal findings of this work include the documentation of a direct relationship between a high level of perceived economic utility of children and high fertility, and as this perceived utility begins to vanish, the productive value of children for parents declines. Although it is argued that a central reason for the decline from high to low fertility rates is this transition in the value of children, the question of which development factors cause specific changes in values and disvalues of children involves a complex process that has not been addressed by these studies (Ibid.: 53).

A recent analysis of the economic value of children in rural areas of Bangladesh focuses specifically on their value as insurance against economic risk (Cain and Lieberman, 1982). The study depicts the harshness and diversity of the risk environment there and the absence of effective forms of insurance. It is argued that a direct attack on the risk-insurance-fertility nexus is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for a substantial fertility decline in rural Bangladesh (Ibid.: 27). The principal recommendation offered is that the Bangladesh government reorganize and reconstitute its employment-generating initiatives as a guaranteed employment scheme offering secure income-earning opportunities to all in need.

Status and employment of women

The best answer that can be given to the question of whether the fertility of working women is lower than that of nonworking women is maybe (Kupinsky, 1977:369). There is no consistent pattern in the LDCs (or for that matter in the DCs) among all subgroups of working women. Such factors as the status of women in a given society; the normative orientation toward women working, particularly in nonfamilial, nonagricultural occupations; the nature and type of occupations women engage in; their identification or commitment to their worker role; the societal norms regarding childbearing and family size; and the attitude toward and availability of inexpensive mother substitutes and daycare centers to mitigate role conflicts—all play a role as part of the general economic, social, and psychological setting affecting the fertility of working and nonworking women.

A review of studies on female work status and fertility in Latin America showed no consistent inverse relationship between female labor force participation and fertility (Davidson, 1977:351–52). The inverse relationship was fairly predominant in large cities but virtually absent in small towns. The important factors related to female labor force participation were education, the number and ages of children, husband's income, the type of family (nuclear versus extended), urban-rural status of the community, and the stage of economic development of the country.

It has been observed (Ahooja-Patel, 1977:83) that in the great development dialogue the principal protagonists have successfully omitted any reference to the place of women in the development process. The human and economic costs of this neglect are particularly high in many areas of the developing world, especially in rural areas. If the basic-needs approach is to have any genuine effectiveness for rural women, it will have to open up redistribution of land and other assets for women as well as men beyond the level of the domestic unit and provide equitable economic and occupational opportunities for women (Palmer, 1977). Improving women's opportunities for education, ownership of assets, and participation in rural development on equal terms with men (as well as access to the full range of jobs in the urban sector), like reducing infant mortality, has its own justification; but adding the fertility-reduction potential to such projects increases the benefits of the projects relative to their given costs.

Family planning programs

There has been an ongoing debate on the question of whether family planning programs reduce fertility more efficiently and effectively than general development programs. Given the difficulty of controlling for the effect of changes apart from family planning, such as increases in income, in occupational structure, and in education, the question cannot be answered definitively. Some studies, within-country and comparative, indicate that family planning programs have influenced fertility declines in addition to the effects of development, but it is probable that such programs are effective only where there has been at least some developmental change. Socioeconomic development has facilitated contraceptive practice. Once the motivation to practice family planning is present, availability of means through large-scale programs can accelerate fertility decline. The effectiveness of family planning programs thus is closely associated with the level of development reached by a country. They are probably most effective in countries that have reached a medium or intermediate level of development. At lower levels, motivation and demand are not strong enough among the highest fertility groups for programs to reach them, whereas at more advanced levels of development fertility is likely to decline in any case (Urzua, 1978:83; Freedman, 1978:616–20).

Income distribution

At the most general level, all the evidence seems to point toward the proposition that fertility will decline as economic and social development bring improved well-being to the poor majorities in the developing countries, which decades of economic growth have failed to do. But the idea that income itself can have a direct relationship to fertility has been difficult to test (Simon, 1976; Ridker, 1979:xiv). Even if there is a causal relationship, could it operate with sufficient strength and speed to justify a policy of income redistribution? Clearly, there are other justifications as well for implementing such a policy, which have been already noted.

A recent, well-documented analysis of the relationship between income distribution and fertility places the argument on somewhat more secure ground (Repetto, 1979). The study documents the contribution of economic inequality to rapid population growth through its effect on birth rates. It shows that a more unequal distribution of income within a community implies a higher aggregate birth rate and a faster rate of population growth than elsewhere, and that for a community at any level of development, as measured by average income per capita or some similar index, the overall birth rate will be lower the more equally distributed that total income is. Societies in which economic gains are limited to a small elite, while the vast majority lead marginal lives of insecurity and deprivation, display high fertility. Any fertility declines under these conditions are usually concentrated within the small fraction of the population that has received most of the economic benefits so that they do little to reduce the rate of population growth in the society as a whole. At low levels of income, increases in living standards result in rapid fertility declines, whereas at higher levels there may be little change in fertility and possibly some increase. So it is impossible to refer generally to the effect of economic improvements on birth rates. The point is that the economic status of those who experience the improvement is a key determinant of that effect. The effect of income growth on birth rates depends on who gets the income; that is, it is the distribution of income that matters.

The principal proposition to which Repetto's work is oriented, namely, that reductions in income inequality induce declines in fertility, has been rejected by one writer on the basis that the evidence presented is not convincing (Boulier, 1982). Even though the question of how and to what extent fertility responds to income redistribution programs still remains to be answered, however, the analysis just described does establish the importance of the problem and lays the groundwork for further research on this issue.

CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH

Health

High fertility rates have an immediate effect on costs of health services. since obstetric and pediatric care constitute a large part of total demand for health services (Birdsall, 1977:69). Nevertheless, rapid population growth is by no means the only cause of inadequate health care. In most LDCs, the physician/hospital/high-technology approach to health care has limited such care largely to urban elites. Given the powerful commitment of the medical profession to this approach, health services do not reach or are inaccessible to a large proportion of the population in need, perhaps as much as 80 to 85 percent. Services are sparse in rural areas and urban slums largely as a result of a gross maldistribution of facilities and personnel. Health care systems in most LDCs (and DCs as well) are dominated by physicians and fail to make optimal use of other health personnel. And a poor balance exists between curative and preventive care, since curative, hospital-based, high-technology medicine in urban areas is usually dominant.

In view of these conditions, reforms in health care delivery might yield as much improved health as would an immediate reduction in demand due to lower population growth rates. Instead of services for only a limited number, a shift to a primary health care approach could provide coverage for those large proportions of the population in need (Simmons, 1982). Such an approach would include the following components: major participation by the community to be served, with some of the needed resources mobilized by the community; orientation to specific locations in the sense of designing the program to fit the actual circumstances of different communities; involvement of paramedical personnel of appropriate kinds; inclusion of other elements besides medical care, such as nutrition, water supply, health education, immunization, and specific therapies; emphasis on maternal and child health, including family planning; and linkages to a broader array of development efforts in education and agriculture and other income-producing activities. Both reduction of fertility and adoption of a primary health care approach (which in itself would help to reduce fertility) are indicated if the benefits of development are to be reaped by all.

Education

Population growth creates greater strains in education than in almost any other development sector (Cassen, 1976:812–13). The age distribution in LDCs generates very high population proportions of school age. Expenditures on education have risen sharply in most LDCs. In most developing countries the contribution of population growth to the increase in recurrent costs of primary education over a 20-year period has been estimated to be on the order of 50 to 70 percent, and higher if capital costs are added (Jones, 1975:81). Current high fertility virtually insures more children entering the schools in the future. The single most important factor in increasing educational expenditures is the absolute increase in the number of students; but associated factors, such as an increase in the number of teachers and their rising wages, as well as extra facilities, also elevate costs. In view of the scarcity of available resources, it is likely that rapid expansion of an educational system will be at the expense of upgrading quality or even result in lower standards. Costs can be contained to some extent by increasing student-teacher ratios and decreasing the number of years students are enrolled, but these moves dilute whatever quality of education school systems are trying to maintain (Birdsall, 1977:69). The inhibiting effects of age structure on future educational development would be substantially mitigated if a rapid decline in fertility could be accomplished.

Food

Like most of the other relationships being considered, that between population growth and food supply is complex, and long-range projections of the supply of and demand for food are beset by such uncertainties as income changes, changes in agricultural technology, the variations in agricultural conditions around the world, and the political plausibility of redistribution. Viewed globally, food supplies can probably match the rate of growth of population for a long time to come, even with current technology (Cassen, 1976:809). This global picture owes much to the capacity of the DCs, taken as a whole, to generate surpluses for export. But in the absence of marked improvements in food production in the LDCs, that capacity may not be much of a help. Increasing population will result in more demand for food, and the LDCs will be forced to import larger amounts. Estimates of the probable amounts of these imports vary but range up to more than 100 million tons per year by 1990, a cost of about $20 billion a year (Murdoch, 1980:132–33). Large imports of food cause a severe drain on the limited foreign exchange that many of the poorest LDCs can earn and constitute a serious impediment to their economic growth. The balance between food and population is also more precarious than the global picture suggests because food production around the world fluctuates from year to year. Shortfalls in production in some years can cause greatly increased hardship, particularly when bad weather causes simultaneous reductions in various parts of the world.

As indicated earlier, food consumption by large sections of the population in all but the richest LDCs is well below what is needed for a minimally satisfactory diet. The underlying cause of hunger and malnutrition is that those who need food do not have the money to buy it or to produce it, not because supplies are inadequate in some absolute sense. An annual increase of 3.5 to 4 percent in food production in the LDCs is within physical and technical constraints and is also economically possible. Such a rate of increase would be large enough to meet the projected food needs of the LDCs and would facilitate rapid economic development. Even at such high growth rates, however, a redistribution of income would be needed to reduce malnutrition significantly as well as to facilitate reduction of fertility (Stedman, 1978–79:409–10).

Labor absorption

Rapid population growth is no more directly responsible for unemployment in the LDCs than it is for hunger and malnutrition. Unemployment and underemployment can be attributed to inadequate access by the poor to public services, to education, and to productive assets, which in turn depends on the inequities at which poverty-focused development approaches are aimed (Cassen, 1976:811). Even if basic-needs policies can be implemented, rapid population growth still makes the task of creating productive employment that much harder. But such policies could moderate the negative effect of rapid population growth to the extent that they would promote the development of appropriate labor-intensive technology for production, expand irrigation to permit more intensive use of land, and reorient industrialization to serve the goals of a national development strategy that will serve the needs of all sectors of the population. In the absence of such changes, rapid population growth will continue to play a part in confining a large proportion of the rural and urban labor force to low-productivity, low-wage jobs (Birdsall, 1977:69–70).

Income distribution

As indicated earlier, although income distribution and redistribution are now a prominent issue in the development dialogue, the influence of fertility change on distribution problems has received little attention. But the relationship may be a critical one in coping with the problems of economic development (Cassen, 1976:811–12). There are at least two kinds of effects of rapid population growth on income distribution—those that affect overall economic growth and thus differentially affect different income groups, and those that result from differential fertility and mortality among income groups and thus directly affect their income-earning prospects and the numbers who depend on those incomes. The first effect evidently has a negative impact on income distribution. As noted, rapid population growth exacerbates the problem of providing adequate educational and health services, which adversely affects the poor more than the rich, who have access to private educational and health services. It can also be argued that the effect of higher fertility among the rural poor may force them to subdivide their land (if they have any) and make them more vulnerable to losing it altogether.

High fertility increases the inequality of income distribution among families (Birdsall, 1977:76–77). Less educated and lower-income parents are more likely than others to have large families; and to the extent that there are economic and social restrictions on upward mobility, the relatively more rapid increase in numbers of the poor can adversely affect efforts at income redistribution. If the norm of large family size persists in future generations, the poverty associated with such large families is likely to be perpetuated and to exacerbate the difficulties of implementing poverty-focused development policies.

Given the paucity of both theory and empirical research in this area, however, convincing generalizations are still not within reach. The effects of demographic factors on income distribution, and vice versa, are mixed and inadequately understood. Although it does appear that higher fertility is associated with greater economic inequality, it is not clear whether the direction of causation is from fertility to inequality (Rodgers, 1978:315). The reverse causation may be just as likely, as indicated by the analysis reported in the discussion of income distribution as a determinant of fertility.

CONCLUSIONS

This overview of poverty-focused development perspectives, of the requirements for their implementation, and of the interrelations between population and development has yielded no easy solutions to the problems of choosing between alternative policy options. It would seem that the social scientists giveth with one hand and taketh away with the other. The effects of population change on a country's development efforts and how such efforts are likely to affect population change are still beset with many unresolved questions, the answers to which will differ from country to country. Nevertheless, a substantial knowledge base has been generated that points to recurrent significant linkages between population and development factors that can provide useful guidelines for the work that needs to be done to clarify these relationships at national and regional levels, and those guidelines can be operationally useful in national development planning and policy making.

At the general level, there are just too many factors that might make a difference one way or the other (Miro and Potter, 1980:100). Policy-relevant research has to be country-specific (McNicoll and Nag, 1982:10; Urzua, 1978:129; Jones, 1978:85–86). Even when the same problem is analyzed in more than one country, it cannot be assumed that social, economic, and political factors will have exactly the same effect in each country. Quite different levels and kinds of development are associated with fertility reductions in, say, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America (Kirk, 1971:145–46).

Going beyond population policy to the issues of development policy, one finds similar uncertainties. The LDCs cannot be viewed as a homogeneous group. They are diverse in their past and present economic performance, social structure and cultural traditions, political arrangements, infrastructure, availability of natural resources, and thus in their prospects for future development. The factors that are most significant in determining the course of development vary from country to country. Answers to policy questions will require identifying the particular mix of these factors that have to be manipulated if goals of national development are to be achieved, whatever a country decides those goals should be (Jones, 1978:25–26).

For the most part, decisions about what research on population problems is undertaken rest largely with individual social scientists pursuing their own disciplinary interests, and relatively little attention is given to the needs of development planners and policy-makers. In undertaking country-specific research and to insure that it has policy relevance, there is a need to bring to the planners and policy-makers an understanding of what is already known that is of policy relevance, to engage them with researchers in a common effort to identify the key questions that are researchable and need to be answered, and to provide policy-makers with continuing consultation, based on the best available knowledge, of what options may be open to them, together with the anticipated effects, as they engage in the decision-making process (Simmons and Saunders, 1975:16–17).

One way to facilitate the systematic consideration of population factors in national economic and social development planning and programming has been to set up a unit in the planning apparatus of government staffed by researchers who can work continually on analyses of current planning and policy issues and give planners and policy-makers relatively quick and specific answers to their questions. Such researchers should also be able to provide policy-makers with a range of alternative policy options and estimates of probable outcomes of the alternative policies, both for population and for development objectives (Ibid.:17–18; Saunders, 1978:17). Several Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, already have established population units in their national development planning agencies; and others, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines, are in the process of creating such units (Population Council, 1980:1). As would be expected, each country has defined the location and role of the unit in its own way, but all of the units have the common problem of limited staff capacity, so that staff development is a critical need. It is to be hoped that these institutional arrangements will foster a mutual learning process—to help planners see the relevance of population to their problems and researchers to understand better the constraints under which planners and policy-makers operate. Researchers will have to learn how the world looks to policy-makers and to take into account their perceptions and values, as well as to be critical of planners' assumptions if those assumptions are at odds with demographic realities (Simmons and Saunders, 1975: 17).

Development policies that seek to reduce poverty and population policies aimed at reducing fertility go hand in hand. It is extremely unlikely that social science research will eventually identify any fundamental solutions to the problem of reducing fertility that would not involve major social and economic structural change as well (Miro and Potter, 1980: 192). Recent analyses of what has happened to absolute poverty in the LDCs over the last 20 years indicate that there are absolutely more poor people; whether the proportion is larger is less certain (Streeten, 1978: 242).[5] A wide variety of explanations has been offered as to why this is so. Development policies obviously play a part; but the social and political structure, cultural traditions, the extent of human capital formation (especially education), the distribution of assets (particularly land), and foreign trade all influence the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction, although the relative importance of each of these elements is uncertain (Ibid.). Many of these factors are also related to fertility reduction; and if better health and the reduction of infant mortality, more productive employment, and higher status of women are added, the determinants of fertility and of poverty are fairly well subsumed.

Attainment of these objectives of development may indeed facilitate reduction of fertility, but they are not in themselves a sufficient condition for such a reduction in the short run (Coale, 1978–79:41). As has been indicated, the uncertainties that becloud the nature of the relationships between fertility and its determinants and the unresolved question of the length of lags between changes in these determinants and the occurrence of fertility decline do not evoke much confidence in the slogan that development by itself is the best contraceptive. The objectives of poverty-focused development strategies must be assiduously pursued in any case, of course, since they are desirable in their own right. Their attainment will all be made easier by the reduction of fertility, however, so there is an imperative need to move ahead in evaluating and improving policy measures that can be undertaken for the specific purpose of reducing fertility in the short run. These measures include family planning programs and their interactions with other aspects of social change; the incorporation of family planning programs into other development programs, such as health, rural development, and education, where this may enhance the effectiveness of family planning; the use of incentives; and other interventions that may have more immediate fertility-reducing effects. (The interest in "restructuring development" to maximize fertility reduction has not, however, yielded any useful policy measures as yet.)

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[5] According to the World Bank report cited earlier (International Bank, 1980:35), the proportion of people in absolute poverty in LDCs as a group is estimated to have fallen during the past two decades (although probably not in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s). But because population has grown, the number of people in absolute poverty has increased.

Final observations require noting that a number of relevant important areas and issues have not been considered in this discussion at all. Their inclusion in this paper would make its length prohibitive, but at least some of them may be listed.

Internal migration, its determinants and consequences, and their links to national development strategy constitute a problem area perhaps equal in importance to that of fertility. It is a reasonable proposition that the goals of development strategy in a country ultimately determine the spatial distribution of the population and changes in that distribution. If the principal goals include making the best use of natural and human resources where they are to be found and reducing the disparities in access to the benefits of development both between social classes and the rural and urban sectors, then it will be necessary to implement policy measures aimed at eliminating the urban bias and rural neglect that characterize so many developing countries. As indicated earlier, this should not be construed as downgrading the need for industrialization in countries that have the capacity for it. On the contrary, employment-oriented rural development is required to facilitate industrial development.

Mobilizing popular participation and community-level action programs is a critical area for attention if poverty-focused development strategies are going to work (International Labour Office, 1977:66, 69; Cassen, 1978a:5–6; Ghai and Alfthan, 1977:20 ff.). Not only is it necessary to reallocate existing patterns of expenditure for public services in favor of the poor, but also giving them proper access to the necessary resources to help them meet their own needs more fully will lower the costs of poverty-reduction programs. Moreover, popular participation is both an efficient means of achieving basic-needs targets and a worthy goal in itself for the fulfillment of human potential. The government must provide services, but it should balance such welfare by giving people the opportunity to learn to help themselves and each other. Popular participation and community-level action constitute a complex area for development efforts; even so, it is at that level that development and population change must be based. Much more needs to be known about how the commitment of local people can be mobilized and their participation secured and strengthened, and how local programs can be incorporated into national development efforts and linked effectively to larger networks of resources and economic relations.

Finally, a few words are needed about the imposing political and other constraints on the implementation of poverty-focused development strategies. Much has been written in the development literature about the need for equitable distribution of the benefits of development, but little about how the DCs and LDCs alike might generate the political will and determination to initiate and implement the changes that are required to obtain that equitable distribution. Nor has the increase in expressions of concern in the literature for the poorest groups in the poorest countries been matched by a parallel increase in the number of LDC programs effectively aimed at that poverty (Garcia-Bouza, 1980:47).

At the international level, foreign aid, under proper conditions, can assist development, but the DCs have also hindered development, through adverse trading arrangements, the transfer of inappropriate technology, the negative fallout from the operations of multinational corporations, and, on occasion, even direct opposition to desirable political change. Until DC governments do more to eliminate these hindrances, their expressions of concern about the persistence of world poverty will have little credibility.

Within the LDCs, it is evident that restructuring political and economic power relationships is a prerequisite for effective implementation of a poverty-focused development strategy. The provision of welfare services and transfers of income and resources are a necessary but not sufficient condition because they will not definitively eliminate the underlying causes of poverty (Griffin and Khan, 1978:303).

The real solution lies in structural change, in changing the distribution of productive wealth and thus the distribution of economic power, and in increasing the participation of the poor in decision-making and thus enabling them to exercise political power. Some governments, dominated by entrenched elites, will relinquish nothing to the poor until they are forced to by revolution, whereas others are already engaged in attacking the causes of poverty. In many, probably most, developing countries the political decision to allow the poor to share power with those groups that are already powerful seems at least plausible, through reformist tactics and initiation of a pragmatic process of tradeoffs (Bell, 1974:71–72).[6] In some countries, it is likely that vigorous pursuit of such strategies will not be easily forthcoming, but the pressure of events may finally compel recognition that sharing power may indeed be the only way to retain it.

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[6] Incremental approaches of this kind are advocated here only because of the need to design selective and flexible strategies that have the best chance of coping with adverse political reactions likely to be elicited by the introduction of policies aimed at redistributing economic and political power to include the poor. But this should not be construed as minimizing the need for a "package" approach aimed at genuine change in the condition of the poor through a concerted effort on a variety of fronts simultaneously if the objectives of poverty-focused development perspectives are to be realized.

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